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FROM THE EDITORS
Chinese island-building and related activities in the South China Sea continue to 
foster instability in the region and to pose a major challenge to the United States 
and its friends and allies there. In a speech delivered recently at Chatham House 
in London, Peter A. Dutton spells out the implications of these developments and 
makes the case that they are altering in a fundamental way the strategic environ-
ment of Southeast Asia. Peter Dutton is director of the China Maritime Studies 
Institute at the Naval War College.
In “Panning for Gold: Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary 
Sources,” Ryan D. Martinson provides a valuable service to researchers attempt-
ing to make sense of the vast and growing body of Chinese-language publications 
relating to naval and maritime strategy. Cautioning that it may be a mistake to 
presume too much strategic purpose and coherence in the activities of the many 
Chinese government agencies and officials with responsibilities in this area, he 
argues that important insights nevertheless can be gleaned from this literature by 
weighing carefully the relative authoritativeness of authors and the institutions 
with which they are associated. Ryan Martinson is a research associate of the 
China Maritime Studies Institute.
There seems to be no clear end in sight to the “long war” in the Middle East 
that has engaged this country for the last fifteen years. It is all the more important 
that the United States improve its ability to assess the changing fortunes of con-
flict and make timely adjustments to its military strategy and operations. In “Stra-
tegic Assessment and Adaptation: Reassessing the Afghanistan Surge Decision,” 
Francis G. Hoffman offers a careful analysis of the shortcomings of our current 
approach to the admittedly difficult art of assessment, with particular emphasis 
on the need for a sharper focus on the strategic level and factors such as domestic 
politics and other international players. Frank Hoffman is a research analyst with 
the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
Zinaida Bechná and Bradley A. Thayer address an aspect of the Chinese chal-
lenge to fundamental American interests today that has been seriously neglected. 
In “NATO’s New Role: The Alliance’s Response to a Rising China,” they warn that 
the United States cannot expect its NATO partners to stand shoulder to shoulder 
with it in opposing China’s newfound willingness to upset the strategic status quo 
in East Asia. Europeans do not perceive China as a military threat to themselves 
6905_FromTheEditors.indd   3 6/9/16   3:42 PM
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and are eager to do business with the People’s Republic, while China very likely 
sees opportunities to play off the allies against us. Bechná and Thayer argue per-
suasively that the United States needs to make a concerted effort to strengthen 
NATO’s commitment to the norms of the liberal international order and to enlist 
the alliance proactively to deter Chinese adventurism in the region.
In “The Destruction of Convoy PQ17: 27 June–10 July 1942,” Milan Vego 
analyzes a largely forgotten naval battle of World War II that took place off the 
coast of northern Norway. The devastating German attack on a convoy of Allied 
merchant ships carrying arms to the Soviet Union via the Barents Sea caused the 
suspension of these operations for several months, with potentially dire conse-
quences for the larger war effort against the Nazis. Milan Vego is professor of 
joint military operations at the Naval War College.
IF YOU VISIT US
Our editorial offices are now located in Sims Hall, in the Naval War College 
Coasters Harbor Island complex, on the third floor, west wing (rooms W334, 
335, 309). For building-security reasons, it would be necessary to meet you at 
the main entrance and escort you to our suite—give us a call ahead of time (401-
841-2236).
6905_FromTheEditors.indd   4 6/9/16   3:42 PM
9
War College: Summer 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
Address by Peter Dutton at Chatham House, London, U.K.,  
16 February 2016
A MARITIME OR CONTINENTAL ORDER FOR 
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTH CHINA 
SEA?
Since the sixteenth century, Southeast Asia has been open to maritime trade 
and political engagement, advanced and supported by naval and other military 
power� Although historical evidence demonstrates that international trade oc-
curred prior to that time, often robustly, at various times Chinese imperial 
leaders sought to dominate the economic, political, and security elements of the 
region� During these periods, Southeast Asia fell under the sway of China’s vast 
continental power and whatever naval power-projection capacities emperors 
built to augment it� At times, to serve the security and stability requirements of 
the dynasty, Chinese emperors sought to control or curtail regional trade� During 
these periods, Chinese continental power overwhelmed that of any regional state 
or combination of states, and therefore the primary locus of strategic action was 
continental� That is, China’s land power and subsidiary naval forces were the pri-
mary determiners of the region’s economic, political, and security order� With the 
introduction of superior Western naval technologies in the nineteenth century, 
however, the locus of strategic power in Southeast Asia shifted to the maritime 
domain, where it largely has remained since� This shift enabled seapower—
eventually joined by power-projection capacities of airpower, space power, and 
cyber power—to ensure the South China Sea, and Southeast Asia more broadly, 
remained an integral component of an open, global, liberal, maritime order�
Today, China’s land power is once again ascendant in the region in the form 
of missile, air, space, and cyber forces, augmented by a growing naval capability� 
Accordingly, the future locus of strategic power in the South China Sea—mari-
time or continental—is in play� So too may be the degree to which Southeast 
Asia, and especially continental Southeast Asia, will have freedom to choose 
trade and engagement policies without Beijing’s imprimatur� My central thesis is 
that China’s advances into the South China Sea pose a challenge to the capacity 
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of naval and other power-projection forces to ensure an open economic and po-
litical regional order� In particular, China’s island building in the Spratly Islands 
creates a significant new strategic challenge to the open, global, liberal, maritime 
order in Southeast Asia�
Many have asked, what are the strategic implications of China’s island-building 
program in the South China Sea, and why has America reinvigorated its freedom- 
of-navigation program to begin to address it?
Much has been made of American freedom-of-navigation operations in the 
South China Sea over the past few months� As I see it, the purpose of the U�S� 
freedom-of-navigation program is to support the maintenance of a rules-based 
international order at sea� Some Americans assume that this maritime order ex-
ists on its own, that the security, economic benefits, and political stability that 
flow from this order exist without any effort from us, like the oxygen we breathe� 
This is simply not the case� The maritime order that has promoted global eco-
nomic growth since 1945 and the peaceful expansion of state interests into the 
oceans of the world since 1982 is an order that was created and must be tended� 
This order is expressed through a structure of international law and institutions, 
such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the customary law the 
convention reflects� But law never exists in a vacuum� Law exists because the 
sovereign authority of states establishes it, and it persists primarily because the 
power of states reinforces and sustains it� Thus, there is a fundamentally im-
portant correlation between law and power� Law cannot exist without power to 
reinforce it� And power without the limits of law is mere tyranny� This is as true 
at sea as it is on land� So the purpose of the freedom-of-navigation program, as I 
see it, is to marry American power with international law in order to reinforce the 
rights and obligations and the freedoms and duties that comprise international 
law of the sea�
Do these purposes serve only America’s narrow interests? Certainly not� The 
global maritime system that was created in part through American leadership 
has produced secure oceans and tremendous growth in trade and national wealth 
around the world� Nowhere is this truer than in Asia, where several of the world’s 
largest economies reside� True, the rules that govern international behavior in 
the maritime domain provide great security, stability, and wealth for the United 
States� But they have served the countries of Asia equally well� The objectives 
that freedom-of-navigation operations seek to achieve can be summed up in one 
simple word: access� Free access—that is, free use of the maritime domain, for 
all countries, to the fullest extent allowed under international law of the sea—is 
the essential component of an open regional order in every quarter of the globe�
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   6 6/8/16   3:57 PM
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What is the essence of an open regional order? An open regional order is one 
that is freely accessible to all countries—according to their interests and their 
capacities—for the purposes of economic and political engagement� An open 
region is one that is free of the irresistible gravitational pull of any one power� An 
open region is one in which regional states are free to pursue their economic and 
political interests and are not bound to accede to the demands of their strongest 
neighbor� Such freedom from undue political and economic influence is what 
makes a state truly free�
Since the very earliest days of the American republic, the nation’s leaders 
certainly have seen free economic access to other regions of the world as a vital 
interest worth defending, with force if necessary� Economic access includes the 
right to undertake free commercial trade, finance, banking, direct investment, 
and government-to-government support; in short, free economic access involves 
the full range of economic activities available to all countries� One objective of 
the freedom-of-navigation program, therefore, is to ensure the oceans remain 
open to support the full range of economic activities in which countries and their 
citizens engage�
Imagine the damage that could be done to the economies of smaller states 
if they were forced to limit their economic policies to the preferences of the 
region’s strongest state� History demonstrates that when one power dominates a 
region, other states have fewer and fewer political and economic choices� This is 
especially true when political issues become sharp� Disputes over territory and 
resources are certainly among those that tend to become sharp� The dominant 
state will use its economic monopoly to force other states to accept the political 
outcome it prefers� Thus, a state’s freedom to pursue its own economic choices 
is a component of political independence� Accordingly, as I see it, ensuring free 
political access is a second American vital interest that is also an objective of the 
freedom-of-navigation program�
Third, ensuring American security and regional maritime stability is also an 
objective of the freedom-of-navigation program� History has shown that the 
world never has been stable politically for long, and supporting national security 
and international stability still requires the influence of naval power, which can 
only be wielded through access to the oceans� About naval power’s ability to ad-
dress inter-state instability, more than three decades ago the American statesman 
and ambassador Elliot Richardson stated, “[T]he classical uses of sea power have 
assumed fresh importance� � � � To back up friends, to warn potential enemies, 
to neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, to exert influence in 
ambiguous situations, to demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable 
force—all these are tasks that naval power is uniquely able to perform�” Although 
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that statement was written during the Cold War, it is as relevant to the world we 
live in today as it was then, and as it was in the generations that preceded it�
Today, there are many ways in which the maritime rights and interests of 
smaller states in East Asia are threatened� In light of these concerns, Ambassa-
dor Richardson’s words continue to have meaning as the United States seeks to 
guarantee free political and economic access in East Asia� To ensure the region’s 
freedom and full American access to the region, the U�S� Navy’s freedom-of- 
navigation program still helps to ensure that the United States can back up 
friends, warn potential enemies, neutralize military deployments by other pow-
ers, exert influence in ambiguous situations, and above all demonstrate resolve� 
These are especially important attributes of naval power in the highly charged 
atmosphere of the South China Sea today�
Given the context of military developments in the South China Sea, it should 
be increasingly clear that free economic access and free political access are under-
written by free security access—in this case, free naval access� In East Asia, where 
one regional state dominates land power, the presence of naval power ensures the 
existence of an overall military balance that guarantees an open regional order 
based on existing international laws, rules, principles, and norms� In short, naval 
power provides the foundation on which the region’s economic and political 
freedoms rest�
What in East Asia threatens these three freedoms—political, economic, and 
security—making renewed commitment to the American freedom-of-navigation 
program all the more important? First, in the South China Sea, China’s projec-
tion of its national power deeper into the maritime domain challenges the stable 
balance between land power and sea power that has up until now guaranteed 
a free, open, stable regional order in East Asia� All countries have a right to 
enhance national defense, and no one would deny that right to China� But cre-
ation of thousands of acres of new islands in the South China Sea—in a region 
that at least one state other than China claims as its continental shelf—followed 
by building on those islands the facilities necessary to project military power 
sufficient to dominate the other five regional claimants is, in my view, a major 
strategic event that heightens regional instability, threatens to increase the risk 
of military clashes, and, if not countered, has the tendency to remove the South 
China Sea from its place as a part of the global maritime commons by turning it 
into a strategic strait�
China’s island-building campaign has heightened regional instability because, 
by projecting its power farther into the South China Sea and closer to its neigh-
bors, it has weakened the ability of other states to support their territorial and 
resource zone claims and caused those states to shift their security postures� It 
is plain that other states in the region are beginning to work together to balance 
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China’s forward military presence in ways that were not occurring before this 
development� Some may think this balancing is being coordinated or directed 
by the United States� But balancing behavior against China’s power projection 
would be occurring with or without an American security presence in the region, 
since smaller states have an interest in maintaining their political and economic 
independence�
Indeed, during the years between about 1996 and 2009, as China’s economy 
was growing at annual rates often in the double digits, China’s relationship with 
its Southeast Asian neighbors was quite strong� China actively engaged its neigh-
bors economically and politically, but did not make any moves that challenged 
their security or their ability to maintain their island and resource claims� By 2009 
that began to change, and from 2012 to the present Chinese advances steadily un-
dermined both regional stability and the capacity of smaller states to maintain 
their claims to islands and resources in the South China Sea� Although all parties 
to the South China Sea disputes have built up existing islands to some degree, 
China’s island building is orders of magnitude greater than other states’ similar 
activities� Additionally, no other state has built large islands where no island pre-
viously existed at all� A final distinction is also very important� Coming from the 
largest power in the neighborhood by far, China’s actions have disproportionate 
effects� For these reasons, I reject the apologists who say China’s island building 
is no different from the activities of its neighbors� On the contrary, China’s island 
building in the Spratly Islands is the prime action that fundamentally changed 
regional political and security dynamics�
Some commentators focus on the statement by President Xi Jinping during 
his 2015 visit to Washington that China has no plan to militarize its newly built 
islands and their purpose is primarily to support civilian uses of the regional seas� 
We should all be looking forward to Chinese-provided public goods, but in the 
meantime remain clear-eyed about the military implications of the newly built 
islands� As a Financial Times article recently pointed out, “China has stepped up 
its construction of runways in the South China Sea since President Xi Jinping vis-
ited Washington in September, underscoring how U�S� efforts to counter China’s 
assertive stance there appear to be having little effect� Satellite images of Subi Reef 
and Mischief Reef � � � suggest that Beijing will soon complete two runways that 
will join a newly operational landing strip on a third reef called Fiery Cross in 
the contested waters�”
There are reports that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) maintains artil-
lery vehicles on the newly constructed islands� However, whether or not China 
further militarizes those islands, the construction on them of facilities capable of 
supporting military operations—which in some cases has already been complet-
ed and in others remains under way—gives China the capacity to militarize the 
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southern portion of the South China Sea rapidly� As the recent commercial test 
flights demonstrated, the islands can have fighter aircraft on them within about 
two hours� Thus, promises not to militarize the islands further are insufficient to 
undo the existing damage to regional stability�
In addition to causing regional instability, China’s island building weakens 
tactical stability during times of crisis and creates a critical new strategic dynamic 
in the South China Sea� Concerning the tactical situation, consider the EP-3 crisis 
in 2001 or the USNS Impeccable crisis in 2009� During each of these crises there 
was a reasonable buffer between the crisis itself and the possibility that one side 
or the other would use military force to resolve the issue� That buffer existed in 
part because in East Asia Chinese national defense capabilities were largely con-
tinental and American defense capabilities remained largely at sea� That calculus 
already has shifted somewhat as China deploys its naval forces more consistently 
farther from its shores� That calculus will change appreciably if China further 
militarizes the islands with missiles and airpower designed to deny access to the 
waters of the southern half of the South China Sea, as it is apparent the PLA can 
do within a short time�
How would crisis-management calculations about escalation and the use of 
force change if Chinese sea-denial assets were placed on the newly built islands? 
Military forces on small islands are similar to naval forces on platforms at sea, in 
that they are vulnerable to first use of force by other military forces in the region� 
Accordingly, in any crisis in the South China Sea between China and another 
country’s naval forces, each side would receive a benefit from the first use of 
force, since such preemption reduces tactical vulnerability� This dynamic was set 
in motion by China’s decision to build islands with military facilities on them� 
The effect of that decision—even if unintended—is to narrow the margin for 
tactical de-escalation in some future crisis� Thus, the political and military buffer 
between crisis and clash, or even conflict, is, in my view, narrowed dangerously�
Concerning the new strategic dynamic, China’s island building has the ten-
dency to turn the South China Sea into a strategic strait� In essence, it presents a 
situation for naval power much like a long Strait of Hormuz� How does the South 
China Sea, a body of water at least six hundred nautical miles wide, become a 
strait? If the Chinese place sea-denial military capabilities on the reclaimed is-
lands, the South China Sea becomes a body of water that can be controlled from 
the land territory of a single country� When Chinese bases remained in the north-
ern part of the South China Sea, it was clear they were defensive in nature and 
posed less of a threat to free movement of seapower in the South China Sea� But 
the new bases China has built on islands in the southern part of the South China 
Sea have military-sized runways, substantial port facilities, radar platforms, and 
space to accommodate military forces� The logical conclusion to draw from the 
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addition of these facilities to China’s preexisting mainland bases is that the coun-
try seeks the capability to dominate the waters of the South China Sea at will� 
Building the islands is therefore, in my view, a significant strategic event� These 
actions leave the potential for the South China Sea to become a Chinese strait 
rather than an open component of the global maritime commons�
Why do I say the South China Sea is in danger of becoming a strategic strait? 
The South China Sea has global strategic importance as part of the maritime 
commons because fully 50 percent of global maritime commerce passes through 
it, as do 90 percent of East Asian energy imports� The South China Sea is there-
fore a key artery sustaining the global economy� Additionally, it is a major east-
west pipeline for the flow of forces from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean 
and vice versa� If, during a time of political disagreement between China and 
other countries, the waterways of the South China Sea were threatened with clo-
sure, this would dampen seriously the ability of naval forces to—as Ambassador 
Richardson put it—back up friends, warn potential enemies, and exert influence�
This new reality in the South China Sea creates a new zone of competition 
between China and the United States, and requires the United States to behave 
differently� That is, the United States must demonstrate more openly and actively 
its resolve to use naval power to keep the region’s waters open and thereby to 
continue to underwrite the region’s economic and political freedoms�
What can be done to address the changes in the South China Sea? And will any 
American action be effective in changing the tide of growing Chinese power in 
the South China Sea?
There are at least four broad policy responses the United States can lead to 
improve the regional strategic trends in our favor� We can strengthen our own 
regional force posture; we can build the capacity of other regional states to sup-
port their own interests; we can reenergize like-minded states to reinforce the 
political, legal, and institutional power of the global maritime system; and we 
can undertake operational activities in the South China Sea to signal American 
determination to remain a meaningful part of an open regional order�
Will these policies be effective? If success depends on preventing Chinese ad-
vancement into the South China Sea, then our efforts probably will not be effec-
tive� The Chinese have demonstrated willingness to gain strategic space through 
nonmilitarized coercion, backed up by significant military and naval power, 
taking advantage of the fact that no party wants open conflict and leveraging the 
power of the great economic benefits China can bestow� These are hard forces to 
counter�
However, preventing Chinese advancement should not be the measure of 
success� The United States need not and should not undertake a containment 
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   11 6/8/16   3:57 PM
16
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/20
 1 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
strategy� Therefore the United States does not need to dominate Southeast Asia 
or the South China Sea� It needs only to prevent China from doing so� Such a 
strategy might be termed an access strategy—one that seeks to preserve eco-
nomic and political access underwritten by access for security purposes� Thus, if 
the objective is defined as maintaining access to—in Ambassador Richardson’s 
words—ensure seapower’s ability to back up friends, warn potential enemies, 
neutralize similar deployments by other naval powers, exert influence in ambigu-
ous situations, and demonstrate resolve through deployment of palpable force, 
then it is my view that the United States can develop affordable, effective policies�
Nonetheless, this is not a light undertaking� The United States already has 
policies that support some activities in each of the four categories mentioned 
above� Whether the nation chooses to do more is a matter that must be addressed 
systematically through the political process, because it will involve serious trade-
offs among domestic priorities and security concerns� The kind of strategic 
competition needed to maintain the maritime character of a major region of the 
globe is costly� Therefore we should engage in it only after a systematic review of 
our national interests, our specific objectives, the risks involved in various policy 
choices, and our policy trade-offs� The United States faces a strategic choice� We 
can compete to retain the maritime character of the region, or we can adapt to the 
reality of a region dominated by continental power� In my view, the open, global, 
liberal, maritime order that the United States helps lead is worth defending, since 
it has brought unprecedented wealth, political freedom, and security�
The American freedom-of-navigation program is a nonthreatening and neu-
tral demonstration that our country will not shirk this duty� But it is just a very 
small start of what must be an overarching strategy with clear goals and objec-
tives centered on maintaining political, economic, and security access� The most 
important objective will be to demonstrate that the United States will not retreat 
from the South China Sea, even as China advances� We must accept that a new 
zone of friction exists—and perhaps even create friction there when necessary to 
advance our own interests� Such friction will be necessary at times to reinforce 
the critical link that exists between power and law—a link that gives life and 
meaning to the law�
In closing, global maritime access and the security it provides, unlike the air 
we breathe, do not just exist as a state of nature� They must be established and 
then regularized through laws and institutions that support them� And then � � � 
they must be defended through political, economic, and military means when 
challenged�
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   12 6/8/16   3:57 PM
17
War College: Summer 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 D U T T O N  1 3
PETER DUTTON
Peter Dutton is a professor of strategic studies and the director of the China Mari-
time Studies Institute in the Center for Naval Warfare Studies of the Naval War 
College. He served in the Navy’s Judge Advocate General Corps and as a naval flight 
officer, retiring in 2006 with the rank of commander.
The opinions expressed herein are the personal views of the author and are not 
meant to represent the official views of the Department of the Navy or any other 
agency of the federal government. This text differs in very minor ways from that 
delivered at Chatham House.
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   13 6/8/16   3:57 PM
18
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/20
Rear Admiral P. Gardner Howe III is a native of Jack-
sonville, Florida. He was commissioned in 1984 fol-
lowing his graduation from the U.S. Naval Academy. 
He graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in 
1995 with a master of arts in national security af-
fairs (special operations / low-intensity conflict), and 
from the National War College in 2002 with a master 
of arts in national security.
Howe’s operational assignments have included a 
full range of duties in the Naval Special Warfare 
and Joint Special Operations communities. He com-
manded Naval Special Warfare Unit 3 in Bahrain; 
Naval Special Warfare Group 3 in San Diego, Cali-
fornia; and Special Operations Command, Pacific 
in Hawaii. His service overseas includes multiple 
deployments to the western Pacific and Southwest 
Asia, and participation in Operations Earnest 
Will, Provide Promise, Enduring Freedom, and 
Iraqi Freedom.
Howe is the fifty-fifth President of the U.S. Naval 
War College.
His key joint and staff assignments include cur-
rent operations officer at Special Operations Com-
mand, Pacific; Chief Staff Officer, Naval Special 
Warfare Development Group; assistant chief of staff 
for Operations, Plans and Policy at Naval Special 
Warfare Command; director of Legislative Affairs 
for U.S. Special Operations Command; and Assis-
tant Commanding Officer, Joint Special Operations 
Command.
19
War College: Summer 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
PRESIDENT’S FORUM
IN THIS PRESIDENT’S FORUM, I’d like to share some thoughts 
about a recent addition to my bookshelf: The Rules of the Game: 
Jutland and British Naval Command, by Andrew Gordon (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2013). At first glance, it looks like a rather obscure history book 
on the battle of Jutland. After reading it, however, I now see it as an astute study 
of command culture with important insights on professional military ethics. This 
is a book with which every member of the maritime profession of arms should 
spend time.
Before diving into the book and its lessons, let me explain how it got on my 
bookshelf.
One of the best parts of this assignment is the opportunity to meet with all 
the great leaders who visit the Naval War College over the course of a year. Last 
fall, General James Mattis, USMC (Ret.), was here in Newport for a lecture of 
opportunity, and I had a chance to speak with him prior to the lecture. We dis-
cussed the leader development challenge the Navy is addressing today: how best 
to prepare our leaders for naval warfare at sea, with near-peer competitors, in an 
age of precision strike, and in an increasingly complex operational environment.
When I asked whether he had any recommendations on books to read that 
might be relevant, he stated without hesitation: “Gardner, you have to read The 
Rules of the Game—it tells the story of what happened to Britain’s Royal Navy 
between Nelson at Trafalgar and Jellicoe at Jutland.”
With only a foggy knowledge of Jellicoe and the faintest understanding of the 
battle of Jutland, I responded with a hearty “Wilco, sir,” and we headed off to his 
lecture.
The Rules of the Game and Professional Military Ethics
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That night, I went home and ordered the book on Amazon. Three days later, 
the package arrived; I was ready to rip through the book and looked forward to 
its leadership lessons. Well, I opened the package and my jaw dropped—I saw this 
tome of a book, more than two inches thick and over seven hundred pages. My 
dreams of a quick read and quick lessons on leader development were dashed. 
But, motivated by the directness of General Mattis’s recommendation, I waded 
into the book. By the time I was finished, I knew I had read a seminal document 
with important implications for how I thought about the maritime profession of 
arms and the enduring ethical challenges our members face.
In the introduction, Gordon, a noted naval historian, explains that the book 
originated out of a simple disagreement with a retired naval officer about the 
appropriateness of the tactics the British employed at Jutland. In this discussion, 
Gordon suggested that, on meeting the German High Seas Fleet, the British 5th 
Battle Squadron either should have turned in succession immediately or turned 
all together, rather than turning in the delayed, in-succession manner in which 
it did. Gordon’s suggestion provoked such a strong response from his colleague 
that he decided to dive into his own primary-source research. Over the course 
of that research, Gordon’s focus shifted from the history of the battle and “could 
have / should have” questions to a detailed look at the command culture of the 
Royal Navy—more specifically, the changes in the command culture of the Royal 
Navy from Nelson at Trafalgar to Jellicoe at Jutland—and the key forces that 
drove those changes.
Shifting from Nelson’s Command Culture
The battle of Trafalgar was fought off the Spanish coast on 21 October 1805. In 
this most decisive naval engagement of the Napoleonic Wars, Nelson’s twenty-
seven ships went up against the thirty-three ships of the combined Spanish and 
French fleets. Twenty-two Spanish and French ships were lost, while the British 
didn’t lose a single ship.
The manner in which Nelson commanded during this battle sealed his legacy 
as an extraordinary combat leader. He focused his energy on setting conditions 
for success in battle well before the battle itself. He held frequent, face-to-face 
meetings with his commanders to ensure they had a common understanding of 
the situation, the enemy, and his intent. He encouraged initiative and empow-
ered his subordinate commanders at every level. Together, these actions allowed 
Nelson to execute decentralized operations effectively and succeed in combat. A 
master of what we now know as mission command, Nelson was a professional 
whose “greatest gift of leadership was to raise his juniors above the need of super-
vision” (Gordon, The Rules of the Game, p. 160).
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About halfway through the book, Gordon has a chapter titled “The Long Calm 
Lee of Trafalgar.” It’s here that Gordon moves away from the battle of Jutland itself 
and spends the next two-hundred-plus pages recounting the changes in British 
command culture, and the drivers of those changes, in the century between Tra-
falgar and Jutland.
In the aftermath of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy reigned supreme across the 
oceans of the world during a period of significant social and technological 
change. This period witnessed the rise of Victorian culture as Britain enjoyed 
prosperity and the ever-increasing spread of its empire. Gordon writes (p. 179), 
“The Victorians sought to structure and codify as many fields of behavior as pos-
sible in order to regulate their world, disarm the unpredictable, and perpetuate 
the status quo.” As William Manchester writes in The Last Lion, central to the Vic-
torian’s worldview was a “firm belief in obedience—absolute obedience to God, 
the Queen, and one’s superiors. . . . It was a time of pervasive authoritarianism 
. . . [and] [u]nquestioning submission to orders.”* The way to succeed in life, as in 
sport, was to play by the rules of the game—to comply with the established order. 
With some understanding, Gordon notes (p. 182) that “the tendency of the late 
Victorians to ritualize and regulate, and thereby ‘tokenize,’ warfare was perhaps a 
natural one for the world’s foremost territorial freeholder.”
This was also a period of significant technological change. As the Industrial 
Revolution progressed, ships’ propulsion transitioned from sail to steam and 
their weapons transitioned from cannon to guns. Gordon asserts (p. 183) that 
these changes resulted in a new era of seamanship for the Royal Navy, a “seaman-
ship of iron and steam,” in which “mathematics were subverting the art of centu-
ries and a vista of possibilities opened up for tightly choreographed geometrical 
evolutions—far beyond what had been possible with sailing fleets.”
Gordon argues (p. 182) that the combination of the social and technological 
changes during this period had a significant impact on the Royal Navy’s com-
mand culture. As they looked back to the legacy of Nelson and forward to the 
almost unlimited potential of controlled fleet actions, “the Victorians chose to 
extract the myth of the central genius directing the lovely obedient fleet with 
brilliance and precision.” Jutland would prove the shortcomings of this approach 
to command and control.
One interesting indicator of this authoritarian approach to command is the 
Royal Navy’s Signal Book, which Gordon calls (p. 183) “the supreme agent of 
centralization.” Dating from 1799, the Signal Book had been established before 
Nelson’s time, but what changed over this period was its size and role. In its early 
* William Manchester, The Last Lion, vol. 1, Visions of Glory 1874–1932 (New York: Random House, 
1983), p. 70.
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days, the Signal Book’s limitations were appreciated and its primary use was to 
supplement commander’s intent. At the end of the nineteenth century, how-
ever, it had grown to over five hundred pages in two volumes, and had become 
enshrined as the key enabler not only of fleet maneuvering but also of effective 
naval operations.
At the end of The Rules of the Game, Gordon acknowledges (p. 564) that the 
Grand Fleet achieved its strategic objective at Jutland: maintaining sea control 
and holding the threat of the German High Seas Fleet at bay. At the same time, 
however, he questions whether Jellicoe and the Royal Navy “gave Jutland their 
best shot.” Noting that “war is infinitely unpredictable in detail, nobody can ex-
pect to control it, and the power of a military force must include its capacity to 
respond rapidly and effectively to unscripted eventualities,” he states (p. 565) that 
Jellicoe’s “main fault was that ‘control’ was a contract he tried to make with fate; 
he feared losing it . . . and imposed a doctrinal regime which seemingly presumed 
to govern the very nature of war.” One has to wonder, Gordon implicitly ques-
tions, how World War I might have transpired if the Grand Fleet had operated 
with a decentralized command structure, clear commander’s intent, subordinate 
empowerment, and individual initiative.
As you can imagine, at seven hundred pages in length, there is much more to 
this book, including the following (p. 597): 
• The story of Vice Admiral Sir George Tyron that recounts his attempts to 
reinstill a Nelsonian and decentralized approach to operations, the Victoria-
Camperdown collision in 1893 that ended such efforts, and the resulting 
courts-martial that rewarded the members of the bridge team who, while 
knowing that the ordered maneuver was going to result in a collision, held 
fast to the culture of obedience and simply executed the order
• Gordon’s own lessons learned from the research, and his offering of twenty-
eight “syndromes” that impact maritime forces today
• Gordon’s discussion about “regulators and ratcatchers,” in which he points 
out that there is in peacetime a natural rise in the predominance of “regula-
tors,” and therefore there is a need to develop, deliberately and purposefully, 
“ratcatchers”: officers comfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity and ready 
to exercise initiative when appropriate
It’s important to highlight that The Rules of the Game is not without its critics. 
Some scholars of naval history see Gordon’s treatment of Jellicoe as too negative 
and too pro-Beatty, and opine that The Rules of the Game fails to give the Royal 
Navy full credit for its successful incorporation of emerging technology (efficient 
and reliable mechanical propulsion, central direction of gunnery, signals intel-
ligence, and wireless communications).
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Key Takeaways
Despite such critiques, this has become a very important book to me. I read it 
while clarifying what the profession of arms means to me; what my professional 
identity was—and what it should be; and how I should think about ethics in this 
framework. Within this context, The Rules of the Game spoke loudly. It chal-
lenged me to think more broadly about professional military ethics, far beyond 
the rules-based, compliance focus of ethics to which I had become accustomed 
over the course of my career.
The story of the Royal Navy in the nineteenth century pointed out to me that 
a profession’s identity, the culture that underpins it, is never static, but rather in 
a constant state of evolution. Left unattended, that culture will morph, and there 
is a natural tendency for bureaucratic attributes to dominate professional attri-
butes. As a result, members of the profession have an ethical responsibility never, 
never to take the profession’s identity for granted. We must assess the profession’s 
identity constantly and deliberately, then nurture and sustain the attributes that 
best serve the client—for us, the American people.
Additionally, I saw a cautionary tale for the U.S. Navy, with parallels between 
what Gordon described as the “long, calm lee of Trafalgar” and the U.S. Navy’s 
history since World War II. Reading and reflecting on The Rules of the Game 
made me realize that, as stewards of our profession, we have an ethical responsi-
bility to ensure that our Navy doesn’t fall prey to the potential for complacency 
and professional erosion in what could be described as our own “long, calm lee 
of Leyte Gulf.”
Finally, I saw a clear linkage between the key lessons of the book and our 
Navy’s “Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” The Design highlights the 
critical importance of decentralized operations to achieve success in a complex 
environment, and calls for our Navy to focus on being prepared for decentral-
ized operations. Trust and confidence are the critical enablers of decentralized 
operations. Bureaucratic organizations are characteristically low-trust and 
low-confidence organizations. Only an organization with a strong professional 
identity engenders the trust and confidence necessary to fight and win in a complex 
environment.
So, reading The Rules of the Game reinforced in me the idea that there is a 
war-fighting imperative that we view our Navy as a profession. Such a view isn’t 
an academic exercise or a purely theoretical construct; it has practical and op-
erational implications. As stewards of this profession, I see clearly that we have 
an ethical responsibility to ensure that our professional identity, including the 
attributes of our professional identity most essential for war fighting—integrity, 
accountability, initiative, and toughness—is never taken for granted, but rather 
constantly and deliberately developed, nurtured, and sustained.
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During the centenary anniversary of the battle of Jutland this year, I encourage 
all members of the U.S. Navy to read (or reread) The Rules of the Game, reflect 
on the experiences of the Royal Navy, and commit to strengthening our sense of 
professional identity.
P. GARDNER HOWE III
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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Assessing Chinese Maritime Strategy from Primary Sources
Ryan D. Martinson
PANNING FOR GOLD
 What are the drivers behind China’s vigorous pursuit of sea power? What are the interests Beijing seeks to advance by building a powerful blue-
water navy and the world’s largest coast guard? What are the principles that guide 
its use of sea power in pursuit of its national interest? How are China’s state objec-
tives, and approaches to pursuing them, evolving over time?
The answers to these questions are of obvious concern both to the states along 
China’s maritime periphery, many of which are party to maritime disputes with 
Beijing, and to external powers with major interests in East Asia, such as the 
United States� Increasingly, Chinese actions have important implications for 
other parts of the watery world, such as the Indian Ocean region, where China 
has maintained a constant naval presence since late 2008�1
Those seeking to gauge and define Chinese policy must be willing and able to 
draw on all available sources of information� Most fail to do so� The vast majority 
of analyses of China’s maritime strategy focus almost entirely on Chinese behav-
ior: what it has done, what it has built� In particular, most highlight a small num-
ber of events or cases from which they draw conclusions about Chinese strategy�
To be sure, Chinese actions are the best indicators of Chinese strategy� They 
reveal exactly what Chinese policy makers are willing to do� They provide raw 
data that cannot be manipulated� However, the specific drivers of a given behav-
ior are often open to interpretation� Some analysts, for example, assume that Chi-
nese actions in the “near seas” of East Asia are a product of a carefully designed 
and implemented national strategy, with head and arms working in perfect 
coordination� However, were these analysts familiar with the breadth of Chinese 
writings lamenting the country’s lack of well-defined ends, ways, and means, they 
might revise this proposition� While strategy is surely involved, Chinese mariners 
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probably are not acting out a detailed script for regional dominance�2 Moreover, 
a particular action may be the result of local initiative, or later may be judged a 
mistake, in which case it may not portend future behavior� The 2009 Impeccable 
incident, discussed below, may be a case in point�
Judicious use of authoritative statements about Chinese maritime strategy can 
validate and enrich assessments made on the basis of observed behavior, amelio-
rating the problems described above� Many of those who research and write on 
contemporary maritime issues, however, are not fully aware of the potential value 
of original Chinese documents� Moreover, those who are aware often disagree, 
sometimes fiercely, about which sources are most useful�3 This problem is exac-
erbated by the tremendous proliferation of Chinese documents in recent years, a 
challenge that has aptly been called “a poverty of riches�”4
This article seeks to describe the range of sources available for helping to 
understand Chinese maritime strategy and to assess their relative value� It com-
prises five parts� Part 1 outlines basic assumptions and defines key terminology� 
The subsequent three parts examine three distinct categories of sources, grouped 
according to the role of the author or speaker: those who formulate Chinese 
maritime strategy, those who implement the strategy, and the scholars and pun-
dits who define and influence it� The article concludes by offering a set of general 
rules for assessing the value of Chinese sources on maritime strategy�
The primary aim of this article is to identify specific individuals and their 
affiliations and draw conclusions about why their statements may (or may not) 
shed light on Chinese maritime strategy� For illustration purposes, the article will 
offer examples of the type of information that may be gleaned from close reading 
of those sources� It does not, however, seek to define Chinese maritime strategy 
comprehensively, per se�
DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This article focuses on Chinese “maritime strategy,” defined as state policy gov-
erning the development and use of sea power to achieve national objectives in 
peacetime�5 It adopts a narrow definition of sea power: those instruments the 
state wields directly to achieve objectives on or from the sea�6 These instruments 
include the Chinese military, above all the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy; 
Chinese maritime law enforcement forces, especially the China Coast Guard; 
and the maritime militia, i�e�, civilian mariners, often fishermen, who sometimes 
perform state functions�
The term “maritime strategy” (海洋战略) seldom appears in Chinese docu-
ments� Chinese decision makers do not refer to one overall set of policies gov-
erning use and development of all the sea services� PLA Navy strategists write 
of “naval strategy” (海军战略) or “maritime security strategy” (海上安全战
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略); the former only involves naval forces, while the latter seeks to leverage all 
the components of sea power (i�e�, military, maritime law enforcement, and 
militia)�7 Leaders in China’s maritime agencies, especially the State Oceanic 
Administration (SOA), tend to use the term “maritime development strategy” 
(海洋发展战略), which refers to an overall national approach to leveraging the 
ocean and ocean-related industries to support Chinese economic development� 
Maritime development strategy also encompasses “maritime rights protection” 
(海洋维权), meaning the use of maritime law enforcement forces to defend and 
advance China’s position in its 
maritime disputes�8 The term 
“maritime power strategy” 
(海洋强国战略) is often used 
synonymously with “maritime 
development strategy�”9 Some 
in the SOA, including deputy 
director Sun Shuxian, speak 
of “maritime rights protection strategy” (海洋维权战略), which refers very nar-
rowly to the use of sea power to defend China’s maritime claims�10
That Chinese policy makers seldom use the term “maritime strategy” is sig-
nificant� It suggests a compartmentalization among China’s sea services� This 
fact, however, does not invalidate use of this term when examining how China 
develops and uses sea power� For analytical purposes, Chinese maritime strategy 
comprises a set of policy guidelines—however compartmentalized—governing 
the development and use of sea power to pursue a range of peacetime purposes� 
These include, inter alia, deterring Taiwan from formally declaring indepen-
dence, deterring American military intervention in a regional conflict involv-
ing China, defending and advancing China’s position in its maritime disputes, 
expanding China’s strategic depth in the maritime direction, ensuring sea-lane 
security, cultivating Chinese “soft power” through naval diplomacy, and protect-
ing the lives and property of Chinese citizens in foreign lands�
This article assumes that the statements of those in positions of authority 
within the party-state or military are most likely to reflect actual policy� This as-
sumption is uncontroversial� However, authority does not always imply reliabili-
ty� Sometimes individuals who ostensibly hold positions of authority disseminate 
propaganda aimed at shaping opinions at home and abroad� In such instances, 
their views may be unreliable� This tendency will be discussed in some detail in 
part 2� This article also generally dismisses the public statements of Chinese dip-
lomats, who naturally have a strong interest in downplaying Chinese ambitions 
and vindicating Chinese actions�
There is very little publicly available informa-
tion about the . . . entity . . . created . . . to 
formulate and coordinate maritime dispute 
policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, and the military.
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This article examines the statements of individuals� Because of their obvi-
ous importance and because they are the best-studied sources for understand-
ing Chinese strategy, documents that the Chinese state issues directly are not 
examined in any detail� These include national defense white papers, five-year 
plans, party and government work reports, government yearbooks, and laws and 
regulations�11
POLICY MAKERS
Major decisions affecting China’s maritime strategy are made by senior members 
of the party-state in secret sessions in Beijing� Outside observers have little or no 
access to information on the content of these meetings� The Chinese legislature 
does not summon Chinese policy makers for public inquiries at which they are 
questioned about national security policy� The decisions of the Central Mili-
tary Commission, which guide naval policy, are classified; when information is 
released, it is often dated and incomplete� There is very little publicly available 
information about the Maritime Rights and Interests Leading Small Group (中
央海洋权益工作领导小组), an entity the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or 
Party) created in the second half of 2012 to formulate and coordinate maritime 
dispute policy among the SOA, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry 
of Public Security, the Ministry of Agriculture, and the military�12 Sources on 
the State Oceanic Commission (国家海洋委员会), set up in 2013 to formulate 
China’s maritime development strategy, are likewise extremely sparse�13 Scholars 
do, however, have access to “the strategy” as Chinese policy makers articulate it 
when they openly speak about maritime issues� Given the obvious authority of 
such sources, they should be regarded as key building blocks for any effort to 
define Chinese maritime strategy�
One such source is the official summary of a July 2013 CCP Politburo “study 
session�” An innovation of Hu Jintao, Politburo study sessions take place at 
roughly one-month intervals� Two experts are invited to provide lectures on the 
topic under discussion�14 During these sessions, the Party leader outlines his 
views on the topic� These reflect state policy�
At the 30 July 2013 study session, the Politburo discussed the topic of building 
China into a “maritime power” (海洋强国), an objective identified eight months 
earlier in Hu Jintao’s work report at the Eighteenth Party Congress� The official 
summary of the meeting provides a precious glimpse into how China’s top leaders 
conceive of the country’s relationship with the sea�
A close reading of this document reveals that the party-state’s definition of 
“maritime power” is very broad� Maritime powers use the ocean to build wealth� 
Their marine science and technology are advanced� They are able to exploit 
marine resources effectively� When they use the ocean, they take steps to avoid 
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harming its ecology� That the two invited lecturers were both civilians is a clear 
indication of this economic focus�
However, maritime powers are also able to safeguard their maritime rights and 
interests, and a careful reading of Xi Jinping’s remarks also suggests endorsement 
of an assertive turn—in his words, a “transformation” (转变)—in how China 
handles its maritime disputes, an assessment that observed behavior has borne 
out� In Xi’s words, “We love peace and will continue along the path of peaceful 
development, but we absolutely cannot abandon our legitimate rights and inter-
ests, much less sacrifice our core interests�”15
Official coverage of Xi Jinping’s attendance at the Fifth National Border and 
Coast Defense Work Meeting in Beijing in June 2014 offers another example 
of the availability and value of policy-maker statements� This event is relevant 
to China’s maritime strategy because “ocean defense” (海防) involves much 
more than preventing foreign invasion along China’s coast; it refers to actions to 
defend all “Chinese” space from encroachment, including offshore islands and 
remote waters under Chinese jurisdiction�16 The Xinhua news agency published 
an official summary of Xi’s remarks� Xi recalled the humiliating and damaging 
experiences of modern Chinese history, when China “was poor and weak � � � 
and suffered several hundred instances of foreign encroachment�” As a result, 
China must place the highest priority on sovereignty and security, “resolutely 
safeguard territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests,” and build an 
“an impregnable wall [literally, “a wall of copper and iron”] for border and ocean 
defense�” Other senior leaders spoke at the event, but media coverage of the meet-
ing gave them scant mention—the focus was Xi Jinping�17
Xi’s remarks take on special meaning when contrasted with official media 
coverage of Hu Jintao’s participation in the same meeting in January 2010� Aside 
from shaking hands and posing for group photos, Hu played no role in the earlier 
event� People’s Republic of China (PRC) minister of national defense General 
Liang Guanglie delivered the keynote address� Liang’s speech balanced out pa-
triotic content—“defending the security of national territorial sovereignty and 
maritime rights and interests must be seen as the sacred mission of border and 
coastal defense work”—with conciliatory words about the need to “deepen and 
expand friendly relations with neighboring states�”18 Such comparisons both sug-
gest the policy shift that has taken place in the intervening years and shed light 
on the role Xi may be playing personally in deciding China’s maritime strategy�
Provincial leaders also play important roles in maritime policy� This is espe-
cially true for Hainan Province, which administers all the Chinese-claimed land 
features within the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea� Hainan’s marine 
policy, then, has direct repercussions for Chinese behavior at sea� Provincial lead-
ers also play a large part in mobilizing civilian mariners to serve in the country’s 
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maritime militia (海上民兵)� At a meeting in December 2013, Hainan provincial 
party secretary Luo Baoming (罗保铭) spoke on the role of provincial militias� 
According to an official summary of his remarks, Luo stated that militias serve 
a key function in China’s maritime disputes� Their presence in disputed waters 
“highlights” (彰显) Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea�19 The province, 
then, must play a role in fostering their growth and development�
POLICY IMPLEMENTERS
Elements of Chinese maritime strategy are reflected in the statements of those 
charged with implementing it, above all senior officers within the Chinese mili-
tary and the Chinese coast guard�20 The civilians in the SOA who directly oversee 
China’s maritime law-enforcement agencies also speak and write authoritatively 
about the ends, ways, and means of China’s approach to the sea�
PLA Leaders
Among senior officers, the most authoritative statements are naturally those 
made by the PLA Navy commander, currently Admiral Wu Shengli (吴胜利)�21 
Admiral Wu is no Sergei Gorshkov, a senior officer who had pretensions to pro-
found strategic insights�22 In contrast, Wu’s statements are often clogged with jar-
gon and therefore difficult to decipher� They are generally very short on details� 
However, in some cases they do offer valuable revelations about “the strategy�”23
In August 2014, Admiral Wu gave a very important speech at a ceremony, held 
aboard the aircraft carrier support ship Xu Xiake, to commemorate the 120th an-
niversary of the first Sino-Japanese War�24 The text was published in the August 
2014 issue of China Military Science, with “appropriate abridgment�”25 While the 
purpose of the event was to reflect on a historical event, Wu delivered his speech 
with contemporary issues very much in mind� For the student of Chinese strat-
egy, it demonstrates the service’s commitment to expanding its role in waters be-
yond Asia—in Wu’s words, “wherever China’s interests extend�” It confirms that 
senior leaders fear that a powerful enemy (强敌—i�e�, the United States) seeks to 
contain China� Its numerous references to Xi Jinping show that the head of state 
takes a keen interest in China’s development and employment of sea power�
The content of Wu’s speech also has important implications for understanding 
the nature of China’s commitment to resolve its maritime disputes� He suggests 
that the ocean may be equivalent to the land in its importance, declaring that 
“we must not only protect every inch of land, but also every inch of the ocean�” 
Wu talks about the need to protect both China’s rights under international law 
and “historic rights passed down from ancestors,” a reference to Chinese claims 
to waters within the nine-dash line in the South China Sea� Wu refers to China’s 
claims to “island sovereignty and maritime rights and interests” as constituting 
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“core interests” (核心利益)� Thus, not just offshore land features but also the 
zones of sovereignty and jurisdiction emanating from them may now be con-
sidered objects of vital state interest�26 Wu’s remarks also provide more specific 
insights on current strategy: China should “continue to strengthen control over 
[its] claimed maritime space�” Wu’s speech, then, is an index of the PRC’s com-
mitment to resolve the disputes in China’s favor�
The words of other flag officers may also serve as useful indicators of Chinese 
strategy� These regularly appear in service publications� On 19 March 2014, for 
example, People’s Navy published excerpts of speeches that senior PLA Navy 
leaders had given at a meeting held to discuss Xi Jinping’s maritime strategic 
thought� All sixteen of these eigth-hundred-to-nine-hundred-character excerpts 
are worth reading, but the remarks of Rear Admiral Zhang Zhaoyin (张兆垠), 
deputy commander of the South Sea Fleet, stand out�
Rear Admiral Zhang sheds light on the Chinese sea services’ overall approach 
to handling China’s disputes in the South China Sea� Zhang candidly acknowl-
edges that the objective of Chinese strategy in the South China Sea is to “continu-
ously expand the strength of Chinese administrative control” and to “progres-
sively achieve effective administrative control” over Chinese-claimed waters�27 
That is—in contradiction to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs narrative that China 
merely responds to the provocations of other states—the PLA Navy, working in 
conjunction with the Chinese coast guard, is pursuing proactively a policy aimed 
at controlling disputed land and ocean areas in the South China Sea�28
Coast Guard Leaders
The statements of leaders within the Chinese coast guard and their civilian over-
lords are also authoritative indicators of Chinese strategy� Liu Cigui (刘赐贵), 
head of the SOA from February 2011 to January 2015, frequently spoke and wrote 
on China’s efforts at “rights protection�”29 Liu presided over China’s policy shift 
from a generally passive coast guard presence in disputed waters to actual efforts 
to assert control over disputed waters on the pretext of routine law enforcement�30
Liu’s statements provide useful data for understanding China’s “maritime 
power” strategy and how it impacts China’s approach to its disputes� In a 7 June 
2014 essay in a SOA-run newspaper, China Ocean News, Liu outlined what was 
involved for China to transform itself from a “major maritime state” (海洋大国) 
into a “powerful maritime state” (or “maritime power”—海洋强国)� Liu’s article 
elaborates on many of the themes Xi Jinping had discussed in his remarks at the 
Politburo study session eleven months earlier� Liu describes the current period 
in very dark terms, as one in which states compete with one another for control 
over the ocean and the ability to use the ocean to become wealthy and powerful� 
He concludes with a very important admission:
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As can be seen, for a long period going forward, China will face increasing challenges 
in its efforts to safeguard maritime rights and interests� The ocean very likely will be-
come the primary direction from which come efforts to interfere with China’s period 
of strategic opportunity [to engage in economic development] and threaten China’s 
security� These realities require that we continuously improve our abilities to control 
the ocean, accelerate the pace of efforts to transform China into a maritime power, 
and more effectively safeguard and expand China’s maritime rights and interests� 
This and many other similar statements indicate that the national objective is 
peacetime control of the sea, and the consequences of failing to realize this aim 
could not be more severe�31
Prior to the creation of the China Coast Guard in mid-2013, China Marine 
Surveillance (CMS) was the constabulary agency most active along China’s mari-
time periphery� Thus, the statements of senior CMS leaders also provide useful 
indicators for assessing key elements of “the strategy�” In July 2012, just days after 
the Scarborough Shoal standoff ended with China in control of the feature, senior 
CMS officer Sun Shuxian attended a maritime conference held in Hainan� At 
the event, Sun suggested that China should use military force against other (un-
named) disputants, because doing so would “ensure a century of peace�” Sun also 
said, “We do not want to be provocative, but we are not afraid of provocations 
and cannot tolerate provocations� We cannot simply respond by issuing state-
ments that their actions are illegal and invalid� We must make the provocateurs 
pay a cost� By killing one, we can deter a hundred others, thereby preventing the 
situation from worsening�”32 This episode sheds light on the personality of an im-
portant leader within China’s sea services� Moreover, that Sun was subsequently 
appointed deputy commandant of the China Coast Guard and later promoted to 
deputy director of the SOA suggests a degree of endorsement within the party-
state for Sun’s aggressive attitude toward handling China’s maritime disputes�
Certain commanders within China’s other maritime law-enforcement agen-
cies also have been forthcoming with information on their services’ role in 
China’s maritime strategy� Until his retirement in 2014, Wu Zhuang, the head of 
the South China Sea branch of Fisheries Law Enforcement, frequently gave inter-
views to Chinese news outlets� Wu’s own history also sheds light on the mecha-
nism through which policy leads to state behavior, in that individual personalities 
can play an important role in events at sea: it was Wu, apparently operating on his 
own initiative, who likely ordered Chinese fishing vessels to obstruct the opera-
tions of Impeccable in March 2009�33
In a December 2012 interview, Wu spoke of the strategic logic behind a 
decision to begin convoying Chinese fishing vessels out to fishing grounds in 
disputed waters in the southeastern sections of the South China Sea� The lives 
and property of Chinese fishermen were being threatened by the maritime 
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law-enforcement forces of other states� Protecting them was a priority because 
their presence in disputed waters was extremely important, not for the fish they 
were catching, but for the political significance of their activities� Wu said, “De-
velopment of fisheries near the Spratly Islands involves questions of sovereignty 
over China’s Spratly Islands� ‘Development equals presence, presence equals 
occupation, and occupation equals sovereignty�’”34 This statement, uttered by 
somebody in Wu’s position, may reflect how Chinese strategists conceive of the 
role of civilian economic activity in China’s maritime dispute strategy�
SCHOLARS AND PUNDITS
Any original research on Chinese maritime strategy should rely, to the maximum 
extent possible, on the statements of those who formulate and implement policy� 
Yet while these sources are far more numerous than most analysts recognize, 
leadership statements alone are inadequate� To fill the gaps, students of Chinese 
strategy must look to the writings of men and women whose vocation is to define 
and influence “the strategy�”
Studying the works of Chinese scholars, however, is an approach fraught with 
risk and uncertainty� The easy availability of scholarship and punditry on mari-
time affairs in China creates a strong temptation to draw heavily on these sources� 
At issue is when to regard a particular item as a primary source and when to 
regard it as a secondary source (and thus to subject it to the same standards of 
evidence as analyses written by non-Chinese scholars)�
Any claim a Chinese scholar makes can be regarded as more or less authorita-
tive depending on the extent to which he/she has privileged access to “the strat-
egy�” Scholars who work at research units within the Chinese military or a civilian 
maritime agency likely have privileged access to at least some components of 
“the strategy�” The extent of access no doubt varies by rank and position; with 
seniority comes access� Regardless of rank or position, at best their statements 
may serve as proxies for the more authoritative statements of those they serve�
PLA Scholars
Given the prominent role of the navy in Chinese maritime strategy, PLA Navy 
scholars no doubt constitute the most authoritative sources in this category� They 
work in the Naval Research Institute (NRI), PLA Navy educational institutions 
(e�g�, the Naval Command College in Nanjing and the Naval Academy in Dalian), 
and other military institutions, such as the National Defense University (NDU)�
NRI scholars deserve special consideration� NRI was set up at the behest of 
the then commander of the PLA Navy Admiral Liu Huaqing� This was in 1985, 
during a period of intense ferment in the field of naval strategy�35 NRI scholars 
and analysts continue to do important work on strategic issues, much of it for 
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internal use� Many NRI products, however, are publicly available� NRI scholar 
Senior Captain Zhang Wei (张炜) is among China’s leading experts on the stra-
tegic use of sea power�36 Interviewed for a July 2012 People’s Navy article, Zhang 
recounted the joy she felt in discovering the theories of Gorshkov and Mahan, 
whose work had a “rational core” (合理内核) that transcended the immorality 
of their respective periods and systems�37 Chinese policy makers have turned to 
her for guidance regarding some of the more difficult policy challenges facing the 
regime as it expands in the maritime direction�38
Some publicly available NRI products serve to convey elements of “the 
strategy” directly to the fleet� For example, close reading of Senior Captain Ren 
Xiaofeng’s (任筱锋) Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations sheds light on 
the political assumptions that 
animate PLA Navy interpre-
tations of international law� 
Ren defines the PRC’s official 
position on the nine-dash line 
in the South China Sea, what he terms China’s “traditional maritime boundary 
line” (传统海疆线), to mean that China “enjoys historic rights to all of the natu-
ral resources” within these waters� Ren’s volume also outlines PLA Navy policies 
and procedures for handling encounters with foreign vessels conducting military 
surveys (军事测量) in China’s exclusive economic zone�39
The Naval Command College in Nanjing is home to several important PLA 
Navy scholars, including Senior Captain Feng Liang (冯梁), a professor in the 
strategic research department and director of the college’s Maritime Security 
Center� Feng was a driving force in the creation of the Collaborative Innovation 
Center for South China Sea Studies (中国南海研究协同创新中心), a think tank 
located at Nanjing University, and continues to serve in a leadership position 
within this organization�40 Collaborating with NRI’s Zhang Wei, he wrote the 
award-winning book Maritime Security of the State (国家海上安全)�41 While this 
volume, published in 2008, is now somewhat out of date, it provides a good base-
line from which to gauge recent changes in China’s maritime strategy�42 Among 
his publicly available works, Feng also coauthored China’s Peaceful Rise and the 
Maritime Security Environment (中国的和平发展与海上安全环境), another 
volume highly regarded within the PLA�43
The bulk of Feng’s work likely involves directing research projects intended for 
internal use� His products are read by—or at least given to—Chinese policy mak-
ers� For instance, he led a research team studying the topic of “SLOC [sea lines 
of communication] security and expanding state interests”; its work purportedly 
has influenced Chinese policy makers� He has also researched the topic of the 
“21st Century Maritime Silk Road,” again for the reference of leaders within the 
Wu’s [speech] confirms that senior leaders 
fear that a powerful enemy (the United States) 
seeks to contain China.
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military and the party-state�44 Feng also has led projects studying questions vital 
to China’s maritime dispute policy� He has researched strategic problems associ-
ated with infrastructure construction, presumably Chinese, on islands in the 
South China Sea� Moreover, Feng was an important force behind the decision 
for the Naval Command College to provide advanced training for maritime law-
enforcement officers from CMS� He has also completed dozens of studies on the 
roles and missions of CMS forces in maritime rights protection operations, which 
doubtlessly have influenced the use of maritime law enforcement in China’s 
disputes�45
The PLA Air Force also constitutes an important agent in China’s maritime 
strategy� As such, scholars working on its behalf have valuable insights on how 
and why China pursues sea power� For example, in a 2015 article published in 
China Military Science, Senior Colonel An Peng, head of research at the PLA Air 
Force Command College, wrote about the role of the PLA Air Force in China’s 
strategic posture in the “maritime direction” (海上方向)� Among other useful 
data, An’s article highlights the prominent place of the American threat in Chi-
nese strategic thinking� In peacetime, writes An, China must develop airpower 
to prevail in the “struggle to contain and counter the containment” (围堵反围
堵, 遏制反遏制) of a certain, unnamed foreign superpower� In a conflict with 
another East Asian state, Chinese airpower must be potent enough to counter 
the same unnamed foreign superpower’s “military intervention” (军事干预)�46
Some authoritative scholarly works are collective efforts published under the 
name of a single organization� In such cases, the degree of authority is a function 
of the institution, not any individual� Written/edited by three dozen scholars 
from the strategic studies department of the Academy of Military Science, the 
2013 Science of Military Strategy (战略学) is a case in point� Despite its primary 
focus on the prosecution of war (page 4), this volume also has a chapter on peace-
time military operations (chapter 8), which naturally include a broad spectrum of 
naval operations, from counterpiracy operations to sovereignty patrols through 
disputed waters (page 163)� Indeed, much of the content in the section on the 
PLA Navy’s “strategic tasks” focuses on the service’s peacetime missions (pages 
209–21)�47
The statements of some members of the PLA thinking class should be received 
with skepticism� These are the pundits�48 Their frequent appearances on Chinese 
television and their prolific output of often-shallow analyses in the popular press 
suggest that shaping domestic and international opinion is a major function of 
their work� Their writings and commentary may be guided by instructions to 
convince domestic audiences that international affairs are important and that the 
party-state is taking steps to protect the nation, and to signal to foreign audiences 
that China is willing and able to defend its interests�49
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PLA Navy pundits include Senior Captain Li Jie (李杰) (Ret�) and Senior 
Captain Zhang Junshe (张军社), both from NRI; Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (尹卓) 
(Ret�), director of the PLA Navy Informatization Expert Committee; and Rear 
Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong (张召忠), a professor at NDU�50 For his part, Rear 
Admiral Zhang Zhaozhong has published numerous books and articles aimed at 
the mass-consumption market, and he frequently appears on Chinese television 
to talk about maritime issues�51 His views are sometimes far-fetched, making him 
the target of online pillorying�52 As Andrew Chubb shows, pundits such as Zhang 
Zhaozhong openly acknowledge their role as propagandists� This obviously casts 
doubt on the reliability of their statements�53
Nevertheless, one cannot discard wholesale the statements of PLA pundits� 
In their role as transmitters of national defense policy to the Chinese people, the 
pundits may offer useful insights� For instance, when Zhang says that China has 
adopted a “cabbage strategy” (包心菜战略) in the South China Sea, who is to 
doubt him, especially when his description matches known behavior?54 When 
NRI’s Li writes that a primary driver behind China’s “One Belt—One Road” strat-
egy is to counteract perceived American efforts to hem China in from positions 
along the “first island chain,” and that the strategy requires a strong PLA Navy, 
what logic suggests he is lying?55
The extent to which students of Chinese maritime strategy should ascribe 
value to the statements of military pundits clearly is debatable� Therefore, any 
scholarship that cites a member of their ranks must reckon with this debate�
SOA Scholars
The same assumption of privileged knowledge applies to researchers working 
for civilian maritime agencies� The SOA’s internal think tank is called the China 
Maritime Development Strategy Research Institute (中国海洋发展战略研究, 
officially translated as the China Institute for Marine Affairs—CIMA)� CIMA 
scholars are assigned research projects for the direct benefit of Chinese policy 
makers, that is, for internal use� One area of focus has been maritime power, a 
topic CIMA researchers have studied for years� In 2010, CIMA researchers com-
pleted work on a report entitled Research on China’s Maritime Strategy for the 
Years 2010–2020: Building China into a Mid-Level Maritime Power, and in 2011 
they began another major research project called A Blueprint for Turning China 
into a Maritime Power, both for internal consumption�56 Although the original 
reports are unavailable, the public writings of CIMA scholars, including CIMA 
deputy director Zhang Haiwen (张海文), and researcher Wang Fang (王芳), 
make an excellent proxy�57
Individual CIMA experts publish books, scholarly articles, and essays� CIMA 
researchers interpret the significance of new maritime policies, place the policies 
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into an international context, and contribute to the debate on China’s proper rela-
tionship with the ocean� They also analyze developments in China’s relations with 
states along its maritime periphery� Examining their assessments over time sheds 
light on the evolution of China’s maritime strategy� In May 2007, for instance, 
several CIMA experts wrote an analysis of China’s maritime security environ-
ment, publishing it in China Ocean News� Looking back at 2006, they conclude 
that the implementation of China’s policies of “treating neighbors well, treating 
them as partners” and as “harmonious neighbors, secure neighbors, and wealthy 
neighbors,” and the diplomatic approach of “building a harmonious world” had 
a certain restraining effect on the acquisitive activities of some states, thereby 
resulting in continuous improvement in the maritime situation near China�58
Thus, in 2007 the consensus in Chinese maritime policy circles may have 
been that a conciliatory approach toward other disputants was proving effective� 
This suggests that China’s decision to pursue a more assertive dispute strategy in 
subsequent years may have been a result of an internal debate in which Chinese 
policy makers decided ultimately that the former approach no longer was bear-
ing fruit�
The statements of two CIMA researchers merit particular attention� One is 
CIMA director Gao Zhiguo� Gao was one of only two maritime experts who 
briefed the CCP Politburo during the July 2013 Politburo study session (discussed 
above)�59 Thus, he demonstrably has the ear of Chinese leaders� Aside from in-
ternal research projects, Gao publishes academic articles and commentary on 
maritime issues, often blending legal and strategic analysis� Gao collaborated 
with another Chinese scholar on a treatise outlining the legal bases for China’s 
nine-dash line�60 Gao has long advocated for China to draft a maritime basic law, 
a comprehensive document that, among other things, could define more fully 
the scope of Chinese maritime claims and the penalties for foreign mariners who 
encroach on them�61 Perhaps in part as a result of Gao’s efforts, the SOA currently 
is taking the lead on researching and drafting a maritime basic law, an objective 
on the agenda of the current National People’s Congress�62
The second is Gao’s deputy, Zhang Haiwen mentioned above� Like Gao, Zhang 
is a maritime legal expert� Much of her work involves internal reports prepared 
for Chinese policy makers’ reference (决策参考建议)� For example, Zhang 
has led a team researching the question of the rights of Chinese maritime law-
enforcement vessels operating in disputed waters� Do foreign states, for instance, 
have the right to board CMS ships? Such work has very direct policy implications� 
Zhang also advises Chinese leaders on how to handle incidents at sea (突发事
件)�63
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CIMA also publishes institutional analyses� It produces the annual China 
Oceans Development Report (中国海洋发展报告), a volume that covers a full 
range of maritime-related topics, from maritime law to marine-related economic 
production� It is an important source for understanding how China conceives of 
its maritime rights and interests and how it uses the sea services to “safeguard” 
them�
CIMA has an avowed role in state propaganda efforts� In late 2012, at the 
height of tension among China and its neighbors in the East and South China 
Seas, Zhang Haiwen frequently appeared on television for the purpose of “cor-
rectly guiding public opinion” (正确引导舆论)� The Chinese people needed to 
know the source of tensions—that foreigners were to blame—and they needed 
to know that Chinese leaders were acting to defend the nation, thereby “dis-
pelling the misunderstandings” of Chinese nationalists�64 Thus, in settings in 
which a large audience is presumed, the reliability of statements made by CIMA 
scholars—indeed, the statements of all scholars affiliated with the military or the 
party-state—should be scrutinized for any political purpose�
Outside Scholars and Pundits
Unlike their colleagues working for the sea services, outside scholars writing 
about Chinese maritime affairs cannot be assumed to have privileged access; in-
stead, the case must be made� Unless it is, their writings lack authority and should 
not be treated as primary sources�
When outside scholars publish in authoritative periodicals, their statements 
may carry some authority� For example, in the days and weeks following the 
above-mentioned July 2013 Politburo study session, Rear Admiral Zheng Ming 
(Ret�) was invited by China Ocean News to offer his interpretation of the signifi-
cance of Xi Jinping’s remarks� In the subsequent article, published on page 1 of 
the newspaper, Zheng highlighted Xi Jinping’s use of the twelve-character expres-
sion “sovereignty belongs to China, shelve the disputes, and engage in joint de-
velopment” (主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发), an approach that Deng Xiaoping 
developed for handling China’s disputes�65 Many people in China tend to omit the 
first part—“sovereignty belongs to China”—because it sounds uncompromising� 
Xi Jinping’s decision to include it, in Zheng’s view, indicates his resolve never to 
make concessions on China’s claims�66 While Zheng Ming himself no longer may 
work for the Chinese military—and therefore cannot be presumed to possess 
privileged knowledge of the current strategy—the fact that a SOA publication 
would invite him to express his views on such an important topic suggests a de-
gree of authority in his statements�67
The work of outside scholars may carry special significance if one can dem-
onstrate direct influence on those who make and implement policy� In such 
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cases, the scholarship itself is not important because of its privileged insights on 
Chinese strategy; rather, the fact that the scholar is “influential” may suggest that 
his/her work reflects thinking within the military, the party-state, or both� Even 
in the very best of circumstances, however, this approach is seldom conclusive�
The case of Zhang Wenmu (张文木) sheds light on some of these difficulties� 
Zhang is a professor at Beihang Univeristy (formerly Beijing University of Aero-
nautics and Astronautics)� 
He was an early and ardent 
advocate for China to build 
a powerful navy and he sees 
international affairs in the 
starkest geostrategic terms� 
His analyses, often couched in 
the idiom of Marxist thought, are sweeping in scope and prone to facile historical 
analogy� Zhang’s essays on maritime affairs are collected in On Chinese Sea Power 
(论中国海权), a volume that has gone through three editions�68
It is clear that Zhang Wenmu’s ideas have some influence within the Chi-
nese military and the party-state� He is invited regularly to conferences and 
roundtables on maritime affairs, including those sponsored by the SOA�69 Indeed, 
in 2014 he was asked to lecture to a class of more than eighty SOA bureaucrats 
receiving a two-day course on maritime strategy�70 At least some parts of the PLA 
attach importance to his work� For instance, he was interviewed about the stra-
tegic significance of China’s “One Belt—One Road” strategy, and the transcripts 
were published in the July 2015 issue of National Defense, a journal run by the 
PLA’s Academy of Military Science�71 All of this suggests that some of his views 
on the international environment and the use of sea power have some purchase 
among at least some leaders within the SOA and at least some faction of the PLA 
Navy� Ultimately, however, this is not very instructive for anybody seeking to 
understand Chinese maritime strategy�72
The Chinese press publishes a wide selection of what might be called “naval-
ist” publications� These include Modern Ships (现代舰船), Naval and Merchant 
Ships (舰船知识), and Shipborne Weapons (舰载武器)� Analysts/pundits who 
write for these magazines often delve into important strategic and operational 
issues, sometimes with obvious erudition and candor� Seldom, however, do we 
learn anything about the scribes themselves, many of whom write under pseu-
donyms� Therefore, it is impossible to map out the connection between the views 
of authors writing for these publications and the thinking of the men and women 
who formulate and implement maritime strategy� In the end, the empirical value 
of their statements is negligible�
Liu presided over China’s policy shift from a 
generally passive coast guard presence in dis-
puted waters to actual efforts to assert control 
over disputed waters on the pretext of routine 
law enforcement.
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   37 6/8/16   3:58 PM
42
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/20
 3 8  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
The statements of those affiliated with the Chinese military and the party-state 
are excellent sources for understanding elements of China’s evolving maritime 
strategy� These sources, used in conjunction with behavioral indicators (building 
programs, behavior at sea, etc�), allow observers to define the primary contours 
of China’s relationship with the sea� Listed below are some general principles for 
assessing the value of these sources, distilled from the cases examined above:
1� Chinese statements on maritime strategy are useful to the extent to which 
they can be shown to be authoritative�
2� The statements of men and women responsible for formulating and 
implementing policy are the most authoritative indicators of Chinese 
strategy�
3� The statements of Chinese scholars and pundits should be regarded as 
secondary sources (and judged as such) unless these individuals can be 
shown to have privileged access to “the strategy�”
4� Scholars and pundits who work directly for China’s sea services (or 
agencies that manage them) should be assumed to have some privileged 
access� This access is likely a function of rank and position�
5� Beware the statements of scholars/pundits who work for the sea services 
but whose primary work involves internal and external propaganda� The 
sincerity of their statements may be questionable�
6� Outside scholars and pundits cannot be assumed to have privileged access 
to “the strategy�” Privileged access must be demonstrated�
7� That an outside scholar is known to be “influential” does not necessarily 
mean that his/her views reflect the mainstream thinking of Chinese policy 
makers�
8� The statements of unknown pundits writing for “navalist” publications 
have negligible value as indicators of China’s maritime strategy�
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 42. Academy of Military Science researcher Shi 
Xiaoqin calls this book a “weather vane” (风
向标) for understanding the Chinese govern­
ment’s views on the relationship between sea 
power and the pursuit of national wealth and 
power. See 师小芹 [Shi Xiaoqin], 论海权
与中美关系 [On Sea Power and China-U.S. 
Relations] (Beijing: Military Science, 2012), 
p. 225. Zhang Wei and Feng Liang, Maritime 
Security of the State.
 43. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4. See 
also 程勇 [Cheng Yong], 探讨安全环境直
面热点问题 [“Discussing Important Topics 
Regarding the Security Environment”], 人民
海军 [People’s Navy], 27 December 2010, p. 2; 
冯梁, 高子川, 段廷志 [Feng Liang, Gao  
Zichuan, and Duan Tingzhi], 中国的和平
发展与海上安全环境 [China’s Peaceful Rise 
and the Maritime Security Environment] 
(Beijing: World Knowledge, 2010).
 44. See Bo Yang, “The Man Gazes Afar,” p. 4.
 45. Ibid.; Gu Bo, “Feng Liang,” p. 3. Other naval 
experts whose work, because of their affilia­
tion with the PLA Navy, offers useful indica­
tors of Chinese maritime strategy include 
Xie Shiting (谢适汀) from the Dalian Naval 
Academy and Liang Fang (梁芳) from NDU.
 46. 安鹏 [An Peng], 加强海上方向空中力量建
设的战略思考 [“Strategic Consideration on 
Strengthening the Air Forces in the Maritime 
Direction”], 中国军事科学 [China Military 
Science], no. 3 (2015), p. 83. Despite being less 
relevant in China’s maritime strategy, scholars 
working for the PLA ground forces do write 
about maritime affairs. These include Sr. Col. 
Xu Qiyu (徐弃郁), deputy director of the 
Institute for Strategic Studies at NDU; Shi 
Xiaoqin (师小芹), a scholar at the Academy 
of Military Science; and Maj. Gen. Zhang 
Shiping (张世平), a scholar at the Academy 
of Military Science. Of note, Shi Xiaoqin 
contributed to the very authoritative Science 
of Military Strategy (discussed below).
 47. 军事科学院军事战略研究部 [Academy of 
Military Science Strategic Research Depart­
ment], 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy] 
(Beijing: Military Science, 2013). For an 
excellent catalogue of authoritative volumes 
on Chinese military strategy, see M. Taylor 
Fravel and Christopher P. Twomey, “Project­
ing Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter­
intervention,” Washington Quarterly 37, no. 4 
(Winter 2015), pp. 171–87.
 48. Distinct from a scholar, a pundit is a person 
who primarily writes articles for magazines 
and newspapers or mass­market books that 
do not expect scholarly standards of evidence.
 49. Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda as Policy? 
Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part 
Two),” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13, 
no. 16 (9 August 2013), www.jamestown.org/.
 50. Rear Admiral Zhang left active duty in mid­
2015. Other branches of the Chinese military 
also have pundits who speak and write on 
maritime affairs. Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan (罗援) 
(Ret.) of the PLA ground forces is a promi­
nent example. In October 2014, the China 
Coast Guard Academy in Ningbo held a 
conference to discuss how China can use its 
maritime law­enforcement forces to defend 
and advance its position in its maritime 
disputes. The event brought together scholars 
(including Sr. Capt. Feng Liang), pundits (in­
cluding Luo Yuan, who was keynote speaker), 
and current and former service members 
(including Sun Shuxian and Yu Zhirong, 
introduced below). See 朱健, 石晶 [Zhu Jian 
and Shi Jing], 我院举办第二届“海洋维权与
执法论坛” [“Academy Hosts Second ‘Mari­
time Rights Protection and Law Enforcement 
Forum’”], 公安海警学院学报 [Journal of the 
Public Security Coast Guard Academy], no. 4 
(2014), inside cover.
 51. For example, in 2011 Zhang published a 
four­hundred­page book entitled Toward the 
Deep Blue. For several reasons, it should not 
be considered a work of scholarship: (1) It 
contains no citations of any kind. (2) It was 
published by the Guangdong Economic Press 
(广东经济出版社), not a PLA­affiliated 
press. And (3) the book’s preface was written 
by the director of the Propaganda Depart­
ment of Guangdong Province, who stated that 
among other things the purpose of the book 
was to “strengthen the maritime conscious­
ness of the Chinese people.” 张召忠 [Zhang 
Zhaozhong], 走向深蓝 [Toward the Deep 
Blue] (Guangzhou: Guangdong Economic 
Press, 2011).
 52. In a recent article, Zhang defended himself 
from his detractors. See 张召忠 [Zhang 
Zhaozhong], 张召忠回应美第七舰队司令:
你别撞上中国心烦时 [“Zhang Zhaozhong 
Responds to the Commander of the USN 
Seventh Fleet: Do Not Bump into China 
When China Is in a Bad Mood”], 凤凰军事 
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[Phoenix Military], 18 February 2016, news 
�ifeng�com/�
 53� Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: 
Explaining the PLA’s ‘Hawkish Faction’ (Part 
One),” Jamestown Foundation China Brief 13, 
no� 15 (25 July 2013), www�jamestown�org/�
 54� The “cabbage strategy” describes China’s 
coordinated use of its sea services to control 
maritime space, especially waters around dis-
puted land features� Zhang seems to have first 
used this term during a May 2013 Beijing TV 
news show� For a transcript of the interview, 
see 张召忠: 反制菲占岛 只需用“包心菜”战
略 [“Zhang Zhaozhong: To Counter Philip-
pine Occupation of Islands China Just Needs 
to Implement a ‘Cabbage’ Strategy”], 环球网 
[Global Times Online], 27 May 2013, mil 
�huanqiu�com/�
 55� 李杰 [Li Jie], 缘何加力推进“海上丝路”战略 
[“Why China Should Strengthen Its ‘Maritime 
Silk Road’ Strategy”], 军事文摘 [Military 
Digest], no� 9 (September 2015), pp� 6–10�
 56� 中国海洋发展战略高层论坛在京召开 [“A 
Senior-Level Forum on the Topic of China’s 
Maritime Development Strategy Opens in 
Beijing”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 
30 November 2010, p� 1, epaper�oceanol 
�com/; 香山论坛: 建设中国特色海洋强国 
[“Xiangshan Forum: Constructing Maritime 
Power with Chinese Characteristics”], 中国海
洋报 [China Ocean News], 1 January 2013,  
p� 3�
 57� 张海文, 王芳 [Zhang Haiwen and Wang 
Fang], 海洋强国战略是国家大战略的有机
组成部分 [“Maritime Power Strategy Is an 
Organic Component of Grand Strategy”], 国
际安全研究 [International Security Stud-
ies], no� 6 (2013), pp� 57–69� Obviously, the 
publicly available article is not identical to the 
internal reports� It is, however, unlikely that 
the publicly available article contradicts any 
of the content of the internal reports� Other-
wise, there would be no point in writing and 
publishing in a public forum�
 58� 贾宇, 吴继陆, 疏震娅 [Jia Yu, Wu Jilu, and 
Shu Zhenya], 2006年我国周边海上形势综
述 [“A Review of the Situation along China’s 
Maritime Periphery in 2006”], 中国海洋报 
[China Ocean News], 22 May 2007�
 59� “At the Eighth Politburo Collective Study 
Session Xi Jinping Emphasized That China 
Should Do More to Take Interest in the Sea, 
Understand the Sea, and Strategically Manage 
the Sea, and Continually Do More to Promote 
China’s Efforts to Become a Maritime Power,” 
p� 1�
 60� 高之国, 贾兵兵 [Gao Zhiguo and Jia Bing-
bing], 论南海九段线的历史, 地位和作用 
[The Nine-Dash Line in the South China Sea: 
History, Status, and Implications] (Beijing: 
Ocean, 2014)� This book is a bilingual copy of 
an article the two authors originally published 
in a 2013 issue of the American Journal of 
International Law.
 61� 高之国, 辛崇阳 [Gao Zhiguo and Xin 
Chongyang], 制定我国海洋基本法的必要
性与可行性——我国现行海洋政策, 立法, 
执法的现状与问题 (上) [“On the Neces-
sity and Feasibility of China Formulating a 
Maritime Basic Law (Part I)”], 中国海洋报 
[China Ocean News], 5 November 2010, p� 1� 
See also 高之国, 辛崇阳 [Gao Zhiguo and 
Xin Chongyang], 制定我国海洋基本法的必
要性与可行性——我国现行海洋政策, 立
法, 执法的现状与问题 (下) [“On the Neces-
sity and Feasibility of China Formulating a 
Maritime Basic Law (Part II)”], 中国海洋报 
[China Ocean News], 9 November 2010, p� 1�
 62� 赵宁 [Zhao Ning], 国家海洋局召开海洋
基本法立法座谈会 [“The State Oceanic 
Administration Holds a Meeting to Discuss 
Legislation of a Maritime Basic Law”], 中国
海洋报 [China Ocean News], 29 December 
2014, p� 1�
 63� 张斌键 [Zhang Binjian], 以法护海的巾帼卫
士——记国家海洋局海洋发展战略所副所
长张海文 [“The Heroine Who Uses the Law 
to Safeguard the Sea—A Profile of Deputy 
Director of CIMA Zhang Haiwen”], 中国海
洋报 [China Ocean News], 26 June 2013, p� 3�
 64� Ibid�
 65� 郑明 [Zheng Ming], “搁置争议 共同开发”
前提是“主权属我” [“The Precondition for 
‘Shelving Disputes and Engaging in Joint 
Development’ Is ‘Sovereignty Is Mine’”], 中
国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 3 September 
2013�
 66� For more on the history and efficacy of 
the twelve-character strategy for handling 
disputes, see 温勇 [Wen Yong], 新形势下维
护海洋权益解决海洋争议的思考—对邓小
平 “主权属我, 搁置争议, 共同开发” 思想
的再探讨 [“Considerations on Safeguarding 
Maritime Rights and Interests and Resolving 
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Maritime Disputes in the New Situation—A 
Reconsideration of Deng Xiaoping’s Ideas 
on ‘Sovereignty Belongs to China, Shelve 
the Disputes, and Engage in Joint Develop-
ment’”], 中国军事科学 [China Military 
Science], no� 2 (2015), pp� 67–74� Wen is a 
professor at the Dalian Naval Academy�
 67� Yu Zhirong (郁志荣) is one of the more 
prolific retired maritime law-enforcement 
officers (former CMS) currently research-
ing and writing on maritime strategy� He is a 
researcher at the China Maritime Develop-
ment Research Center (中国海洋发展研究
中心), which is an association of experts from 
the SOA, provincial and municipal maritime 
agencies, and Chinese universities� It was 
established in 2006� For information on this 
organization, see 黄冉 [Huang Ran], 国家海
洋局局长刘赐贵会见中国海洋发展研究
中心主任王曙光 [“SOA Director Liu Cigui 
Meeting the Director of the China Maritime 
Development Research Center Wang  
Shuguang”], 海洋局网站 [SOA website], 20 
May 2011, www�soa�gov�cn/�
 68� The most recent edition was published in 
2014� See 张文木 [Zhang Wenmu], 论中国海
权 [On Chinese Sea Power] (Beijing: Ocean, 
2014)�
 69� See, for example, “海洋观与建设海洋强国”
学术研讨会发言 (摘登) [“Remarks Made 
at an Academic Conference on the Topic of 
‘Views of the Ocean and Building China into  
 a Maritime Power’” (excerpts)], 中国海洋报 
[China Ocean News], 1 September 2014, p� 3�
 70� The title of Zhang’s lecture was “A Chang-
ing Global Situation and China’s National 
Security�” 路涛 [Lu Tao], 海洋强国战略培
训班在京举办 [“A Training Class on China’s 
Maritime Power Strategy Takes Place in 
Beijing”], 中国海洋报 [China Ocean News], 
26 November 2014, p� 2�
 71� 从政治高度认识“一带一路”的战略意义—
本刊专访北京航空航天大学战略问题研究
中心张文木教授 [“A Political Understand-
ing of the Strategic Significance of the ‘One 
Belt—One Road’—An Interview with Zhang 
Wenmu”], 国防 [National Defense], no� 7 
(2015), pp� 22–25�
 72� For additional detail on Zhang, see Lyle J� 
Goldstein, “Get Ready: China Could Pull a 
‘Crimea’ in Asia,” National Interest Online, 
11 April 2015, nationalinterest�org/� Other 
outside scholars who study Chinese maritime 
affairs but may have direct connections 
with policy makers, the sea services, or both 
include Hu Bo (胡波), a researcher at Peking 
University’s Maritime Research Institute; Ni 
Lexiong (倪乐雄), a professor at Shanghai 
University of Political Science and Law; Shi 
Yinhong (时殷弘), a professor at Renmin 
University; Wu Shicun (吴士存), president 
of China’s National Institute for South China 
Sea Studies; Zhang Jie (张洁), a researcher 
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; 
Zhang Mingyi (张明义), a member of the 
Senior Advisory Committee on National 
Maritime Development; and Zhu Feng (朱
锋), executive director of the China Center 
for Collaborative Studies of the South China 
Sea at Nanjing University�
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Reassessing the Afghanistan Surge Decision
Francis G. Hoffman
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try officer and a graduate of the Naval Command 
and Staff College (with highest distinction). He now 
serves as a senior research fellow at the Institute 
for National Strategic Studies at National Defense 
University.
Naval War College Review, Summer 2016, Vol. 69, No. 3
STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT AND ADAPTATION
 As former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once noted, we go to war with the Army (and Navy) we have. However, we do not necessarily win wars 
with the same armed forces or strategy with which we began them. Often, these 
forces initially are not optimized for the particular conflict in which they become 
engaged, and even when they are, adaptive adversaries present unanticipated 
challenges. Often throughout history, leaders have needed to recognize that their 
initial plans were not successful and that adaptation (organizationally, doctrin-
ally, or in weapons and equipment) was needed.1
Because of war’s inherently interactive nature, victory often depends on which 
side most quickly can recognize problems or gaps in performance and implement 
changes. Despite this well-grounded observation, interest has arisen only recently 
in how military organizations adapt during war.2 Moreover, what literature does 
exist focuses heavily on operational and tactical forms of change, overlooking 
strategic adaptation.
This article explores that gap, beginning with an overview of the literature on 
assessment and adaptation. Next it establishes an analytical framework for both 
strategic assessment and adaptation that will serve as the basis for a subsequent 
analysis of a particular strategic reassessment: the Obama administration’s surge 
decision in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM.3 The 
article concludes by offering insights relevant to 
senior policy makers and the joint community.
ASSESSMENT AS ART AND SCIENCE
In studying military adaptation over the course 
of the twentieth century, one historian concluded 
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that “[a]daptation in one form or another has been a characteristic of success-
ful military institutions and human societies under the pressures of war�”4 Yet 
education and doctrine often overlook this strategic assessment and adaptation 
function�
While strategic assessment represents a crucial element of a state’s ability to 
adapt strategy to changing wartime conditions, it is not a regular field for schol-
arly study� This is odd, since it plays a critical role in determining the outcome 
and cost of wars�5 A major shortfall in the conduct of our national security sys-
tem has been the lack of appreciation for a continuous assessment of strategy 
implementation� Our national security mechanisms should not stop when the 
president issues a decision� Instead, an “end-to-end” approach must encompass 
policy formulation, strategy development, planning guidance, resource alloca-
tion and alignment, implementation oversight, and performance assessment 
based on feedback loops�6
Research by a number of experienced policy makers and scholars underscores 
how important it is for the National Security Council (NSC) system to incorpo-
rate effective mechanisms for oversight and performance assessment—yet how 
hard some agencies resist the same�7 The NSC remains a valuable mechanism for 
ensuring that presidents entertain a full set of feasible options, i�e�, that options 
and positions are vetted and aired; and that large governmental bureaucracies get 
the strategic direction they need�8 The NSC must also remain in oversight mode 
to ensure that strategic direction is implemented as intended�
The importance of campaign and operational assessment is well known to the 
American military community� Critical issues involved in assessment include 
evaluation of intelligence; likely international consequences of proposed actions; 
the operational plans proposed to obtain defined political objectives; and a state’s 
relative capabilities, including how well they relate to the requirements the strat-
egy proposed is likely to entail�9 The role of metrics in operational assessments 
and their complexity in accurately measuring progress in counterinsurgency 
campaigns is also recognized� So too is the potential danger of politicization of 
metrics to satisfy bureaucratic or institutional politics�
During the Vietnam War, U�S� military operations were assessed using new 
techniques derived from systems analysis and operations research� Derived from 
the physical sciences, these proved less valuable in capturing the more political 
and socioeconomic aspects of the Vietnam War� The assessment of progress at 
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) was oversimplified in one 
sense by concentration on body counts and kill ratios, then later overcomplicated 
by consideration of an abundance of metrics�10 When critics challenged MACV’s 
strategy, there was strong pressure to generate favorable indicators to buttress the 
appearance of progress�11
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American operations in Iraq and Afghanistan faced similarly daunting re-
quirements for data collection�12 The challenges involved in selecting, collecting, 
and analyzing the right metrics in combat theaters are significant� There are 
myriad political, sociocultural, and economic factors relevant to combating in-
surgencies and civil wars� At the operational level, participants can operate under 
a biased view of how well they are doing but overlook disquieting indicators� At 
the strategic level, the national command authority needs to establish sources 
and consider the resultant feedback to monitor progress and adapt as necessary�
American experience in and official doctrine for assessment are limited, re-
sulting in “inventive but ad hoc solutions” at the operational level, as Ben Con-
nable puts it in Embracing the Fog of War�13 The analytical community crafted 
measures to promote an understanding of the operational effectiveness of the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan� Assessing prog-
ress was recognized as important because the perception of progress has an effect 
on the sustainability of the war effort�14 Joint doctrine evolved to capture these 
lessons�
Although operational-level metrics and campaign assessments are necessary, 
they are not sufficient at the national level� An operational assessment provides 
insights into the progress of a strategy or campaign plan, but it should not be 
confused with a national strategic-level assessment, which must incorporate a 
much larger perspective involving international risks, opportunity costs, coali-
tion dynamics, and national resources� A strategic assessment often will take a 
regional if not a global perspective, and will factor in political elements� A strate-
gic assessment also must account for domestic political constraints, resourcing, 
and opportunity costs� The experience of the last fifteen years reveals more ad 
hoc solutions applied to this higher and less-quantitative form of strategic review�
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
To explore this challenge, I used Risa Brooks’s attributes of strategic assessment as 
an analytical framework�15 To evaluate the strategic logic and the appropriateness 
of the strategic adaptation decision, I added a fifth element� The five factors are 
defined as follows:
• Performance-assessment mechanisms capture the quality of institutional 
structures and processes devoted to evaluations of our intelligence concern-
ing enemy capabilities and capacities, as well as the evaluation of our own 
political and military activities and progress� Such mechanisms also must 
include a capacity to assess the interdependent political, diplomatic, and 
developmental activities consistent with effective counterinsurgency�
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• Collaborative information-sharing environment describes the routines and 
conventions of dialogue associated with exchanging information at the apex 
of decision making� Key to information sharing is the degree of openness 
and how forthcoming participants are about options and assessments not 
favorable to their preferred policy outcomes� “Collaborative” means a climate 
in which parties are free to explore options, test assumptions, and debate the 
merits of those options� A collaborative context is not consensus driven, but 
instead searches for good options and viable compromises�
• Strategic coordination captures the overall governmental structure and 
mechanisms used to develop and make policy decisions� These influence 
how well policy is defined, how strategies are developed, and how well mili-
tary aspects are coordinated with diplomatic activities and other aspects of 
the state� These measures should identify disconnects among the respective 
elements of a strategy, questionable assumptions, unintended consequences, 
and inconsistent objectives�16
• Decision-making authorization clarity captures how state leaders articulate 
and promulgate decisions and the degree to which those decisions are com-
municated unambiguously� Within this dimension, decision-making flexibil-
ity, subordinates’ prerogatives, and accountability for constituent pieces of a 
larger strategy are allocated and defined�
• Strategic coherence evaluates the inherent logic of the proposed adaptation 
and its linkage of ends, ways, and means� A coherent strategy matches a 
selected approach to the diagnosed problem and allocates commensurate 
responsibility and resources�17 Coherence integrates the use of all instruments 
and tools of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and eco-
nomic� The purpose of a strategy is to establish and preserve the alignment of 
ends, ways, and means�18 That alignment is the essence of coherence�
As Richard Betts has noted, “Strategy fails when the chosen means prove in-
sufficient to the ends� This can happen because the wrong means are chosen or 
because the ends are too ambitious or slippery�”19 To that we should add, “� � � or 
because the wrong way is selected�” All three—ends, ways, and means—have to 
be tied together coherently�
This set of factors is crucial to creating a foundation for understanding ad-
aptation at the strategic level� One cannot understand strategic-level adaptation 
without considering the mechanisms and institutional capacity for strategic as-
sessment� The criteria employed in our evaluation of the strategic adaptations in 
this case study are presented in the table below�
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ASSESSING THE OBAMA ASSESSMENT
The detailed history of the protracted debate over Afghanistan strategy has been 
covered elsewhere�20 This section focuses on an analysis of the major components 
of the assessment�
Performance-Assessment Mechanisms
Even state-of-the-art operational assessment leaves much to be desired, and there 
is no evidence from the Afghan surge debate to suggest that strategic assessment 
is any easier to perform or yields better results� Multiple assessments by RAND, 
NATO allies, and service schools concluded that the complex metrics collection 
systems used in Afghanistan did not meet policy needs or those of military deci-
sion makers�21 One study on operational assessment noted, “Once again, � � � the 
pitfalls in trying to quantify complex dynamics [have] made the production of 
accurate and useful assessments a persistently elusive aim�”22
The challenges in Afghanistan included the complexity of the counterinsur-
gency effort and the management of a large coalition� ISAF eventually put an 
extensive effort into data collection, but the focus was on operational and tacti-
cal data, and not at the right level for strategic audiences� One scholar concluded 
that the flaws in the currently used approaches “are sufficiently egregious” that 
professional military judgment on assessments is “rightfully distrusted�”23 The in-
grained optimism—the “can-do” spirit—of the U�S� military may be an additional 
complicating factor�24
Assessments in Afghanistan proved especially problematic owing to that 
campaign’s dynamics, producing numerous criticisms and recommendations 
for innovative solutions�25 NATO produced a major evaluation of the credibil-
ity of assessment methods for both Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and Operation 
Assessment and Adaptation Factors Criteria
1� Performance-assessment  
mechanisms
Did the NSC have a process to monitor independently data collected on 
progress and costs, and other relevant metrics?
2� Collaborative environment  Did the process allow perspectives and intelligence to be completely shared 
in a climate in which parties were free to explore policy aims, assumptions, 
and options openly?
3� Strategic coordination Did the coordination process produce both strategic positions and options? 
Were they integrated and coordinated?
4� Decision-making authorization 
clarity
Was a clear presidential decision issued, in writing, with timely  
guidance?
5� Strategic coherence Did the selected strategy adaptation resolve the diagnosed problem and 
align ends, ways, and means?
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ENDURING FREEDOM� That effort found that “[i]n both of these campaigns, se-
nior leaders across the various coalition nations demanded reams of quantitative 
data from their operational commanders which, in some cases, may have been 
an attempt to compensate for a lack of operational and strategic clarity and the 
inability to discern meaningful progress over time�”26
The NATO study includes a report that one regional command in Afghanistan 
required subordinate units to collect and transmit some four hundred different 
metrics� A senior assessment officer in Kabul once estimated that more than two 
thousand mandatory reportable quantitative metrics were levied on subordinate 
units across the theater�27
In Afghanistan in the summer of 2009, the newly appointed commander of 
ISAF, Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal, knew the critical importance of 
assessment and indicators at both the operational and strategic levels of war� 
Specifically, he understood that ISAF needed to identify and refine appropriate 
indicators to assess progress so as to clarify the difference between operational 
measures of effectiveness critical to practitioners on the ground and strategic 
measures more appropriate to national capitals�28 In contrast, the component 
agencies tended to define their contributions and metrics in terms of inputs or 
traditional tasks rather than the actual outputs achieved�
McChrystal’s strategic review, which received augmentation by volunteer 
scholars, warrants more study in that it is an exception: it strove to be a real stra-
tegic assessment�29 However, its orientation was on defining the requirements for 
a fully resourced and effective counterinsurgency effort, answering the presumed 
question about what it would take to defeat the Taliban, as opposed to providing 
a clear delineation of national interests, policy, and options� In addition, while the 
ISAF review was quite impressive, it lacked a broad enough charter and repre-
sentation (State Department, embassy, coalition, and interagency) to serve as the 
basis for subsequent NSC deliberations� Moreover, it failed to address the trans-
regional and political barriers that were the real problem in obtaining desired 
results� Some believe that the McChrystal approach should be continued—but 
they fail to recognize how critically the report was received at the White House�
In any case, theater military commands are not structured to produce such 
strategic assessments� The ISAF product failed to incorporate alliance perspec-
tives, much less the concerns of U�S� ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry; 
and it did not truly address Pakistan� It was too narrow, so it only spurred the 
larger and longer review that the president and NSC staff started immediately 
upon receiving ISAF’s inputs and troop request�
Overall, in this case, performance-assessment mechanisms were limited, par-
ticularly at the NSC, which in the summer of 2009 was not yet effectively oversee-
ing the administration’s foreign policy agenda�
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Collaborative Information-Sharing Environment
The president’s desire for disciplined debate, his request for options, and his evi-
dent discomfort with early portions of the debate suggest that information shar-
ing was limited� The president’s reaching out to his staff and to the vice chairman 
to gain additional insights and to push for more-constrained options suggests 
that this component of the process was not fully satisfied�
Some scholars suggest that, by trying to preclude political interference, the 
military input to the Afghanistan assessment process ended up degrading the 
civil-military discourse needed both to understand and to alter the strategy in 
that campaign�30 No overt efforts to manipulate assessment data in Operation 
ENDURING FREEDOM have been identified, but the strategic dialogue between na-
tional and theater-level officials certainly was strained� Participants share consid-
erable agreement that candor and trust were corrupted early in the process, and 
that their resultant low levels negatively impacted the decision-making process� 
On several occasions, speeches, leaks, and comments to the media or Congress 
created the impression that the military was trying to maneuver the president 
into a box�31 McChrystal’s assessment was leaked almost as soon as it arrived in 
Washington, and Ambassador Eikenberry’s secret cables also were deliberately 
given to the media� Both former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and General 
McChrystal believe that these leaks and media comments negatively impacted 
the decision-making process� Policy options and strategic discourse between 
civilian and military officials at the NSC are best conducted in a climate in which 
candor exists and options and various positions are debated thoroughly� Such a 
context helps produce sound policy decisions and strategies�32
Strategic Coordination
In the case of Afghanistan, the NSC initially was not aware of the existence of 
resource gaps, confusion over the mission, or inconsistent objectives� It was not 
aware that the ISAF staff was unclear about U�S� policy objectives, and that, in the 
absence of clear policy aims or guidance, ISAF was making a counterinsurgency 
approach the basis of its strategy� The terms of reference for the ISAF strategic 
assessment, issued by Mr� Gates, were vague, but ISAF took many steps to ensure 
its own review had a strategic focus�
The greatest challenge in the surge debate was over the assessment of strategy 
options� A president and his policy team need options, and Mr� Obama expressly 
asked for distinct options� These should include a full range of credible options, 
not just the preferred solution� A military leader with NSC experience notes that 
representatives “must generate real strategic options to give the president actual 
choices; however, the ends to which each option can aspire and the inherent risks 
involved in them are often dissimilar, and the nation’s senior civilian leadership 
needs to understand those dynamics as well�”33
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If the president does not believe in the validity of the options the military 
provides, he will seek options elsewhere� The military did not give President 
George W� Bush a range of options for Iraq in 2006 until he insisted on their 
development, nor did it give President Obama a range of options for Afghanistan 
in 2009� Mr� Obama was not well served by the seemingly united front created 
by a Secretary of Defense, a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), and a 
regional combatant commander who aligned behind, and limited discussion to, 
one option� Because of this, the president was engaged in deliberations more than 
was typical, and he felt compelled to generate his own option�34
A second weak spot in the 2009 assessment was the isolation of the political 
element of the strategy from the military component� There was little doubt the 
thirty-thousand-troop surge would enhance security� It would blunt the Taliban’s 
momentum, buying additional time by slowing, if not reversing, Taliban gains� 
The injection of additional forces could lead Taliban leaders to reconsider and 
to recognize that the United States was increasingly committed to securing U�S� 
interests, which could lead to more mutually beneficial negotiations within Af-
ghanistan� Yet while the proposed new strategy accepted Afghan president Karzai 
as a difficult partner, the surge decision was not used to create additional political 
leverage and conditionality for Karzai to reform his government and mitigate 
levels of corruption and incompetence� Furthermore, the NSC decision did not 
assess and resolve correctly whether the Afghan security forces could meet their 
recruiting goals and minimum effectiveness standards within the resource con-
straints and timelines President Obama had framed� Creating sustainable Afghan 
national security forces clearly would be a longer-term but relevant issue if U�S� 
security interests were to be served� Finally, the State Department’s contributions 
were long on promise but short on delivery� Both the strategic assessment and 
NSC oversight should have tested State’s capacity actually to support the plan�
Coordination requires that both sides actually endeavor to understand vari-
ous civilian and military perspectives� This is not a simple matter� As Dr� Janine 
Davidson, a former Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) policy official, has 
noted:
The “professional” military officer has certain expectations about how to craft “best 
military advice” for the President that are deeply embedded into the organizational 
culture and in fact hard-wired into the institutionalized and incredibly detailed 
military planning processes� This planning process is designed with expectations 
about the roles civilian leadership will play in providing guidance, which are in many 
ways out of synch with the expectations of the President and his civilian advisers� 
Ultimately, the output of the military’s planning process fails to deliver the type of nu-
anced advice in the form of creative options that the President needs�35
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Ultimately, the nation’s best interests are served when strategy decisions are 
the product of a rigorous process in which civilian policy makers have options 
and are informed about risks�36 Such reviews require a thorough examination of a 
full range of feasible options� In this case, however, it was only with the personal 
involvement of and “pushing” by the president that discrete policy options were 
developed and debated� Ultimately, again with the deliberate engagement of the 
president, competing factions hashed out a consensus on both the aims and the 
specific “ways” of a strategy� However, because the gaps in political strategy were 
left open, and because the requisite nonmilitary contributions from State and the 
Agency for International Development were not tested for true feasibility, the 
strategic coordination phase, while deliberate, was less than robust, and therefore 
not fully satisfactory�
Decision-Making Authorization Clarity
There appears to be little doubt that the president was immersed fully in making, 
and invested fully in, the final strategic decisions in 2009� However, the six-page 
strategic memorandum that President Obama purportedly authored contains 
contradictions� The president apparently intended, on the basis of a reading of 
Gordon Goldstein’s Lessons in Disaster, that the Vietnam War problem of unclear 
objectives would not be repeated�37 Yet his strategic guidance, while intended to 
reduce ambiguity and reflect the president’s commitment to the decision, evi-
dences distinct tensions between the diagnosis of the problems in Afghanistan 
and a limited allocation of resources and time�
Clarity was augmented by the discourse among the principals, and by the pres-
ident directly questioning each to receive an express assent to the final strategy� 
From the inauguration in January 2009 through late November, the ISAF com-
mander may have had some questions about what the new administration really 
wanted to achieve in Afghanistan; that doubt or ambiguity was clarified during 
the surge debate� The president’s 29 November memo reinforces the clarity of the 
commander’s intent� The U�S� goal in Afghanistan was “to deny safe haven to al 
Qaeda and to deny the Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan government�” 
The military mission was defined in six operational objectives, which were to be 
“limited in scope and scale to only what is necessary to attain the U�S� goal�”38 In 
case there was any question, the president’s memo noted, “This approach is not 
fully resourced counterinsurgency or nation building�”39 However, the president 
also listed numerous military and civilian tasks at the operational level that are 
fully consistent with a broad counterinsurgency approach� The guidance instructs 
the military to reverse the Taliban’s momentum, deny it access to and control of 
key population centers and lines of communication, disrupt the insurgency and 
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its Al Qaeda allies, and degrade their capability to a point at which Afghan na-
tional security forces could manage the threat�
There is little doubt the president reshaped the mission’s scale; authorized 
resources for specific purposes; and introduced a temporal dimension, fram-
ing a faster introduction of U�S� forces� But while he narrowed the mission and 
authorized a substantial force, that force was to accomplish many challenging 
tasks within a tight time frame� Moreover, that time frame was introduced into 
the debate only belatedly, at a time when military commanders were not inclined 
to argue with the president� Overall, this element of the framework was satisfied 
only partially�
Strategic Coherence
Senior leaders, both civilians and military officers, are hard pressed in their 
deliberations to preserve the vital linkages between policy and strategy and 
between objectives and operations� Richard Betts has warned that busy leaders 
have little time to ensure that the logic of a strategy is tested or that the coher-
ence of ends, ways, and means is preserved� Often what is left is a strategy that 
“has unexamined assumptions and slogans left over from coping with their main 
preoccupations�”40
The adaptations the Obama administration proposed in 2009 sought to align 
U�S� strategy better with policy aims, but ended up focusing almost entirely on 
the military “means”—the size and duration of the surge—rather than the pos-
sible “ways�” Despite references throughout the strategy review to the centrality 
of Afghan politics and governance, there is little evidence that alternative political 
strategies were considered�41
As Secretary Gates has noted, the concept of an efficient, corruption-free, 
effective Afghan central government was “a fantasy�”42 By 2009, there was grow-
ing recognition that the highly centralized Afghan government created through 
the 2001 Bonn Agreement and the 2004 constitution was becoming untenable�43 
While McChrystal’s staff was cognizant of the need for a bottom-up approach to 
complement efforts to build the capacity of the central government, the White 
House review process did not generate alternative political strategies to induce 
Kabul to devolve power or reduce its perceived corruption�44
Policy and strategic discussions during this reassessment too often focused 
on the familiar military component (force levels, deployment timelines, and so 
forth) and too little on the larger challenge of political reform, state building, 
and host-nation capacity� The need for some political influence over Karzai was 
evident, but was not incorporated into the U�S� strategy� Unlike in Iraq, there was 
no discussion about using conditionality of U�S� support as a form of leverage to 
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push for political reforms in Kabul� Absent those changes, as Ambassador Eiken-
berry stressed, success from the surge would be limited�45
The strategic assessment conducted in 2009 better defined U�S� core interests, 
policy, and plans� Were those criteria exhaustive, the strategy review would be 
judged a success� However, the decision was promulgated with a defined time 
limit� This had some utility, in that it created a sense of urgency for deploying 
troops and accelerating Afghan force training� But it also generated the percep-
tion of limited U�S� commitment to success� The premature announcement of 
the withdrawal was an error induced by U�S� domestic politics�46 This signaled 
to both our allies and regional powers that American patience was waning—and 
could be outlasted� This did not contribute to positive coalition or host-nation 
perceptions or to U�S� strategic success� Moreover, the civilian and political com-
ponents of the surge were not well integrated into the final strategy, leaving them 
less likely to be implemented as needed�
INSIGHTS
Improving Performance Assessment
Continuous monitoring of strategy implementation is a task shared among the 
NSC, OSD, and Joint Staff� Periodic reassessment is necessary for the successful 
prosecution of any strategy, and its scope should include intelligence, assump-
tions, and execution� In this case, a lack of staff mechanisms for monitoring 
prevented the necessary reassessment and the timely development of potential 
solutions for the president� The NSC staff should institutionalize these mecha-
nisms rather than depend on ad hoc tasking�
The experience of the last two wars suggests that improved strategic oversight 
is needed�47 Instead of a planning board, strategic planning directorate, or war 
czar, some form of implementation board or strategy assessment directorate ap-
pears warranted�48 Implementation oversight really should be the most important 
role the NSC staff plays on behalf of the cabinet� But “unless the President himself 
makes it very clear that the NSC staff has specific authority to oversee implemen-
tation, there is a strong resistance from the Departments to respond to the NSC 
staff,” as a former NSC staffer has noted�49
The functional departments should not view this role for the NSC staff as “in-
trusive�”50 And the cost of a dozen personnel at the White House seems a pittance 
if it helps a harried set of leaders understand how well their strategic direction 
is being implemented or how the adversary is reacting� It certainly amounts to 
far less than the bill for poorly crafted strategies or ineffective operations� The 
NSC leadership should be able to conduct independent and rigorous strategic 
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reassessments, and employ red-teaming techniques�51 Reassessments must be 
brutally objective and consider external and diverse viewpoints (including those 
of coalition partners)� It is hard for folks to “grade their own homework” objec-
tively or to recognize quickly that a preferred plan is not succeeding� The em-
ployment of staff dedicated to these reassessments would help to avoid strategic 
inertia and the politicization of the assessment process�52
Building and Sustaining a Collaborative Environment
Given the complex nature of contemporary conflict, integrated strategy develop-
ment and assessment processes are necessary� In an atmosphere of deliberation, 
candor, and transparency, efforts should focus on maximizing the value of diverse 
and interdisciplinary inputs to policy/strategy development and assessment�
The experience of the past fourteen years suggests that effective civilian and 
military interaction is (and always has been) critical to the framing of realistic 
policy objectives and effective strategy�53 Effective civil-military relations are 
critical to effectiveness in assessing and adapting national policy�54
Senior joint leaders must strive to sustain a professional relationship with 
civilian policy makers and avoid the appearance of trying to go around or negate 
presidential decisions� An absence of friction within policy debates would be 
suspect, but such friction never should be publicly evident, at least emanating 
from military professionals�55
Collaboration does not mean tension-free debate or the subordination of the 
military� The existing NSC system has tensions built into it; these make debates 
uncomfortable but productive� Instead of fighting the process or trying to impose 
a military framework on civilian politicians, military leaders should understand 
the process and embrace it�56 As former CJCS Mike Mullen has noted, “Policy 
and strategy should constantly struggle with one another� Some in the military no 
doubt would prefer political leadership that lays out a specific strategy and then 
gets out of the way, leaving the balance of the implementation to commanders 
in the field� But the experience of the last nine years tells us two things: A clear 
strategy for military operations is essential; and that strategy will have to change 
as those operations evolve�”57
Senior military leaders should understand that influence and trust go together 
and that, just as networking and relationships with peers are important to pro-
fessional success, the same relationship building will pay dividends vis-à-vis po-
litical leaders�58 Moreover, civil-military relations are an important professional 
ethic and part of the educational process for both civilian and military leaders�59 
Senior officers embrace that ethic, but also must temper their public communica-
tions carefully to avoid creating an impression that they are attempting to influ-
ence decisions in the public arena�
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Improving Strategic Coordination
It is important for senior military leaders to understand the decision-making 
process and participate in that process fully� American history contains examples 
of problems encountered in the meshing of civilian and military perspectives�60 
Given the iterative nature of policy and strategy formulation, some tense interac-
tion should be expected; however, a deep historical understanding of strategy and 
solid relationships should overcome friction at the council table�
An important insight for senior policy advisers is to understand how decisions 
are made and how information is evaluated in the policy/strategy process� Policy 
makers are not hardwired to apply lockstep templates or a linear, military-style 
decision-making process� NSC staff officials will not be graduates of professional 
military education (PME) programs� Civilian political officials often will explore 
an array of options without defining a firm political end state� They may be more 
comfortable exploring “the art of the possible” and examining political factors 
and risks differently, including in a far more fluid or intuitive manner� They may 
be more comfortable with ambiguity, political elements, and other intangibles�
During reassessment, as during strategy development, senior military leaders 
should be prepared to challenge assumptions and vague policy aims, as well as to 
offer creative options (ways) to satisfy desired ends� As one military observer to 
this process has concluded, “To be effective and to assist the president in crafting 
and implementing national-security policy involving military force, senior mili-
tary leaders must embrace a more involved role in the back-and-forth dialogue 
necessary to build effective policies and workable strategies�”61
Senior joint leaders must give the president options as, at the end of the day, he 
is the accountable decision maker� As General Martin Dempsey observed, “That’s 
what being commander in chief is all about�”62 Options not wholly acceptable 
or valid for military reasons may still be viable to policy makers and should be 
considered, even when they are neither preferred nor supported� Of several pos-
sible “sins” in strategy development, the commandant of the Army War College, 
Major General William Rapp, noted that the first is for the military to present a 
single option to civilian leaders, trying to force a decision rather than engender a 
dialogue� The next-worst course is to offer an artificially framed suite of strategic 
options centered on the option desired, with all the rest designed to be presented 
as throwaways�63
Policy makers want options, but these need to be real options; they must be 
feasible and suitable; they cannot merely be politically expedient, nor merely 
satisfy preferred military paradigms�64 A failure to provide more than a single 
solution will cede the initiative to the NSC staff or other outlets� Senior military 
officers critical of what they perceive as recent NSC staff intrusions into strategy 
options overlook their own responsibility for previously having shorted President 
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Obama’s request for an array of strategic options in Afghanistan� In the Afghani-
stan case study, a number of options did emerge, but the NSC process failed to 
reconcile those competing views productively�65
The Department of Defense should adapt its education programs to prepare of-
ficers better for the complexity of national-level policy-making processes at the in-
teragency level� Those reforms should emphasize a more iterative mode of policy- 
strategic interaction�66 We are preparing future military leaders for frustration 
or failure if they come away from the classroom with only a linear and mecha-
nistic approach to strategy, one that is long on process and short on the reality 
of strategy development at the highest levels� Educational programs also should 
ensure that military officers understand the interplay of all elements of national 
power� Senior military leaders need to be able to participate in and shape national 
strategy discussions involving these elements, not just to apply military tools�67
Gaining Better Strategic Decision Clarity 
It is clear that military leaders were unclear on U�S� policy aims in Afghanistan 
during much of the first year of the Obama administration�68 Theoretically, the 
president himself established the strategic clarity behind the Afghan surge in a 
formal document late in the deliberative reassessment process� Despite that doc-
ument, some, such as Professor Hew Strachan, have claimed that there was a lack 
of clear political guidance, resulting in doubt about what the actual U�S� policy 
was�69 Yet the ISAF commander and the U�S� ambassador, along with their chains 
of command all the way back to Washington, participated in a rather painstaking 
review of that policy� If, after the December decision and the presidential speech, 
there was confusion about either the policy or the resulting strategy, it was not 
because senior military leaders were absent from the council table or they lacked 
the president’s written guidance� More accurately, the final decision contained 
compromises that reduced clarity and imposed constraints on the strategy that 
Central Command and ISAF preferred, in terms of time and force levels� A lack 
of agreement on an element of the strategy is not the same as a lack of clarity� The 
president’s guidance memo was clear on the “how” and the “what,” but was silent 
on the inherently political “why” and the desired end being sought� Understand-
ing Mr� Obama’s intent would have helped�
The NSC staff can also do a better job of generating presidential policy deci-
sions in a timely manner� To preserve strategic coherence and coordination at 
lower levels across the joint force, senior defense leaders should ensure these 
decisions are promulgated�
Establishing Greater Strategic Coherence
At the national level, policies and strategy are inseparable� National strategies 
must focus on achieving political objectives� Because war is a political act, 
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military strategies must be embedded in and supportive of overall national strate-
gies� The latter must address the use of all elements of national power, they should 
be founded on a strategic logic, and the two types must be linked coherently to 
each other� Sustaining coherency, as Betts notes, involves asking “whether choices 
at any level do or do not maintain a logical consistency with levels above and 
below, and ultimately a consistency between political ends and military means�” 
Senior military leaders must be prepared to serve as the principal strategists to 
ensure a coherent linkage between desired policy objectives and a detailed and 
feasible plan to obtain them�
Strategic coherence in conflicts such as Afghanistan includes a political ele-
ment, and during that conflict U�S� military officers appeared reticent in engaging 
in that element of strategic discourse (General Petraeus was an exception)� Yet 
senior officers have to be cognizant of all instruments of power and the elements 
that drive conflict� National and military strategies are not separate, and military 
officers cannot simply isolate themselves in a professional “lane�”70 Civilian of-
ficials expect to receive inputs from military leaders who truly are expert in their 
sphere (the application of military force), but they also prize advice from senior 
officials who understand how the different components of U�S� power are inte-
grated and best applied coherently�71
The political literacy of U�S� military officers is considered suspect by some 
of the military’s own strategists�72 This may be a function of the U�S� military’s 
apolitical character, which some scholarly observers find to be too focused on 
connecting operations to tactics and too ready to perceive the operational level of 
war as a “politics-free zone�”73 Instead, the interplay of political factors, including 
coalition and domestic politics, must be understood as part of high-level strategy� 
American military officers must get past their reserve about the role played by 
politics, in all its forms� Political considerations do not constitute simply an in-
convenient restraint on military operations�74 Over the course of the last decade, 
the American military community has experienced the consequences of politi-
cal illiteracy and has absorbed a keener appreciation for political influence at all 
levels�75 PME institutions should ensure their curricula capture and reflect this 
hard-earned experience�
The military literacy of civilian officials requires equal attention� Civilian 
leaders need a better appreciation for the complexities of military strategy and 
operations� Richard Betts’s observation from fifteen years ago remains just as true 
today: “For strategy to bridge policy and operations, civilian and military profes-
sionals on either side of the divide need more empathy with the priorities and 
limitations that those on the other side face� � � � Civilians cannot do this respon-
sibly, however, unless they acquire much more empirical knowledge of tactics, 
logistics, and operational doctrines than is normal for top-level staff these days�”76
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Our senior military leaders must be completely frank about the limits of raw 
military power, risk, and time frames for action�77 They also should ensure that 
military resources are not being risked without commensurate support from 
other agencies� In Afghanistan, the U�S� military was overinvested in doing its 
part, and it let military contributions get well ahead of the other instruments 
in the strategy�78 So security conditions were established, at great cost, to enable 
political and economic activities; but then nonmilitary elements of the strategy 
were completely absent, were not feasible, or were executed poorly�
Donald Rumsfeld was right: indeed, we do go to war with the military we have, 
and with an initial strategy as well� But wars rarely are won or concluded with the 
same force or the original strategy� The nature of war as a competitive clash of 
wills requires leaders, as the conflict evolves, to assess progress, recognize short-
falls, and resolve gaps in strategy or operational methods� The case studied herein 
supports the conclusion that the capacity to oversee implementation, conduct 
assessments, and alter strategy under fire during wartime is a clear contributor 
to strategic success� Professor Williamson Murray concluded a 2011 study of 
military adaptation with the claim that “[t]he ability to adapt at every level of war 
from the tactical to the strategic and political would seem to be more important 
� � � than [at] any time since 1941�”79 If that is true, this research is both timely and 
relevant�
U�S� policy makers and our military leaders eventually learned this lesson in 
both Iraq and Afghanistan� They adapted strategies to reflect new or changed 
circumstances� The joint force adapted its approaches in both conflicts and 
changed the senior commanders� However, this case shows we have room for 
improvement in tying together policy and strategy changes while conducting 
wartime reassessments� While senior-level courses at joint PME institutions ad-
dress national decision-making processes, more attention to enhancing political 
literacy of future leaders appears warranted�
Future military leaders should draw on this case to enhance their understand-
ing of strategic decision making and the assessment processes at the apex of our 
government� Strategic success in the future undoubtedly will depend on the 
factors that facilitated past successful strategies: proactivity in making choices, 
flexibility over rigidity, and discipline in thinking when applying force in the pur-
suit of political goals�80 It also will require an understanding of the influence of 
cognitive limitations, organizational politics, military culture, and civil-military 
relations that can preclude the timely conduct of strategic assessments�81
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N O T E S
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NATO’S NEW ROLE
ussia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine have been momentous in their con-
sequences for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)� Moscow 
has instilled new life in the almost seventy-year-old alliance� Doubts about its 
relevance and utility in the post–Cold War period have faded, at least for the 
time being, as leaders ponder what Russian leader Vladimir Putin will do next to 
challenge the alliance� This uncertainty weighs heavily on the heads of state and 
government of NATO’s twenty-eight members�1 NATO Secretary General Anders 
Fogh Rasmussen characterized the situation well when he wrote, “In these turbu-
lent times NATO must be prepared to undertake the full range of missions and to 
defend Allies against the full range of threats�”2
These are indeed turbulent times� But this is not a novel situation for the alli-
ance� Since its 1949 founding, NATO has experienced and survived many crises, 
including those in Berlin in 1958 and 1961, the Multilateral Force debate after the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and the deployment of intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles in the 1980s� With the end of the Cold War, NATO confronted another 
crisis: one of confidence�
Our central argument is that the transatlantic relationship is challenged by 
not only Russia’s Machtpolitik actions in Crimea and Ukraine but also the rise of 
China and the lack of a shared security identity between the United States and 
major NATO members� The deleterious conse-
quences of China’s rise are discerned increasingly 
well from Washington� As a result of Beijing’s rise 
and the U�S� strategic rebalancing to Asia to reas-
sure allies there and deter potential aggression, 
Europe is less important to the United States than 
R
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it was during the Cold War�3 Yet a strong U�S� commitment to NATO remains 
important precisely because of the expansion of China’s capabilities and the risk 
it poses to NATO�4
The consequences for NATO of the rise of China must be analyzed to identify 
policy solutions that will prevent a decline in the transatlantic alliance� To con-
tribute to this objective, we review the major military, political, and normative 
aspects of the NATO alliance and argue that an explicit “Norms and Principles” 
component within NATO should be created to reinforce Western identity so as to 
help the organization remain unified in the face of a rising China�
Our argument is significant for two reasons� First, the rise of China has the 
potential to drive the transatlantic alliance apart� This is only in part because the 
United States increasingly is focused on China as a hegemonic threat� Before Rus-
sia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U�S� commitment to NATO was under strain as a 
result of the Obama administration’s reorientation to confront the rise of China�5 
Russia’s actions have given the United States pause, and Washington is laboring 
to increase its presence in Europe while doing the same in Asia� In contrast, many 
in Europe view China not as a threat but as an increasingly sophisticated market, 
trading partner, investor, and lender� Generally, European capitals seek to main-
tain excellent relations with Beijing�6 Should this divergence continue to grow, it 
could place the United States and Europe at strategic loggerheads�
Second, a basic tenet of strategy is to divide your adversary from its allies and 
even win those allies over to your side� Thus, strategists should expect that China 
will seek to divide the West, if China’s rise continues and security competition 
intensifies�7 A United States allied with Europe is a far stronger competitor than a 
United States divided from major European allies, who may remain observers or 
de facto neutrals in a Sino-American crisis� Accordingly, as Sino-American secu-
rity competition increases, it is reasonable to expect that China will try to divide 
the United States from key NATO members through diplomatic and economic 
means� Members of the transatlantic community should anticipate this challenge 
and be prepared to meet it� In doing so, the normative aspect of the alliance can 
play a key role�
NATO AS A MILITARY ALLIANCE
NATO’s historical role as a military alliance was to deter attacks on its members 
and defend them if necessary� NATO was spectacularly successful in this during 
the Cold War, and we submit that this should not change—NATO’s military role 
remains significant�
Historically, NATO was designed as a military alliance to protect security, and 
it has been most effective and successful in performing this difficult task for over 
forty years�8 Indeed, NATO has proved to be one of the most successful alliances 
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in history�9 It served as an instrument to build sustainable security on the inter-
governmental level� The key objective was to contain the Soviet threat� NATO 
provided the security umbrella under which European states were able to bury 
ancient hatreds and unite against a common threat�
With the end of the Cold War, the complicated and rather messy institutional 
security frameworks—not only NATO, but also the World Trade Organization, 
Western European Union, European Community, and Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe—were the result of a correlation of military, politi-
cal, and economic efforts designed to advance European security in an evolving 
world� But despite the proliferation of new institutions and alliance missions, 
the central military concern over Russia never went away� The principal military 
role of the alliance remained to secure members, especially new member states 
on Russia’s periphery, against the Russian threat� Events in Estonia in 2007, in 
Georgia in 2008, and against Ukraine today demonstrate that the concern over 
the actions of Putin’s Russia is significant, and thus NATO’s military mission 
should remain in place�
NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE
NATO is also an alliance, so it is a political creature� As with its military role, we 
argue that this should not change� In essence, the political problems during the 
Cold War were threefold�
The first major challenge for the alliance was to incorporate West Germany 
into the alliance, despite a legacy of tremendous resistance to German rearma-
ment, particularly by the French�10 The hatred and fear directed toward Germany 
were unparalleled and served as a source of tension within the alliance�
The second challenge was to maintain the coherence and unity of the alliance 
whenever a significant alliance member chose to leave its military structure or 
to select neutrality� This was a central concern of Washington in the case of West 
Germany� As diplomatic historian Marc Trachtenberg argues, the fear that West 
Germany would accept a Soviet offer of unification in return for German neu-
trality was considerable in the 1950s and again with the appeal of Gorbachev in 
the mid- and late 1980s�11 Yet France was a major concern in this respect as well� 
De Gaulle’s 1966 decision to remove France from the military structure of the 
alliance but remain within the political structure was a major, albeit temporary, 
crisis for the alliance�
The third challenge was the fundamental question of the credibility of the 
U�S� commitment to maintain a robust, extended deterrent in the face of the 
growth in military power of the Warsaw Pact, particularly after the 1968 inva-
sion of Czechoslovakia, and the continuation of the buildup in conventional and 
nuclear forces into the 1970s and 1980s� U�S� credibility also fluctuated owing to 
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strategic setbacks the United States encountered, especially the fall of Saigon in 
1975 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979� The degree to which such events might 
have emboldened the Soviet Union is less significant than the perception among 
NATO members that the U�S� commitment to NATO was weakening� Reassur-
ing the Europeans—in the face of the ups and downs of political debates in the 
United States; concern over U�S� decline with relation to a rising Japan; and the 
significant, threatening Soviet buildup—was a substantial task�
In the post–Cold War period, the political situation is positive� Germany is 
unified and a core member of the alliance� Moreover, since 2009 France has once 
again been participating fully in the military command structure of the alliance� 
In addition, the extended deterrent of the United States is not questioned in the 
manner it was during the Cold War� Yet despite these improvements, the alliance 
confronts major political problems� First, the United States is a hegemon in rela-
tive decline in relation to China and, as a result of China’s economic and military 
growth, U�S� military resources and political attention are increasingly drawn to-
ward Asia� This generates concern within the alliance, especially as Russia under 
Putin has taken a more belligerent course�12
These concerns are significant now, and have the potential to become worse 
in the future, as they are the seeds out of which might grow a “decoupling” of 
the alliance� All else being equal, a tight coupling of NATO’s military capabilities 
and political intent augments the alliance’s deterrent capability and its political 
health� The threat from Russia is not the threat from the Soviet Union, to be sure� 
However, the lopsided nature of the threat from China—an increasing threat to 
the United States and its interests but a far lesser threat to European states—does 
introduce the potential for divergence�
Within the alliance, perceptions vary considerably regarding the threat China 
poses� For example, May-Britt Stumbaum, an expert on the European Union 
(EU)–China relationship, argues that, “given their significantly different global 
outlooks, the United States and the European Union differ fundamentally in their 
perceptions of China’s rise�”13 She submits that
Europe does not and will probably never share the United States’ hard power perspec-
tive on Asia-Pacific� The U�S�’ rebalancing to Asia-Pacific was spurred by strategic 
military consideration and is seen in an economic view only secondarily� � � � For the 
Europeans, and particularly Germany, the Asia-Pacific region and the relationship 
with China is shaped by the “tyranny of distance,” with Russia in between consum-
ing most of the strategic thinking and resources that Germany and Europe entertain 
eastward�14
Moreover, some European analysts, like Chinese ones, tout the importance of 
multipolarity in global politics, and the necessity for strategic cooperation in 
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the EU-China relationship�15 For instance, Gustaaf Geeraerts asserts that, “as [a] 
consequence of increased international engagement and increasing economic in-
terests abroad, Europe and China are geopolitically more proximate than ever be-
fore�”16 As these arguments suggest, this introduces the possibility that a wealthier 
and more prominent, powerful, and assertive China will be able to entice some 
European states into passivity, or even neutrality, in the event of a Sino-American 
crisis or confrontation�
NATO AS A NORMATIVE ALLIANCE
Although the normative component may be overlooked, given the traditional 
emphasis on the other two responsibilities, NATO has always incorporated this 
aspect� Among its members, the alliance advanced political principles regarding 
individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and due process and the rule of law� 
NATO represented political norms as much as it did military power, and these 
norms provided a stark contrast to oppression within the Soviet bloc�
NATO’s normative component advanced four major objectives:
• It defined national security and united alliance members�17 It served as the 
ultimate reason for the struggle with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact� 
Freedom and human rights were legitimate and superior to totalitarianism, 
and had to be defended against threats�
• It defined what the alliance was and was not: normatively, NATO was the op-
posite of the Warsaw Pact—a bastion of freedom opposed to tyranny�
• It provided a standard against which the domestic politics of member states 
would be measured�
• It served as a weapon to undermine the legitimacy of communism in the 
minds of the Soviet peoples, Soviet allies, and others worldwide, just as the 
Soviets attempted to undermine NATO� 
The normative content was not fixed but evolved to include opposition to racism 
and strongly nationalistic political sentiments, with all components remaining 
important�
Of course, the alliance was not perfect in its adherence to these norms dur-
ing the Cold War or after� NATO sided with many authoritarian governments 
with dismal human rights records� Yet it is equally true that at different times 
in the course of the Cold War the alliance exerted significant pressure on Spain 
to democratize, and it helped to stabilize the relationship between Greece and 
Turkey�18 The alliance worked to establish stable civil-military relations and to 
professionalize the militaries of these countries� It worked to foster democratic 
norms in these cases, as well as in the post–Cold War era� It has had considerable 
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success in transforming NATO from an alliance composed of a mix of authoritar-
ian and democratic governments to a fully democratic alliance�19
While NATO is a military and political alliance, it is also a Western alliance, so 
one of its aims is to protect and advance shared Western values and norms� With 
the end of the military and political threat from the Soviet Union, NATO had an 
opportunity to place greater emphasis on Western identity and values� The role 
of NATO evolved toward a “European security identity�”20 In essence, this identity 
meant supporting democracy in aspiring members� Indeed, to the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, “democracy” meant membership in the Western al-
liance and their commitment to accept its values and norms� As during the Cold 
War, the alliance proved to be not only a military institution but a democratic 
political organization as well, one that supports “a set of values that run counter 
to military nationalism, chauvinism, and racism” by promoting a military that is 
characterized by subordination “to elected officials, parliamentary control over 
defense budget[s], civilian expertise throughout the military-security apparatus, 
and respect for human and civil rights among conscripts�”21
These democratic standards were also evinced in the “Study on NATO En-
largement” of 1995�22 The document illuminated core principles and norms for 
each country joining the alliance during the three rounds of enlargement after 
the Cold War� It defined requirements applicable to future members of NATO 
(even though it avoided an explicit formulation)� The main requirements were 
four: (1) a stable, democratic political system; (2) support of the population for 
the country’s accession to NATO; (3) military readiness; and (4) elimination of 
all unresolved territorial disputes with neighboring countries, and strengthening 
of integration tendencies�23
The study’s overall emphasis was on political rather than military criteria, and 
political readiness for accession to NATO was also given increased attention in 
the three rounds of expansion occurring in 1999, 2004, and 2009� Certainly, the 
common threat from the USSR created NATO in 1949� However, well before the 
demise of the Soviet Union, Europe and the United States shared democratic 
values, a security identity, and institutional ties that bound them� Both sets of 
factors—military power and values—will help to shape and sustain the future of 
transatlantic relations in conjunction with other factors, including perceived in-
terests and threat assessments� Europe and the United States have much more in 
common with each other than with any other major powers in the world� Indeed, 
when we reflect on the alliance’s history, we can see that NATO has always had 
an important normative component� NATO’s “normative pillar” has weathered 
many “normative storms,” just as have the military and political pillars�24 Yet, in 
the present period, as NATO faces the profound challenge of the rise of China, 
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the normative component will play an even larger role: as the cement for the 
alliance�
THE RISE OF CHINA AND ITS IMPACT ON  
THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Whether China and the United States are destined to compete for domination 
in international politics is one of the major questions facing practitioners of 
that discipline� The answer depends to a large degree on whether China will be 
accommodated within the international system led by the United States or will 
seek to compete with the United States, resulting in intense security rivalry be-
tween Beijing and Washington� While there are excellent arguments in favor of 
the former position, our study assumes that the future of the relationship will be 
confrontational�25
We recognize that China’s impressive economic growth is slowing, in part ow-
ing to the 2015–16 collapse of the stock market, but that it nevertheless remains 
positive� China will become an economic superpower; but Beijing does have 
serious economic problems, such as increasing resource scarcities, pollution, and 
other environmental destruction, as well as ubiquitous corruption, a collapse of 
trust in personal and commercial relationships, and gross disparities in income 
and regional development� Huge inefficiencies and losses are likely to result in a 
leveling off of China’s economic growth�26
Although our argument is not deterministic, we are pessimistic about the 
future of the Sino-American relationship because of structural and domestic 
factors� Briefly, there are five major reasons for despair when we consider the 
likelihood of Sino-American security competition�27
First, China has numerous border disputes in the South and East China Seas 
and with India, and of course there is tension with Taiwan� Each of these conflicts 
is dangerous, particularly those in the South China Sea, owing to the perceived 
national security interests of Beijing, Washington, and allies, including the risk 
of intentional or inadvertent escalation�28
Second, we must consider Beijing’s and Washington’s conflicting grand stra-
tegic interests� The world has witnessed China’s abandonment of Deng’s Twenty- 
Four-Character Strategy and his talk of a “peaceful rise” in favor of rapid military 
expansion and what can only be described as a strategic autism, or tone deafness, 
that has alarmed Australia, Japan, India, and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations states, to the benefit of the United States� Unfortunately, unless Beijing 
changes its trajectory, it is on a collision course with Washington� The United 
States faces an increasingly hostile China, a fact that is regularly on display in the 
East and South China Seas and in international forums�29 China’s actions over the 
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last few years have been increasingly bold, including in its abandonment of any 
apparent concern over consequences�
Third, the systemic problems of alliances, mutual concerns over credibility, 
buck-passing, “chain ganging,” and abandonment confront the United States 
within the explicit or de facto alliances it maintains with Japan, India, and the 
Philippines (the relationship with Vietnam is warming as well)�30 Positive rela-
tions with these states provide prodigious benefits, but also introduce pathways to 
conflict with China, such as by emboldening an ally to take precipitous action�31
Fourth, there are structural causes of conflict� The classic problems of interna-
tional politics stem from anarchy; that condition intensifies the security dilemma 
and contributes to spirals of misperception� The world has witnessed increased 
Chinese demands; until recently they have been largely economic, but increas-
ingly are political and territorial, particularly in the East and South China Seas� 
Such demands cause a reaction in Washington�32 This provokes a response from 
China—and thus starts a spiral of increased tension, greater mutual suspicion, 
and more-intensive security competition�
Fifth, at the domestic level, even if the Chinese leadership wants to present a 
peaceful stance, its ability to do so will be jeopardized by domestic changes in 
China� According to Susan Shirk, given the lessons the Communist Party took 
from Tiananmen—avoid public splits, suppress popular movements, keep the 
People’s Liberation Army on the party’s side—today’s increasingly virulent na-
tionalism, spreading mass protests, and availability of information through the 
Internet and commercial media may destabilize China by provoking a reaction 
from the deeply insecure Chinese leadership�33
We do recognize that responsible Chinese leadership may find an avenue by 
which to avoid confrontation with the United States and Japan�34 However, work-
ing against this possibility is a motivation for conflict that is rooted in an internal 
fragility resulting from the leadership’s need to prove to the public, the military, 
the internal security agencies, and indeed China’s leaders themselves that they 
are staunch defenders of national pride and sovereignty�35 Thus, to back down in 
a crisis would entail considerable risk for the regime� Moreover, should internal 
destabilization occur, perhaps as a result of economic inequality or a push for 
greater liberalization, the risk of war with the United States and other powers 
would greatly increase� Any such crisis always brings with it the increased pos-
sibility of misperception, as well as a heightened fear that foreigners may exploit 
domestic instability to destabilize the country�
Stefan Halper argues that the threat China poses is greater by far than has 
been recognized�36 The threat is not just a military or economic one; it arises also 
from a new market-authoritarian model, one that provides both rapid growth 
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and stability, and thus the promise of a better quality of life� Absent are Western 
freedoms, including the possibility of political plurality or opposition�
China’s modernization has provided the most compelling demonstration of 
how to liberalize economically without surrendering to liberal politics� China’s 
success has provided three major advantages to China� First, China undermines 
American power and Western economic institutions� Second, as a matter of ideo-
logical struggle, China is also seen as a success—a rising economic and military 
power—in contrast to a United States in relative decline� Third, China’s success 
assists with building alliance relationships, and gives developing countries and 
emerging markets the freedom to deny Western conditions of financial engage-
ment� For example, China provides states in economic crisis, such as Angola, 
Cambodia, Chad, Iran, Myanmar, Sudan, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela, with an 
alternative to following the dictates of Western institutions such as the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund and the World Bank� Beijing’s creation in late 2015 of the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank was a major step in that direction� Also, 
such countries no longer must choose between emulating the Western model and 
rejecting capitalism, because China provides a model of market-based economic 
development and modernization paired with authoritarianism�
To Halper’s concerns we would add that China’s rise carries with it the explicit 
rejection of fundamental Western norms held by NATO members� While many 
violations of Western norms in the realm of human and civil rights occur within 
China, of particular importance today is the lack of a strong culture of antiracism� 
In his exceptional study of contemporary China, Martin Jacques writes that 
“there is a widely held view, not least in East Asia, that racism is a ‘white problem’: 
it is what white people do to others� In both China and Taiwan, the official posi-
tion is that racism is a phenomenon of Western culture, with Hong Kong holding 
a similar view� This is nonsense�”37 Jacques notes the ubiquity of racism in China: 
“All peoples are prone to such ways of thinking—or, to put it another way, all 
races harbour racial prejudices, engage in racist modes of thought and practice 
racism against other races� Racism, in fact, is a universal phenomenon from 
which no race is exempt, even those who have suffered grievously at its hands�”38
Racial discrimination arising in a potentially unstable empire with an em-
battled Communist Party could have grave consequences for regional stability in 
Asia� Moreover, in China we see the resurrection of the ideal of a racially based 
state through the myth of a Chinese people of the same race, blood, and culture� 
The myth of descent from the Yellow Emperor is the basis of a racial nationalism 
and xenophobia that submits that there are primal biological and cultural bonds 
among the Chinese that cannot be altered�39 These bonds compel a common 
adherence to state patriotism and nationalism� The Chinese are said not only to 
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share a common ancestry but also to derive from progenitors who, in the distant 
past even before the reign of the Yellow Emperor, separated themselves from 
non–East Asians, thus becoming the “core of the yellow race�”40
For M� Dujon Johnson, an African American sinologist who lived for many 
years in China, Chinese racism is endemic—such an obvious aspect of life that 
the fact of its existence is not worth discussing: “In Chinese society one of the 
reasons that the issue of race and racism is rarely discussed openly � � � is because 
racism is universally accepted and justified behind the veil of Asian cultural val-
ues�” He continues, “[T]hose who hold these views consider � � � [Chinese] cultural 
perspectives of other ethnic groups to be unassailable no matter how inaccurate 
or offensive they may be�”41 Johnson states that his experiences have demon-
strated to him “on a daily basis how life in Chinese society is racially segregated 
and in many aspects similar to a system of racial apartheid�”42
While the growth of Chinese power will have many positive elements for the 
Chinese, and perhaps for the global economy, it is unfortunate for the advance-
ment of human rights in international politics that China remains authoritarian, 
with discriminatory beliefs still accepted in the public sphere� The growth of 
Chinese power is inextricably linked to an ideology that does not share NATO’s 
concern for individual freedoms, human rights, and antiracism, and thus is a 
major normative challenge to the West�
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO: WESTERN VALUES IN THE FACE 
OF CHINA’S RISE
NATO has confronted threats before, but the rise of China is unlike any previous 
challenge� To a considerable degree, this is because there is gross disparity among 
alliance members in their views of the threat Beijing poses� In Washington and 
among Asia-Pacific allies, there is growing awareness of the adverse geopolitical 
consequences of the rise of China� At the same time, for European alliance mem-
bers the rise of China is a positive economic development and does not represent 
a security threat�43 This is evident from the recent trends in the EU-China rela-
tionship, particularly Chinese investment in the EU� As Nicola Casarini writes: 
“Since the advent of the financial crisis, the eurozone has been experiencing a 
massive surge in outbound direct investment by Chinese firms—a trend that 
is likely to accelerate in the future, as the debt crisis provides big investors with 
lucrative opportunities�”44 She continues:
In March 2012, the Chinese government also injected $30 billion into the China In-
vestment Corporation (the Chinese sovereign wealth fund) to be used specifically for 
acquiring industrial and strategic assets in Europe � � � [while] the “strategic partner-
ship” launched in 2003 has also become highly institutionalised: alongside an annual 
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EU-China summit and HED [High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue] there is 
now an EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue � � � [that organizes discussion along 
specific topics:] political dialogues, economic and sectoral dialogues (of which there 
are now more than 80), and people-to-people dialogues�45
This situation opens an avenue for China to divide the Western alliance� 
China is likely to do so because in a confrontation with the United States, China 
will want to weaken the United States by isolating it from as many of its allies as 
possible� This is unlikely to be accomplished in East or South Asia, because of 
the threat China’s rise poses for the countries there� However, China is not usu-
ally perceived as a direct threat to Europe� As Oliver Bräuner, a researcher at the 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, argues, “China is generally 
not regarded as a military threat� The EU and its member states do not have any 
direct hard security interests in the Asia-Pacific region� Europeans have not fol-
lowed the United States in its so-called pivot (or rebalancing) to Asia that was 
announced by the Obama administration in October 2011”; “the EU and its 
member states remain very much focused on security threats originating from 
its immediate neighborhood, namely, the Middle East, Northern Africa, and, 
to a certain degree, Russia�”46 In Bräuner’s assessment, the “EU-China relation-
ship continues to be dominated by the economic interests of individual member 
states, both in trade and increasingly in investments� Furthermore, owing to a 
lack of direct security interests in the Asia-Pacific, Europeans do not generally 
see China as a security threat or a strategic competitor,” and so “the EU has so far 
failed to develop a strategic approach toward the potential security implications 
of transfers of European militarily sensitive technologies that goes beyond the 
existing arms embargo and currently lacks effective mechanisms to control the 
flow of such technologies to China�”47
Consequently, China will have every incentive over time to grow its economic, 
political, cultural, and social ties in Europe in an effort to supplant the United 
States as the major partner of European states� Clearly, this effort will be less 
successful in a country such as Great Britain that has a “special relationship” 
with the United States� It also will be less enticing for NATO members along the 
Russian periphery that are heavily dependent on NATO’s military commitment� 
However, for many European states, particularly those that are heavily indebted, 
China’s wealth might make China a more valuable ally than the United States�48 
First, China will be a significant potential lender for European states, and Bei-
jing’s importance in this role will only grow as European debt increases� Second, 
China will be able to capitalize on anti-American sentiment� Third, as it does 
today, China will be able to serve as a critical market for European goods as well 
as a manufacturing source for European industries and consumers� Fourth, we 
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should expect China to be very creative in its efforts to gain influence and in its 
messaging to targeted states� The confluence of these factors means that some 
NATO members may be gradually but increasingly drawn away from active sup-
port for the NATO alliance� Accordingly, we should recognize that Europe might 
become a zone of competition between the United States and China�
In response, NATO must strengthen its normative component that serves not 
only as a common bond uniting alliance members but as an enforcement compo-
nent as well� As noted earlier, the NATO alliance’s normative aspect had a power-
ful effect on its members during the Cold War and afterward� NATO will depend 
on that normative aspect once again as an enforcement mechanism to ensure not 
only that alliance members do not align with China but equally importantly that 
they recognize that China violates fundamental Western norms and therefore is 
unacceptable as a strategic partner�
Ideally, the United States would be able to maintain the alliance through a 
common perception of both threat and normative considerations� However, as 
this study has emphasized, alliance members are unlikely to share a common 
threat perception (although some NATO allies are alarmed at China’s actions 
in the South China Sea), so the normative component will be particularly im-
portant� And the normative aspect should not be underestimated, particularly 
regarding its influence on European states, which place considerable emphasis on 
the normative elements of international politics�49 This may provide a foundation 
on which NATO can build a unified Western response to the rise of China�
To that end, we advocate that NATO consider creating a “Norms and Prin-
ciples Committee” to advance two broad objectives:50
The first is to ensure that all current and prospective alliance members abide 
by the political norms and principles necessary to ensure that the alliance as a 
whole is animated by the right ideology� An alliance such as NATO does not 
constitute simply a response to a threat� It serves as a major political, military, 
and normative force in the transatlantic area� Its normative power is significant—
sufficient to ensure that the alliance promotes its shared norms, which serve to 
illuminate its differences from authoritarian governments in China and Russia�
Second, such a committee would be able to advance these values beyond the 
present alliance membership� Building on steps the alliance already takes with 
prospective members, establishing a “Norms and Principles Committee” would 
underscore the importance of adherence to political liberty and human rights, 
not only as a condition for membership, but as a guidepost for potential partners, 
such as Japan, India, other U�S� allies, and even current adversaries around the 
world�
Despite the difficulties in achieving respect for human and civil rights, there 
is a clear distinction between respect for these values in the West and in China� 
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The West has moved in the right direction, toward societies that are more open, 
tolerant, and inclusive; China has not� That stark difference between these so-
cieties reflects the divergent norms that animate the West in contrast to China, 
and it can serve in the future as NATO’s foundation as the alliance’s military and 
political roles shift in relative importance�
This study has explored the multifaceted implications for NATO, including its 
health as an alliance, of the rise of China� The military and political rationales 
for NATO remain sound, and our analysis should not be interpreted as an effort 
to detract from the importance of those aspects� This is especially so given the 
uncertainties represented by Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which remains a significant 
threat to NATO members and to stability in Europe�
At the same time, as we have stressed, the rise of China has the potential to 
damage greatly the transatlantic foundation of the alliance owing to the multi-
faceted nature of that rise and the dependence many modern economies have on 
China� To maintain the unity of the alliance, we urge that the normative element 
serve as the common thread, as it represents the starkest delineation between the 
West and China� The normative emphasis remains the surest foundation for the 
alliance in a time of divergent threat perceptions and conflicting interests�
In spite of having identified the risks China’s rise poses for the alliance, we 
fervently hope that the tension in the Sino-American relationship will decline 
in the future� While it is difficult at present to discern any immediate cause for 
such a reduction, perhaps some future liberalization in China will permit such 
an outcome� Indeed, in the event of political liberalization, NATO may become 
China’s greatest ally against Russia� The same normative interests that unite the 
transatlantic alliance may serve as an instrument of support should China un-
dergo democratization�
However, in the present lamentable situation, China and the United States ap-
pear headed for a clash; and in these circumstances the West must recognize that 
it is shared political principles that provide the foundation for its shared political 
system� Western nations have fundamentally transformed their societies in a 
positive direction, and they must recognize that fact� Aligning with a state—no 
matter how economically powerful—that explicitly rejects Western norms might 
arrest the progress of those norms, or even perhaps open the door to their rever-
sal, including in the West�
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THE DESTRUCTION OF CONVOY PQ17
 The most critical problem for the Western Allies in the northern European theater in 1941–42 was the urgent need to secure the war matériel being sent 
to the Soviet Union. Initially, the Germans did not react strongly against the Al-
lied convoys sailing to northern Russia. However, that began to change quickly 
after February 1942, when the Germans redeployed almost all their heavy surface 
forces and a large number of U-boats from home waters to northern Norway. At-
tacks by the German Luftwaffe and U-boats became not only more intensive but 
increasingly deadly. Correspondingly, the Allied 
convoys suffered ever-larger losses.
Because there were no prospects for opening a 
second front in 1942, it was vitally important for 
the Western Allies to keep the Soviet Union in the 
war; otherwise victory over Nazi Germany would 
be impossible. Hence, all efforts were made to 
supply Russia with increasing amounts of war ma-
tériel. However, the Western Allies faced serious 
difficulties in supplying Russia. The routes that of-
fered the shortest transit times were also the most 
dangerous. The Western Allies had three main 
alternatives: (1) across the Pacific to Vladivos tok; 
(2) across the southern Atlantic and around the 
Cape of Good Hope to the port of Basra in the 
Persian Gulf (called the “Persian Corridor”); and 
(3) across the northern Atlantic to Iceland and 
then to the north Russian ports of Arkhangelsk 
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and Murmansk (the Arctic route). Each of these routes had advantages and 
disadvantages. (1) The Pacific route to Vladivostok passed near northern Hok-
kaido. Hence, after Japan opened hostilities with the United States and Britain 
in December 1941, it could be used only by Soviet-flag ships. Plus, adding the 
distance from Russia’s Pacific coast to the front lines in the west, this route was 
the longest of the three. (2) Shipping from U.S. east coast ports had to go via the 
Cape of Good Hope until July 1943, when the Mediterranean route was opened. 
The Cape route was about 14,500 miles long and required some seventy-six days 
to transit.1 (3) The shortest but the most dangerous route was the Arctic option. 
The Germans proffered a serious threat to Allied ships by using the Luftwaffe, 
U-boats, and heavy surface ships based in northern Norway. The Allied problem 
was made worse by the very poor sailing conditions caused by extreme cold, bad 
weather, and ice. Despite all these difficulties, the Soviets adamantly insisted on 
use of the northern route because it could deliver badly needed war matériel 
more quickly and closer to their forces at the front. Another possible reason was 
Soviet fear of too strong an Anglo-American presence in Persia.2 The decision 
to establish the Arctic route was made by British prime minister Winston S. 
Churchill (1874–1965), with the full support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(1882–1945).3 Admiral Sir Dudley Pound (1877–1943), the British First Sea 
Lord (1939–43), and Admiral Sir John Tovey (1885–1971), commander in chief 
(CINC) of the Home Fleet, were opposed to that decision.4
The single most devastating action in the resupply effort was the German attack 
on Convoy PQ17 in July 1942. The Luftwaffe and U-boats sank twenty-two out of 
thirty-six merchant ships plus one out of three rescue ships during the weeklong 
attacks. The planned augmentation of this effort in the form of a foray (code-named 
Unternehmen [Operation] RÖSSELSPRUNG) by the battleship Tirpitz and other 
heavy surface ships was short-lived in execution because Allied forces detected 
the German ships prematurely. Nevertheless, the Germans achieved a significant 
victory against the Allies’ efforts to supply their embattled Russian ally. In the 
aftermath, all convoys to Russia via the Arctic route were suspended for almost 
two months; the next convoy did not sail until 2 September 1942. During the next 
two years, convoys ran only during the long, dark months of winter. This resulted 
in much smaller losses than in 1942; subsequently, only four ships were lost, three 
in 1944 and one in March 1945.5
In operational terms, the German attack against Convoy PQ17 was a major 
naval/joint operation vs. enemy maritime trade. For the Allies, the defense of Con-
voy PQ17 amounted to a major naval/joint operation to defend maritime trade. 
Strategically, this operation was an integral part of the Allies’ efforts to defend 
and preserve their military-economic potential at sea, while the Germans’ objec-
tive was to destroy it.
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STRATEGIC SETTING
At the turn of 1941–42, the strategic situation for the Western Allies in the Eu-
ropean theater was very unfavorable. The Germans controlled the entire coast of 
Western Europe from northern Norway to the Franco-Spanish border in the Bay 
of Biscay. However, the Germans suffered a series of setbacks in the fall of 1941 
and early winter of 1941/42 on the eastern front. Their forces were stopped at the 
gates of Leningrad (Saint Petersburg today) and Moscow and in southern Russia. 
They were forced to retreat in the battle of Moscow (2 October 1941–7 January 
1942). Yet despite these reverses, the Wehrmacht’s power was not broken.
Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway in April 1940 radically changed 
the strategic situation in the northern area in Germany’s favor. By obtaining 
control of the Jutland Peninsula / Danish Straits and Norway, Germany greatly 
weakened Britain’s strategic position in the northern area. This loss was some-
what ameliorated by the Anglo-American occupation of Iceland in June 1941; 
this greatly improved the Allies’ ability to control surrounding sea areas within 
the effective range of their land-based aircraft. They were also able to carry out 
raids against the German-controlled Norwegian coast.6
By controlling Norway, the Germans made it impossible for the British to 
blockade the Shetlands–southern Norway line, as had happened in World War I 
(when Britain and the United States established the Northern Barrage minefield). 
Germany also greatly weakened the British position in the Shetland–Faeroes– 
Iceland gap. Passage through the northern portion of the North Sea was opened 
up for German naval forces.7 Control of the Norwegian coast significantly im-
proved the effectiveness of the Kriegsmarine (navy) and Luftwaffe (air force) in 
their attacks on enemy maritime traffic in the northern Atlantic Ocean and the 
Barents Sea.
Nazi Germany also greatly benefited economically from controlling Norway. 
Among other things, the Germans obtained control of some commodities impor-
tant to their war industries, including aluminum, copper, paper, and timber. Ger-
many also gained more secure export of Swedish iron ore through Narvik.8 Along 
the 1,745–nautical mile (nm)–long route from Oslo in the south to Kirkenes 
beyond North Cape, some two hundred thousand tons of shipping moved every 
day. At the same time, the political situation in Norway was difficult for the Ger-
mans. The Germans realized that the majority of the populace was pro-British. 
These Norwegians hoped for a British victory, and that the Germans and Soviets 
would exhaust themselves in the war.9
Hitler placed great strategic importance on Germany’s continued control of 
Norway. He was extremely concerned about the possibility of enemy landings 
there. Hitler’s views were shared by Admiral Erich Raeder (1876–1960), CINC 
of the Kriegsmarine and the Naval Warfare Directorate (Seekriegsleitung—SKL). 
90
Naval War College Review, Vol. 69 [2016], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol69/iss3/20
 8 6  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
On 10 October 1941, Hitler issued his instruction (Führerweisung) Nr. 37, which 
assigned new missions to the German armed forces in northern Norway. The 
Kriegsmarine was directed to attack enemy sea traffic to Murmansk and protect 
German traffic in the Arctic. Army High Command (Armeeoberkommando, or 
AOK) Norway, the Luftwaffe, and the Kriegsmarine were directed to cooperate 
closely during the coming months in preparing to oppose possible enemy land-
ings in front and on the sea flanks of the German forces. Hitler directed the 5th 
Air Fleet to return to Norway and establish the post of Air Leader (Fliegerführer) 
North.10
On 14 December 1941, Hitler ordered a buildup of defense installations in 
Norway and the improvement of roads in the coastal area. He believed that if 
the Western Allies were successful in capturing Norway, they would be able to 
supply the Soviet Union regularly, thereby posing a serious threat to the German 
northern front. The enemy also would be able to operate in the Baltic. Informa-
tion gathered by German agents as well as statements made by Western leaders 
and other reports in the Western press lent these views new urgency.11
In meetings with Admiral Raeder on 29 December 1941 and 12 January 1942, 
Hitler pronounced that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of 
heavy German ships as a deterrent against such a landing. On the basis of in-
formation from Swedish sources, he believed the British and Americans might 
land between Trondheim and Kirkenes. Hitler considered Norway to be the 
“Schicksalzone” (“Zone of Destiny”) of the entire war.12 At a meeting with Raeder 
on 22 January, Hitler stated that, from the latest information, Britian and the 
United States were planning to attack northern Norway. If successful, this would 
decisively influence the war.13 In Hitler’s view, every German heavy surface ship 
that was not in Norway was in the wrong place. Raeder fully agreed with that 
assessment.14 Hitler demanded unconditional execution of his orders aimed at 
enhancing the security of the northern area.15
The führer ordered deployment of additional air and naval forces to Norway. 
Reichsmarschal Hermann Göring (1893–1946), CINC of the Luftwaffe, was di-
rected to reinforce the Luftwaffe’s forces in Norway. And these measures had to 
be sped up, because the danger was immediate.16 Among other things, the Brest 
group (battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen) 
would be redeployed to Norway. Hitler also ordered deployment of additional S-
boats (fast-attack craft) to northern Norway and a significant increase in heavy 
artillery for defense against enemy landings.17
OPERATING AREA
During the attack on and defense of Convoy PQ17 in July 1942, the oppos-
ing naval and air forces operated in both the Norwegian and Barents Seas (see 
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map 1); however, the majority of combat actions took place in the Barents. The 
550,000-square-mile Barents Sea borders in the west on the Greenland Sea; in 
the north on the Svalbard Islands (of which the largest is Spitsbergen) and Franz 
Josef Land (Zemlya Frantsa Iosifa); in the east on Novaya Zemlya; and in the 
south on the Kola Peninsula and northern Norway. Jan Mayen and Bear Islands 
are the most important islands within the Barents Sea. The seventy-square-mile 
Bear Island (Bjørnøya) is the southernmost of the Svalbards. Its highest elevation 
is about 1,760 feet. The 34-mile-long, 144-square-mile Jan Mayen is a mountain-
ous, volcanic island partly covered by glaciers.
The weather, ice conditions, and duration of daylight in the Barents Sea and 
the adjoining littoral area greatly influenced the combat employment of surface 
ships, submarines, and aircraft. In the summer months, good visibility and low 
sea state generally prevailed.18 This facilitated air reconnaissance and shadowing. 
At the same time, long hours of daylight made it considerably more difficult for 
submarines to conduct their typical night surface attacks. Lack of cloud cover 
made it more difficult for torpedo bombers to conduct surprise attacks.19 Howev-
er, summer visibility was frequently reduced by the presence of fog: June averaged 
nine days of heavy fog, August nineteen.20 Dense fog posed a great disadvantage 
for the attacker because the target could remain concealed.21
During the winter months, gales of great violence were frequent. This often 
negatively affected fully laden eastbound convoys. Deck cargo such as tanks, wag-
ons, and locomotives endangered the safety of ships, forcing them to return to a 
port of origin. Heavy snow and ice on a ship’s upper deck and top-hamper were 
dangerous if allowed to accumulate, and once formed increased the bulk sig-
nificantly. The westbound convoys did not carry much cargo. Therefore the light 
ships ballasted their bows up so as to submerge their propellers, which sometimes 
made them unmanageable. Escorts also suffered badly; they lost boats, davits, 
and men on many occasions.22 Air reconnaissance and the use of destroyers were 
difficult because of high sea states.23
In the Greenland and Barents Seas, the pack ice affected routing of Allied 
ships bound to and from northern Russia. Generally, it was desirable to keep as 
far as possible from the German airfields in northern Norway and to evade U-
boats lurking between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. One way to do this was to 
take ships through the ice; however, the Allies soon learned that the thin hulls of 
escorts were easily damaged. Also, the ice prevented a convoy from maneuvering 
as a whole.24 In general, ice was always a danger for surface ships, even outside 
the pack—small floes could not be detected easily—so it was preferable to leave 
a margin of about forty miles from the ice boundary.25
The pack ice and icebergs were carried down the east coast of Greenland 
through the Denmark Strait. The major part of the Denmark Strait was usually 
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covered by ice. However, ice was seldom found within the hundred-fathom line, 
because the boundary between the northward-flowing, warm Irminger Current 
and the cold East Greenland Current usually overlay that line. Sometimes ice 
crossed that line and came within sight of Iceland’s coast.26 The ice situation in 
the Denmark Strait greatly affected the routing of Allied convoys to northern 
Russia. Generally, ice along Iceland’s north coast meant that Allied ships sailing 
out of Reykjavík bound northeastward were unable to pass around the west and 
north coasts from Reykjavík, instead being routed southward.27
The boundaries of the pack ice in the Barents Sea changed considerably 
over the course of a year. From December to early June, the pack ice normally 
extended close to or beyond Bear Island. For example, in March the pack’s 
southern limit was the northwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island and the west coast 
of Spitsbergen, and extending from there to Bear Island and to the Kanin Penin-
sula.28 In April, when ice conditions were the worst, with the pack ice boundary 
at its southernmost, it might be necessary to route ships nearly a hundred miles 
farther south—leaving only about 150–200 miles to the Norwegian coast.29 In 
contrast, when the pack ice boundary moved northward, it was possible to sail 
in a west-to-east direction in the area between North Cape and Spitsbergen. In 
a mild season, there was a passage of fifty miles between Bear Island and the ice 
edge, which allowed routing convoys farther north.30 Doing so allowed Allied 
ships to avoid contact with the German surface ships based in northern Norway.
Because of the ice conditions in 1942, Allied ships had to traverse the 260 nm 
distance between longitudes 20 degrees E and 35 degrees E while sailing only 
220–40 nm from the Norwegian coast. These conditions prevailed through the 
end of June.31 In March and April 1942 the ice limits were farther south than at 
any other time of the year. This forced the convoys to northern Russia to pass 
south of Bear Island, and thus within about 250 miles of the Norwegian coast.32 
After April, the sea area gradually enlarged because the ice boundary moved 
north and east. Thereafter, it was more difficult for German surface ships to at-
tack Allied convoys. In August, pack ice ran from Scoresby Strait off Greenland 
northward, then from Bell Strait (in western Spitsbergen) south of South Cape 
and Hope Island, then in a northeastern direction.33 In June 1942, the pack ice 
boundaries fell between the March and August lines.34
ALLIED OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The highest British naval authority was the Admiralty, led by First Lord Albert 
V. Alexander. (His position was the equivalent of today’s Secretary of the Navy in 
the United States.) The Admiralty itself consisted of five sea lords plus four other 
high officials. The First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff was Admiral Pound. 
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He was the highest naval official responsible for naval operations. In contrast to 
the Air Ministry, the Admiralty’s responsibilities included operational planning 
and execution. The most important Admiralty divisions were Plans and Opera-
tions, Trade, and Intelligence. The work of the Plans and Operations Division was 
closely coordinated with the Intelligence Division.35
The Home Fleet was the principal operational-level command for operations 
in European waters. At the outbreak of war in September 1939, the Home Fleet 
consisted of the 2nd Battle Squadron, Battle Cruiser Squadron, aircraft carriers, 
cruisers (2nd, 7th, 12th, and 18th squadrons), Destroyer Command (6th, 7th, 
8th, and 18th Destroyer Flotillas), submarines (2nd and 6th Submarine Flotillas), 
and minesweepers (1st Minesweeping Flotilla), plus the Orkneys and Shetland 
forces. The majority of the Home Fleet’s forces were based at Scapa Flow in the 
Orkneys and Portland, England. Other bases were at Rosyth and Dundee in Scot-
land and Blyth and the Humber in England.36
During the war, the composition of the Home Fleet underwent significant 
changes because many of its heavy units were assigned to other major commands. 
The CINC of the Home Fleet after November 1940 was Admiral Tovey. On 26 
March 1942, the U.S. Navy formed Task Force (TF) 39, initially led by Rear Admi-
ral John W. Wilcox, to reinforce the Home Fleet. On 26 March, TF 39, composed 
of the battleship Washington (BB 56), carrier Wasp (CV 7), and heavy cruisers 
Wichita (CA 45) and Tuscaloosa (CA 37), plus eight destroyers, sailed from Port-
land, Maine, for Scapa Flow. One day later Admiral Wilcox was washed away and 
disappeared in a heavy sea. He was replaced by Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen.37
The Home Fleet’s geographic area of responsibility was never defined. Yet it 
clearly encompassed the northern part of the North Sea and the waters north 
of the Shetlands/Faeroes/Iceland/Greenland line. The southern part of the 
North Sea and the English Channel constituted separate commands deploying 
light forces. The squarish ocean area from the northernmost tip of Scotland 
and southwestern tip of England extending to longitude 30 degrees W was the 
responsibility of the Western Approaches Command in Liverpool (moved from 
Plymouth on 7 February 1941). On 17 February 1942, Admiral Sir Percy Noble 
was appointed CINC of Western Approaches Command. Its main responsibility 
was the protection of convoys between North American and British ports.
Initially, the main mission of the Home Fleet was to prevent German naval 
forces from breaking out of the North Sea and operating in the Atlantic. After 
the summer of 1941, its focus shifted to Norwegian waters and the Barents Sea. 
Overall responsibility for convoys to northern Russia rested with Admiral Tovey, 
CINC of the Home Fleet, but Western Approaches Command provided the ships 
necessary for the close, direct screening of convoys.
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CONVOYS TO NORTHERN RUSSIA
The first convoy to northern Russia (code-named DERVISH) departed from 
Hvalfjord, Iceland, on 21 August 1941—only two months after the Nazi invasion 
of the Soviet Union. This convoy consisted of only six merchant ships, and all 
reached the Soviet port of Arkhangelsk in the White Sea after a ten-day voyage.38 
On 13 September 1941, a decision was made to give a serial number to each 
convoy heading to or from northern Russia.39 The first of the eastbound PQ con-
voys (named after convoy planning officer Commander Philip Quellyn Roberts) 
left Hvalfjord on 28 September 1941.40 The first westbound convoy, QP1, left 
Arkhangelsk on 28 September and arrived at Dunnet Head, northern Scotland, 
on 11 October.41 Between 1941 and 1945, forty-two eastbound escorted convoys 
(composed of 848 ships) and thirty-six westbound escorted convoys (composed 
of 735 ships), plus one eastbound and one westbound unescorted convoy, sailed 
the Arctic route between Russia and the West.42
Ports of origins for the Allied convoys to the Soviet Union were on the U.S. east 
coast and in northern Scotland. The American ships sailed from Philadelphia 
and then joined one of the transatlantic convoys in Halifax or Sydney, Nova Sco-
tia, Canada. Afterward they sailed across the northern Atlantic to a breakaway 
point for continuing their voyage to Iceland. The British ships were organized 
into convoys at Gare Loch or Loch Ewe on the western coast of Scotland. They 
joined American-flag ships at Hvalfjord or Reykjavík, where PQ convoys were 
formed.43
Murmansk in the Kola Inlet and Arkhangelsk in the White Sea were the 
principal destination ports for Allied convoys to northern Russia. Because of the 
influence of the Gulf Stream, the Kola Inlet is ice-free year-round; Arkhangelsk 
was closed to large ships for six months out of the year because of ice.44 The port 
facilities in both Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were very primitive.45
The sea routes from Reykjavík to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk are 1,500 and 
1,900 nm in length, respectively; however, the length of the convoy route to Mur-
mansk was some two thousand nautical miles because of the need to keep as far 
as possible from the Luftwaffe’s aircraft. Transit time for a convoy from Iceland to 
Murmansk was about ten days, to Arkhangelsk twelve days.46 The merchant ships 
from the United States already had a long distance to traverse merely to reach 
their assembly points in Iceland. For example, a merchant vessel sailing out of 
Philadelphia had to traverse some 645 nm to Halifax or 960 nm to Sydney. Dis-
tances from Halifax or Sydney to Reykjavík are 1,940 and 1,655 nm, respectively. 
The PQ convoy route ran generally through the Denmark Strait (which was 
mined); then as far north as ice conditions allowed, while proceeding eastward; 
then south toward the Kola Inlet or southeastward to Arkhangelsk.47
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Allied convoys to Russia generally varied in size between fifteen and thirty 
ships, although some were larger. Smaller convoys ran until early 1942, when 
a decision was made to increase the size of convoys bound to Russia.48 On 26 
February 1942, Admiral Tovey requested that westbound and eastbound convoys 
sail simultaneously so that their transits through the most dangerous areas could 
be synchronized. This would entail fourteen-day cycles for convoys to and from 
Russia.49 A decision was made that a pair of convoys would sail starting in early 
March 1942, and the practice became standard thereafter.50 In May, Admiral 
Tovey advocated reducing the number of convoys during the coming months 
because improved weather conditions would greatly facilitate operations of the 
enemy’s reconnaissance aircraft and bombers, and because the ice boundary 
would not have receded northward sufficiently to avoid these attacks.51 However, 
the Admiralty rejected his recommendation.
The Allied convoys were potentially subject to attack by enemy surface ships 
and U-boats along the entire route, and for some 1,400 miles by aircraft.52 Both 
ends of the convoy route were within range of the Luftwaffe’s reconnaissance 
aircraft. In contrast, the British reconnaissance seaplanes operated from a single 
base, Sullom Voe in the Shetland Islands. The Germans believed that these planes 
were also based on the Langanes Peninsula, Iceland (see map 2). The maneuver-
ing area for a convoy and its covering forces was limited northward and westward 
by ice and southward by the enemy-occupied coast. Within that convoying area 
the currents were uncertain, and frequent gales could disperse a convoy, driving 
ships many miles from their intended route.53
Initially, the Allied convoys to northern Russia were weakly defended from 
attacks by German aircraft and U-boats. This highly unfavorable situation began 
to change for the better in the spring of 1942. In late April, additional destroyers, 
corvettes, and trawlers were transferred from Western Approaches Command 
to the Home Fleet, bringing the number of antisubmarine (A/S) escorts for each 
convoy to about ten.54 However, the Allies’ continuing shortage of destroyers 
combined with the difficulty in refueling them limited their ability to hunt U-
boats at any significant distance from a convoy.55 Each convoy was accompanied 
by at least one fleet oiler for refueling the short-legged destroyers and corvettes.
Each eastbound convoy was accompanied by two submarines to discourage 
enemy surface attack. Several British and the Soviet submarines patrolled the 
areas northwest and west off North Cape.56
The Allies tried repeatedly to involve the Soviet Northern Fleet further in 
protecting convoys. Admiral Tovey in his messages to the Admiralty “pressed for 
strong and continuous Russian patrol activity off the Kola Inlet, to make that area 
untenable by U-boats, and for short-range and long-range fighter protection.”57 
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Tovey believed that this provision of fighter cover—both long-range (two hun-
dred miles off the Kola Inlet) and short-range (sixty miles off), during the most 
dangerous part of the voyage—was both crucial and within Soviet capabilities. 
The Soviet Northern Fleet had sufficient destroyers and smaller A/S ships to op-
erate farther from its bases than heretofore, and Tovey felt the Soviets should take 
over responsibility for defense of the convoys during the White Sea segment of 
the passage. Also, the Soviet submarines based in Polyarny, Kola Peninsula, could 
be employed for scouting and intercepting the German heavy surface ships.58
The British requested that the Russians not only reinforce escorts at the east-
ern end of the voyage by providing long-range fighters or A/S air escort but also 
bomb enemy airfields during convoy transits to discourage surface attacks east 
of Bear Island.59 Although the Soviets repeatedly promised that they would pro-
vide adequate protection to the Allied convoys, they seldom did so in practice.60 
Formally, the Soviets took responsibility for protecting Allied convoys once they 
crossed longitude 18 degrees E.61 They also conducted intensive reconnaissance 
of the German naval and air bases in northern Norway. The submarines of the 
Soviet Northern Fleet patrolled off the Norwegian coast, covering the possible 
deployment routes of German surface forces.62 However, the fact was that the 
Soviets were unable to provide adequate protection to the Allied convoys during 
the most dangerous phase of the transit.63
GERMAN OPERATIONAL COMMAND STRUCTURE
The German operational command organization in the northern theater was 
highly fragmented. The Germans never established a true multiservice or joint 
command in this theater; instead, each service controlled its own forces. Coop-
eration was supposed to be secured through the posting of liaison officers at the 
main headquarters of each of the three services. The highest command echelon 
controlling army troops in Norway and Finland was High Army Command 
Norway, led by General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, from Command Post Finland 
in Rovaniemi, Finland. It was created from Group XXI in December 1941 and 
disbanded in December 1944. Army Norway was directly subordinate to the 
High Command of the (German) Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, or OKH).
Kriegsmarine CINC Admiral Raeder and Luftwaffe CINC Reichsmarschal 
Göring had operational command over all their respective forces. Raeder headed 
the High Command of the Navy (Oberkommando der Marine—OKM) (estab-
lished 11 January 1936). The Naval Warfare Directorate, formed on 1 April 1937, 
had responsibility for the conduct of naval warfare as a whole. The Operations 
Directorate (1./SKL) was the most important of the six SKL staff directorates in 
1942. The OKM also had a permanent representative at Hitler’s headquarters (see 
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figure 1). Contact with the Luftwaffe was maintained through a liaison officer to 
the Luftwaffe CINC.64
By the end of 1941, the highest operational-level headquarters of the Kriegs-
marine were Fleet Command (Flottenkommando) and four naval group com-
mands (Marinegruppenkommandos—MGKs): North, East, West, and South. 
Other major commands were Naval Station Baltic (Marinestation Ostsee), Naval 
Station North Sea (Marinestation Nordsee), and German Naval Command Italy 
(Deutsches Marinekommando Italien). Naval Group Command North (MGK 
Nord) was led (21 September 1940–2 March 1943) by General Admiral Rolf Carls 
(1885–1945). On 10 August 1940 it had been renamed from Naval Group Com-
mand East (MGK Ost) and moved from Kiel to Sengwarden, near Wilhelmsha-
ven.65 At the same time, Naval Group Command West (MGK West) was moved 
from Sengwarden to Paris.66 Naval Group Command North was responsible for 
all Kriegsmarine activities in the German Bight, the northern part of the North 
Sea, the northern Atlantic Ocean (north of Scotland), and the Arctic.67
In 1942, the major part of German fleet forces was deployed in northern Nor-
way. The fleet commander (June 1941–July 1944) was Admiral Otto Schniewind, 
flying his flag in Tirpitz. Directly subordinate to the fleet commander were the 
positions of commander of battleships (Befehlshaber der Schlachtschiffe—B.d.S.) 
(June 1941–May 1942) and the respective leaders of destroyers (Führer der 
Grand Admiral Erich Raeder
CINC of the Kriegsmarine
Naval High Command 
(Berlin)
General Admiral Rolf Carls
Naval Group Command North 
(Sengwarden)















* Dissolved 2 June 1942
** Established 3 June 1942
Vice Admiral Otto Ciliax
Commander of Battleships*
Vice Admiral Oskar Kummetz
Commander of Cruisers **
Commander of Destroyers Commander of S-boats
FIGURE 1
GERMAN NAVAL ORGANIZATION IN NORWAY, JUNE 1942
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Zerstörer) (August 1940–May 1945), T(orpedo)-boats (Führer der Torpedo-
boote) (August 1940–April 1942), and U-boats (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote) 
(November 1939–July 1942). The post of leader of the U-boats (Führer der U-
Boote) had been renamed commander of U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote) 
on 17 October 1939; the latter German term signified a command’s enhanced im-
portance. In the operational chain of command, Commander of U-boats Admiral 
Karl Dönitz became directly subordinate to the OKM; administratively, U-boats 
remained subordinate to the fleet command.68 The commander of battleships 
was renamed commander of the cruisers (Befehlshaber der Kreuzer, or B.d.K.) 
in June 1942, and the leader of the torpedo boats became leader of the S-boats 
(Führer der Schnellboote) in April 1942.
Directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North was the Command-
ing Admiral Norway (Kommandierende Admiral Norwegen), led by General 
Admiral Hermann Boehm. The entire Norwegian coast was divided into three 
geographically based commands: Admiral Norwegian Polar Coast (Tromsö), Ad-
miral Norwegian Northern Coast (Trondheim), and Admiral Norwegian West-
ern Coast (Bergen), plus Commandant of Naval Defenses Oslofjord (Horten). 
In accordance with Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37, the operational staff of Admiral 
Arctic was established on 16 October 1941, at which point Admiral Polar Coast 
became subordinate to Admiral Arctic.69 Admiral Hubert Schmundt, with head-
quarters in Kirkenes, was the first Admiral Arctic (October 1941–August 1942). 
He, in turn, was subordinate to Commanding Admiral Norway. However, at the 
beginning of 1942 Commanding Admiral Norway proposed that Admiral Arctic 
should be directly subordinate to Naval Group Command North. The aim was to 
unify conduct of the naval war in Arctic waters. Another reason for this change 
in command relationships was that Commanding Admiral Norway lacked the 
technical means to conduct communications.70
After April 1942, Commanding Admiral Norway became responsible for the 
security of sea traffic around North Cape to the frontline forces in Finland, and 
for supplying Mountain Corps Norway in Finnmark.71 Admiral Arctic was also 
directed to attack enemy maritime traffic, protect German coastal shipping, and 
conduct defensive mining of coastal waters and ports. A special naval command-
er was to be appointed to accomplish these tasks.72 However, in practice it was 
Admiral Carls who controlled all operations in the Arctic—Admiral Schmundt 
essentially only transmitted his orders to subordinate commanders.73
On 18 June 1942, the SKL directed that Admiral Arctic be responsible for the 
conduct of U-boat warfare against enemy traffic and escorts in the area east of 
the Denmark Strait and Jan Mayen Island. The weight of the main effort (Schwer­
punkt) was to be the employment of U-boats against PQ convoys; however, 
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should an Allied landing occur, the main effort would shift to enemy transports 
and escorts.74
After the invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the 5th Air Fleet (Luft-
flotte 5), led by General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff (1889–1968), was the highest 
Luftwaffe command echelon in Norway and Finland. Until the end of 1941, the 
Air Leader North (West) in Stavanger was the principal subordinate commander 
of the 5th Air Fleet (see map 2). His forces were based in the area of Stavanger 
and Trondheim.75 In Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 37 of October 1941, the führer di-
rected that a major part of the 5th Air Fleet be transferred from Finland back 
to Norway. Headquarters were moved to Oslo, while an operational command 
post was established at Kemi, near Kirkenes. The Air Leader North (West) was in 
Forus/Stavanger, Air Leader Lofoten in Bardufoss, and Air Leader North (East) 
in Kirkenes (see figure 2).76 After June 1941, all fighter aircraft were subordinate 
to the Fighter Air Leader, Norway (Jagdfliegerführer Norwegen), with his staff at 
Forus, near Stavanger. The Air District Command, Norway (Luftgau-Kommando 
Norwegen) in Oslo had responsibility for all air bases and ground-based Luft-
waffe units and installations.
The 5th Air Fleet’s operational area (Operationsgebiet) encompassed the 
Skagerrak (between Norway and Denmark); the northern part of the North 
Sea and northern Scotland; the northern Atlantic; the Arctic Ocean; and the 
General Hans-Jürgen Stump














Air District Command, Finland
Air District Command, Norway


























ORGANIZATION OF THE FIFTH AIR FLEET, JUNE 1042
Source: Mueller-Meinhard, p. 519.
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Murmansk front.77 Its main missions were defending against any enemy amphibi-
ous landing; reconnoitering coastal waters; and attacking Arctic convoys, in co-
operation with the Kriegsmarine.78 Specifically, the 5th Air Fleet was responsible 
for cooperating with naval forces, providing security for German sea supplies, 
conducting offensive mining, and defending against enemy raids. In cooperating 
with the U-boats, the Luftwaffe’s main tasks were to provide reconnaissance of 
the operating area of the U-boats engaging enemy convoys; combat any enemy 
fighter aircraft posing a threat to the U-boats; and conduct joint attacks with the 
U-boats on the PQ convoys. In cooperating with naval surface forces, the Luft-
waffe’s main missions were reconnoitering the operating area and attacking sea 
targets within the framework of an operation.79
In practice, cooperation between the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine in the 
northern area was unsatisfactory. The major reason was that both practiced rath-
er rigid, centralized command and control. For example, if Admiral Arctic had a 
need for air reconnaissance, he had to send a request to Naval Group Command 
North in Sengwarden; from there the request was transmitted to the 5th Air Fleet 
in Oslo/Kemi. This resulted in a long delay in obtaining permission. If granted, 
the latter headquarters then gave orders to the respective air commanders.80 
Other factors that made radio communications difficult were a lack of interop-
erability (the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe used different radio transmitters) 
and the difficult, mountainous terrain of Norway. All radio communications ran 
via Naval Group Command North in Sengwarden; employment of the Luftwaffe 
was directed from Oslo; but radio communications between Oslo and Sengwar-
den were inadequate.81 Combined with the unsatisfactory technical aspect of 
communications, this made it very difficult to organize cooperation between the 
Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine. After Raeder complained about the problem, 
Hitler issued orders to reinforce Luftwaffe units in Norway and to improve coop-
eration with the Kriegsmarine. The leaders of the Luftwaffe and the Kriegsmarine 
discussed the problem, and decided to exchange liaison officers between the 5th 
Air Fleet and Admiral Arctic.82
ALLIED VS. GERMAN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
For both the Allies and the Germans, accurate and timely intelligence about the 
enemy’s order of battle (OOB), plans, intentions, and movements was essential to 
a successful outcome of the war in Arctic waters. The British Admiralty’s Naval 
Intelligence Division (NID) was responsible for preparing at least daily, and often 
hourly, reports regarding enemy forces anywhere in the world. The Operational 
Intelligence Centre (OIC), created in February 1939, was the most important 
of NID’s eight sections. It was headed by a navy captain.83 As part of the Joint 
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Intelligence Committee, the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI) worked closely 
with his counterparts in the War Office and the Air Ministry.84
The British relied on several sources of intelligence to deduce enemy inten-
tions, plans, and movements. These included direction finding, photographic 
reconnaissance, captured enemy documents, prisoners of war, and signals intel-
ligence, the last being the most important. The main source of decrypted enemy 
messages was the cryptanalysts at the Government Code and Cypher School at 
Bletchley Park, Buckinghamshire, England.85
Normally, German ships did not use radio communications while at anchor in 
Trondheim; however, they did use radio transmissions between ships anchored 
at Vestfjord and Altafjord. And shore commands communicated by radio with 
the heavy ships when they were at sea—sending a steady stream of messages, in 
fact. So the absence of such signals was a good indicator that the ships were still 
in port or in some other fjord.86
Air reconnaissance of the German naval bases/anchorages and airfields 
in northern Norway was extremely difficult because of the long distances in-
volved and the often-appalling weather. The British deployed submarines in the 
area between North Cape and Bear Island. The Allies’ network of Norwegian 
agents, which would prove so valuable later in the war, had not yet been fully 
established.87 However, the British were lucky in having some excellent Swedish 
sources of information on German forces in Norway. The British naval attaché in 
Stockholm, Captain Henry Denham, established good relations with the Swed-
ish secret service, especially Major Törnberg (assistant to Major Carl Petersén, 
head of C-Bureau, a unit for secret intelligence collection). The Swedes had a 
good source of intelligence because the Germans’ telegraph and teleprinter lines 
to their naval, army, and Luftwaffe forces in Norway passed through Swedish 
territory. The Swedes were successful in tapping those lines and in breaking a 
number of German ciphers. Denham was often provided with the results of the 
Swedish cryptanalysts’ work. To avoid suspicion being cast on the Swedish secret 
service, Denham met his contacts in a park or some other public place. All the 
information passed over had to be memorized until Denham could get back to 
his embassy and send a signal to the DNI in London. Among other things, these 
Swedish sources gave the first positive clue about the movements of the battleship 
Bismarck in May 1941.88
For the British, the single most critical factor in their ultimate success in the 
Battle of the Atlantic was their ability to read the German navy’s radio messages. 
Yet while many of these messages were read, not all were; and the codes were 
generally difficult to crack.89 But the British did break the German naval cipher 
HYDRA, which was used by not only the patrol vessels and minesweepers but 
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also the U-boats based in Norway, as well as the heavy ships. (The exception was 
special operations, when the NEPTUNE cipher was used; the British code breakers 
at Bletchley Park partially penetrated it.) Major changes in the German cipher 
settings occurred every forty-eight hours, and minor ones every twenty-four 
hours. Bletchley Park largely mastered the daily changes of cipher settings; it was 
the major changes that caused a problem. Once a major code change was broken, 
the lesser ones were usually cracked quickly.90 However, delays did occur, leaving 
gaps varying in length from four to forty-eight hours.91 Hence, there were cases 
when the British were blind or not current at a critical moment. With regard to 
messages sent by landlines, the British were unable to learn anything about them 
unless they received the information from Stockholm. They were also unaware 
of German written instructions. In short, even the best intelligence sources could 
not be relied on to give a complete and continuous picture of what was happening, 
let alone what was going to happen, on the other side of the North Sea.92
Further, on 1 February 1942, the Germans directed all U-boat cipher operators 
to abandon the use of HYDRA codes to tighten security. They introduced a new 
version of the Enigma coding machine, the Triton M4, that used four instead of 
three rotors. Codes generated by the Triton M4 (called SHARK by the British) 
were unreadable using then-existing methods of decoding.93 It was not until late 
1942 that Bletchley Park decoders were able to read these messages.94
The primary source of intelligence for the Kriegsmarine was the Naval Intel-
ligence Service (Marinenachrichtendienst—MND). It was established in June 
1941; the Naval Intelligence Inspectorate (Marinenachrichten Inspektion) was 
dissolved.95 The Naval Communications Service (Amtsgruppe Marinenachrich-
tendienst—4./SKL) was one of MND’s most important office groups. Its Division 
of Radio Intelligence (Funkaufklärung) (4./SKL/III), or B-Dienst (Beobachtung-
Dienst—Observation Service), was primarily responsible for monitoring, deci-
phering, and evaluating enemy radio communications.96 B-Dienst was highly 
regarded by the rest of the Kriegsmarine for its professionalism and the high 
quality of its analysis. Admiral Raeder highly praised its work.97 B-Dienst and 
German Military Intelligence (the Abwehr) had a loose administrative relation-
ship because two of the Abwehr’s departments dealt with “naval matters” (Group 
IV: Radio Intelligence and Group V: Naval Espionage).98
B-Dienst played a pivotal role in the first part of the Battle of the Atlantic.99 
Generally, B-Dienst had a reasonably clear and current picture of the convoy 
situation. It provided essential information to U-boats for their attacks on Allied 
convoys.100 It achieved a great success in March 1942 when it cracked the Allied 
convoy code. This enabled Dönitz to receive decoded signals within twenty-four 
hours of their transmission. From June through November 1942, almost all or-
ders to U-boats were based on German knowledge of decoded signals.101
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The Germans had relatively good knowledge of the Allies’ naval OOB in 
northern Scotland and Iceland. Most of the information came from radio inter-
cepts obtained by B-Dienst, photographic reconnaissance by Luftwaffe aircraft, 
and reports from U-boats.
Initially, the Germans did not have precise information on Allied efforts to sup-
ply the Soviet Union via the Arctic route. Yet already in September 1941, the Ger-
man Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the OKM noticed the increased 
importance of the convoys to northern Russia. They believed at first that supplies 
brought in by these convoys were solely intended for the support of Soviet forces 
fighting on the Murmansk front. They also thought that the Soviets, with the help 
of the British and Canadians, would try to capture vitally important nickel mines 
at Petsamo. This estimate of the situation was expressed in Hitler’s Instruction Nr. 
36 for winter operations in Norway, issued on 22 September 1941.102
However, air reconnaissance and information obtained from agents indicated 
that the enemy convoys were bringing in supplies to be used on the entire east-
ern front. The Germans also deduced that Murmansk and Arkhangelsk were the 
principal destination ports for the enemy convoys. German radio intercepts re-
vealed that the enemy used convoys with a P-Q designation for northern Russian 
convoys; eastbound convoys were designated PQ, westbound QP. The Germans 
knew that the enemy had sent seven eastbound convoys (PQ1–PQ7) by the end 
of 1941. However, because of bad weather conditions in the Arctic, the Germans 
never learned the positions of or the nature of the screens for those convoys.103
By mid-January 1942, the SKL had a clearer picture of the operational situa-
tion. It learned that the convoys originated in Scottish ports. Yet it erroneously 
believed that partial convoys from the United States stopped at Seydisfjord, Ice-
land, and from there sailed three to four times per month to northern Russia (see 
map 3). The screen was composed of cruisers and destroyers, with sometimes a 
single aircraft carrier.104
In mid-February 1942, the Germans learned that the route for the PQ convoys 
ran from Iceland to the southern tip of Bear Island, then eastward to longitude 
38°40ʹ E, then southward to latitude 70 degrees N, where the routes to Murmansk 
and Arkhangelsk separated. The return QP convoys left at the same time as the 
PQ convoys heading to the north Russian ports. The QPs were routed eastward 
and southward of the PQ route. Intervals between successive convoy pairs were 
about fifteen days.105
ALLIED PLANS
Allied planning for Convoys PQ17 and QP13 followed a well-established pat-
tern. While the Admiralty and the Home Fleet were gravely concerned about 
the safety of convoys to northern Russia during the summer months, they had 
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no choice but to send them; political reasons—support of the embattled Soviet 
Union—trumped purely military considerations.106 The time of sailing of the 
convoys could not be concealed from the Germans for more than a day or two 
at most. Hence, it was clear to Admirals Pound and Tovey that sooner or later a 
major disaster was bound to occur. This would be so especially if convoys con-
tinued to run in the summer months, when perpetual daylight prevailed. Pound 
believed firmly that another sortie by Tirpitz (the first foray, against convoys 
PQ12 and QP8 on 13 March 1942, had failed) was inevitable. He argued strongly 
to the War Cabinet that convoys should be postponed until at least the following 
winter. However, he was overruled because of strong pressure from Churchill and 
Roosevelt. Preparations for Convoy PQ17 went ahead.107
Admiral Tovey received information in June 1942 that the enemy intended to 
bring out his main force to attack an eastbound convoy. This meant that enemy 
surface ships would be operating in the area between Norway and Spitsbergen—
where British ships would be operating about a thousand miles from friendly air 
bases. The British destroyers also would be too short on fuel to escort any dam-
aged ships.108 The only hope, Tovey argued, was to induce the Germans to use 
their heavy ships toward the west. This would mean that an eastbound convoy, 
after reaching longitude 10 degrees E, would temporarily delay its transit for 
twelve to eighteen hours (unless it was known that the German heavy ships were 
still in port, or that the weather prevented shadowing by enemy aircraft). Tovey 
hoped that this temporary withdrawal would tempt the German heavy ships to 
pursue, cause them to return to port, or force them to sail into the operating area 
of the British and Russian submarines.109
The Admiralty rejected Tovey’s proposal. Yet the Admiralty’s instructions 
issued on 27 June envisaged the possibility, under certain circumstances, of 
the convoy being temporarily turned back, on Admiralty orders.110 The same 
document stated that the safety of the convoy against surface attack west of Bear 
Island “must be met by our surface forces, and to the eastward of that meridian 
[10 degrees E] must be met by submarines; and that the cruiser covering force 
was not intended to go east of Bear Island, unless the convoy was threatened by 
the presence of a surface force which the cruisers could fight, or in any case to 
go beyond 25° E.”111
Convoy PQ17 consisted of thirty-six merchant ships (twenty-three of them 
American), plus three rescue ships that technically were not part of the convoy. 
Commodore John C. K. Dowding commanded the convoy.112 The convoy carried 
156,492 tons of weapons, equipment, and other supplies. Among weapons and 
equipment, 594 tanks, 4,246 motor vehicles, and 297 aircraft were on board.113 
The plan envisaged that three oilers (designated Force Q) would accompany the 
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convoy to refuel both the destroyers accompanying Convoys PQ17 and QP13 and 
those with the Cruiser Covering Force.114
The route for Convoy PQ17 ran from Hvalfjord around the western and 
northern coasts of Iceland; through the Denmark Strait; past the east coast of Jan 
Mayen; northeast to the vicinity of latitude 75 degrees N, longitude 19 degrees E; 
from there due east, passing north of Bear Island; then proceeding southeast.115 
Upon crossing the longitude of the Kola Inlet (approximately 33 degrees E), the 
convoy route south would split, with one track leading into Murmansk and an-
other on to Arkhangelsk.116 This route ran more to the north than usual because 
the ice boundary had moved farther away from Bear Island. This increased the 
distance from the enemy air bases in northern Norway.117 It also made Convoy 
PQ17’s route longer than usual.118
Defenses for the PQ17/QP13 convoys were similar to those for the PQ16/
QP12 convoys. They consisted of a direct A/S screen and a “long-range escort 
force” sailing with the convoy, a Cruiser Covering Force for close cover, and a 
Battle Fleet for distant cover and support. The direct A/S screen and the long-
range escort force for Convoy PQ17 were under Commander John E. Broome, 
RN. The direct A/S screen consisted of four corvettes, two auxiliary antiaircraft 
(AA) ships, four minesweepers, and four armed trawlers. The long-range escort 
consisted of six destroyers and two submarines (see sidebar, “Allied Order of 
Battle”).119
The Cruiser Covering Force was designated Cruiser Squadron 1 (CS 1). It 
consisted of two British (London, Norfolk) and two U.S. cruisers (Tuscaloosa, 
Wichita) under Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, plus one British (Somali) and 
two U.S. destroyers (Wainwright, Rowan). CS 1, in turn, was organized into three 
divisions: 1st Division (London, Norfolk), 2nd Division (Tuscaloosa, Wichita), and 
3rd Division (Somali, Wainwright, Rowan).120 This force would provide cover as 
far as Bear Island.121 The Battle Fleet, under Admiral Tovey, was composed of the 
British battleship Duke of York, the U.S. battleship Washington, the British carrier 
Victorious, the British cruisers Cumberland and Nigeria, and twelve destroyers.122
Tovey’s plan was for the Battle Fleet to reach latitude 65°56ʹ N and longitude 
10°30ʹ E at 0730 on 1 July. After four destroyers from Seydisfjord joined the force, 
the remaining fleet destroyers would be detached to Seydisfjord and the Battle 
Force would proceed to provide distant cover for Convoy PQ17. CINC Rosyth 
(Scotland) was asked to arrange A/S escort and long-range fighter escort for the 
Battle Force as far northward as possible.123
Initially, eight British and one Free French submarines were assigned to and 
deployed in patrolling areas between North Cape and Bear Island.124 British 
Continued on page 106
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ALLIED ORDER OF BATTLE
CONVOY PQ17
(Commodore John C. K. Dowding)
Total: 39 Ships
36 merchant ships (23 U.S., 8 U.K., 2 Soviet, 2 Panamanian, 1 Dutch); 3 
rescue ships (U.K.)
MERCHANT SHIPS




Bolton Castle (U.K.) (sunk)
Carlton (U.S.) (sunk)
Christopher Newport (U.S.) (sunk)
Daniel Morgan (U.S.) (sunk)
Donbass (Soviet)
Earlston (U.K.) (sunk)
El Capitan (Panamanian) (sunk)
Empire Byron (U.K.) (sunk)
Empire Tide (U.K.)
Exford (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)
Fairfield City (U.S.) (sunk)
Hartlebury (U.K.) (sunk)
Honomu (U.S.) (sunk)
Hoosier (U.S.) (sunk)  
Ironclad (U.S.)
John Witherspoon (U.S.) (sunk)
Navarino (U.K.) (sunk) 
Ocean Freedom (U.K.)
Olopana (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Atlantic (U.S.) (sunk)
Pan Kraft (U.S.) (sunk)
Paulus Potter (Dutch) (sunk)
Peter Kerr (U.S.) (sunk)
Richard Bland (U.S.) (returned to Reykjavík)













(Commander John E. Broome, RN, in Keppel)
LONG-RANGE ESCORTS
6 destroyers: Fury, Keppel, Leamington, Ledbury, Offa, Wilton
2 submarines: P614, P615
A/S SCREEN
4 corvettes: Dianella, Lotus, Poppy; La Malouine (Free French)
4 A/S trawlers: Ayrshire, Lord Austin, Lord Middleton, Northern Gem
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submarines operating north of latitude 51 degrees N were informed that the 
main German units might operate from near the longitude of Bear Island to the 
southward of their patrol lines prior to attacking the PQ and QP convoys. Ice 
conditions might force the convoy to pass south of Bear Island. Hence, it was of 
utmost importance for the submarines to maintain accurate positions, particu-
larly with regard to their latitude.125 Five Soviet submarines patrolled the area 
north of Ingøy Island.126
Admiral Hamilton, in his operation order issued 25 June 1942, assumed that 
the Germans would be sufficiently tempted by PQ17 and QP13 to send their 
heavy ships to sea. After all, two enemy pocket battleships and some destroyers 
had been moved to more northerly ports in Norway, and more aircraft had been 
2 auxiliary AA vessels: Palomares, Pozarica
4 minesweepers: Bramble, Britomart, Leda, Salamander
SUPPLY GROUP—FORCE Q
2 fleet oilers: Grey Ranger (damaged by ice on 28 June; replaced by Alders-
dale), Aldersdale (sunk)
1 fleet oiler: Gray (for QP13)
1 destroyer: Douglas
CRUISER COVERING FORCE—CRUISER SQUADRON 1 (CS 1)
(Rear Admiral Louis K. Hamilton, RN, in London)
4 heavy cruisers 
2 British: London, Norfolk 
2 U.S.: Tuscaloosa (CA 37), Wichita (CA 45)
3 destroyers 
1 British: Somali 
2 U.S.: Rowan (DD 405), Wainwright (DD 419)
BATTLE FLEET
(Admiral Sir John Tovey, CINC Home Fleet, in Duke of York)
2 battleships 
1 British: Duke of York 
1 U.S.: Washington (BB 56) (Rear Admiral R. C. Giffen—TF 39)
1 aircraft carrier: Victorious (Vice Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser)
1 heavy cruiser: Cumberland
1 light cruiser: Nigeria
12 destroyers 
10 British: Ashanti, Blankney, Escapade, Faulknor, Marne, Martin, 
Middleton, Onslaught, Onslow, Wheatland  
2 U.S.: Mayrant (DD 402), Rhind (DD 404)
SUBMARINES
8 British: Sahib (P212), Sea Wolf (47S), Sturgeon (73S), Tribune (N76),  
Trident, Unrivalled (P45), Unshaken (P54), Ursula (N59)
1 Free French: Minerve
5 Soviet
Sources: Naval Staff, The Royal Navy and the Arctic Convoys, p. 57; Dowding, “Report 
of Convoy from Iceland to Time of ‘Scatter,’ 4th July”; Commanding Officer to the Chief 
of Naval Operations, “War Diary U.S.S. Washington, for Period from July 1, 1942, to July 
31, 1942,” folder BB 56 Washington War Diary—with Home Fleet, box 1554, Wasatch 
to Washington, RG 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Records 
Relating to Naval Activity during World War II, NARA; Harriman (NAVCOM LONDON) to 
OPNAV, 2148/29TM (29 June 1942). 
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sent north as well. Hamilton assumed that the enemy units most likely to be 
encountered would be Tirpitz, Lützow, Admiral Hipper, and Admiral Scheer, plus 
some ten destroyers. Because of respective speeds, the most likely combinations 
would be Tirpitz with Admiral Hipper and Lützow with Admiral Scheer.127
In Hamilton’s words, CS 1’s primary objective was to get PQ17 to Russia. A 
slightly less important objective was to bring the enemy heavy ships into action 
with the Battle Fleet and Cruiser Covering Force. To increase the chances of the 
latter action occurring, PQ17 would probably be turned back after reaching the 
approximate longitude of 10 degrees E, and then turned eastward again. The hope 
was to lure the German ships farther from their bases or keep them longer at sea 
within Allied submarine zones.128
The Battle Fleet would begin covering an area in the vicinity of latitude 71 de-
grees N, longitude 0 degrees E by the afternoon of the sixth day (D+6) and remain 
until D+8, not proceeding north of latitude 72°30ʹ N.129 The Cruiser Covering 
Force would leave Seydisfjord on the morning of D+5 to reach its covering area 
at latitude 73 degrees N, longitude 4 degrees E at about noon on D+6. It would 
remain in the area until D+8, or longer if circumstances dictated. Hamilton’s 
intent was to avoid being drawn within close range of the enemy’s shore-based 
aircraft or submarine concentration.130
In support of the operation, Allied planners envisaged the use of a dummy 
convoy (Operation E.S.) aimed at deceiving the Germans into believing that an 
attack on Norway was imminent. Hence, a group of five ships of the 1st Mining 
Squadron plus four colliers escorted by two cruisers (Sirius, Curacao), five de-
stroyers, and some trawlers would sail out of Scapa Flow in the Orkneys.131 This 
group would sortie several days prior to the departure of Convoy PQ17. It would 
pass west of the Shetlands and steer as far as latitude 61°30ʹ N and longitude 1 
degree E, hoping to be seen and reported by enemy aircraft before it turned back 
toward Scapa Flow. In addition, this plan envisaged bombing targets in southern 
Norway, thereby reinforcing the perception that the dummy convoy was heading 
there.132
In June 1942, arrangements were made with the Soviets to deploy a few PBY-2 
Catalina aircraft (No. 210 Squadron) to Arkhangelsk for reconnoitering the sea 
area between Altafjord and Convoy PQ17 on 1–3 July as the ships moved east-
ward; but the resulting patrol encountered nothing remarkable.133
Rear Admiral Geoffrey J. A. Miles, head of the British military mission to 
Moscow, informed the Admiralty on 16 June that the people’s commissar (min-
ister) of the navy, Admiral Nikolay Kuznetsov, promised that all Soviet resources 
would be concentrated on convoy protection. Kuznetsov had not been satisfied 
with the Soviet air effort for Convoy PQ16, but was optimistic about better results 
in the future. He promised to talk to the Defense Committee again to get more 
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long-range fighters. In addition, in the future, some bombers, instead of being 
used to bomb aerodromes, might be used to help long-range fighters. As many 
long-range Hurricane fighters as possible would be sent to the air base at Ponoy 
before Convoy PQ17’s arrival.134
GERMAN PLANS
German plans for the employment of heavy surface ships against a PQ convoy 
were based on several “appreciations” (staff studies) prepared by various naval 
commands during the winter and spring of 1941–42. As was the custom in the 
Kriegsmarine (and in the German Wehrmacht in general), the highest command 
echelon, Naval Group Command North, issued an “operational instruction” (op­
erative Weisung), while the subordinate commanders issued “operation orders” 
(Operationbefehle). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe prepared their separate 
operational plans for the attack on Convoy PQ17. However, each plan envisaged 
close cooperation with the other service.
On 4 June 1942, Admiral Carls issued his operational instruction for employ-
ing the Trondheim and Narvik groups (designated the 1st and 2nd Combat 
Groups, respectively) against the next enemy PQ convoy. The picture, as the 
instruction anticipated it, was as follows. Because the Allies ran the PQ/QP con-
voys at fourteen-to-fifteen-day intervals, the next convoy was expected in the Jan 
Mayen area on 20 June. Generally, the PQ convoys sailed in column formation, 
with four to five merchant ships in each column. The screen usually consisted 
of one cruiser in the midsection and three to four destroyers some 5,500 yards 
ahead of the convoy. Individual destroyers and any other escorts secured the con-
voy’s flanks. The previous enemy convoy had sailed close to the flock ice bound-
ary. A heavy security group that included a carrier had been positioned eastward 
of the Jan Mayen–Faeroes area.135
The operational instruction of 4 June established two chains of command, 
one for the first phase (deployment of the combat groups to their “jumping-off ” 
positions) and another for the second phase (deployment from the jumping-off 
positions to the attacking positions). In the first phase, Naval Group Command 
North at Sengwarden would exercise operational control of the Trondheim 
group, while the fleet commander in Tirpitz would exercise tactical control. For 
the Narvik group, operational control would be in the hands of Admiral Arctic on 
board the S-boat mother ship Tanga, while tactical command and control would 
be exercised by the commander of cruisers in Lützow.136 In the second phase of 
the operation, overall operational control over both surface forces and U-boats 
would be in the hands of Commander, Naval Group Command North. Admiral 
Arctic would retain operational control of the S-boats in the Kola Peninsula area. 
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After the forces were assembled, tactical command and control would rest in the 
hands of the fleet commander. The headquarters of Admiral Arctic would serve 
as radio repeater for the U-boats. Direct control of the U-boats by the fleet com-
mander was not envisaged.137
The operational instruction of 4 June specified the composition of the Trond-
heim and Narvik combat groups for the pending operation. The Trondheim 
group would consist of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper, two destroyers, and three tor-
pedo boats. The Narvik group would consist of Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and six 
destroyers. Besides the Trondheim and Narvik combat groups, Admiral Carls 
envisaged employing three U-boats northeast of Jan Mayen by 10 June. Their 
mission was to obtain early contact with the next PQ convoy and its heavy cover-
ing forces. Additional U-boat groups would be deployed in the area between Jan 
Mayen and Bear Islands.138
Operationally, RÖSSELSPRUNG was simple in concept but difficult in execution. 
Almost everything depended on a timely and covert joining of the two combat 
groups, followed by their unobserved movement toward the anticipated position 
of Convoy PQ17 (see map 3). Specifically, the Trondheim group would move 
to its jumping-off position of Gimsøystraumen in Vestfjord; at the same time, 
the Narvik group, directed by Commanding Admiral Arctic, would move to its 
jumping-off position at the northern exit of Altafjord, in the skerries (rocky islets) 
of Sørøya. Both groups were to be ready to sortie within twenty-four hours after 
leaving their bases for their jumping-off positions. Destroyers and torpedo boats 
would be fully refueled. After the joining of the two combat groups, the torpedo 
boats would be refueled at Altafjord and remain there in a three-hour ready-
for-sortie status. The destroyers’ short radius of action imposed limits on their 
speed during the operation.139 The danger of torpedoes was posed by not only the 
enemy surface forces and aircraft but also submarines; the latter had been used 
to screen the previous PQ convoy. On a signal from Commander, Naval Group 
Command North, both groups would sortie from their respective jumping- 
off positions so as to arrive at a meeting point determined by Commander, Naval 
Group Command North.140 Breaking off the action, if necessary, either would be 
ordered by Commander, Naval Group Command North or would result from an 
independent decision of the fleet commander.141
The situation would require massing German forces rapidly and keeping the 
duration of the operation short. The primary mission was the quick destruction 
of the enemy’s merchant ships. However, the heavy surface ships could merely 
neutralize the enemy cargo ships; their actual sinking should be left to the U-
boats and Luftwaffe. Among the enemy ships, sinking the tankers would be 
especially important. It also would be desirable to capture several enemy ships. 
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Attacking the convoy, not the enemy heavy covering group, was the primary mis-
sion of Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper.142
The enemy convoy would be detected by establishing U-boat patrolling lines. 
After the U-boats detected the PQ convoy, the Luftwaffe would be responsible for 
maintaining continuous contact. The Luftwaffe would also search for the enemy 
heavy group in the area of the Shetlands–Faeroes–Iceland–Jan Mayen line. If the 
Allied heavy covering group was not detected, it would be critically important to 
reconnoiter the sea area some 250 nm around the enemy convoy. The Luftwaffe 
was also tasked with reconnoitering the areas of Reykjavík, Scapa Flow, and the 
Firths of Forth and Moray in Scotland.143
On the day the combat groups sortied from Trondheim and Narvik, the 
Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the quadrant of offshore waters up to two hundred 
nautical miles from the coast running northeastward from latitude 62 degrees 
N to the longitude of North Cape. On the day of departure from the jumping-
off positions, the Luftwaffe would reconnoiter the truncated strip of waters two 
hundred nautical miles offshore from the latitude of the southern tip of Lofoten 
to the longitude of North Cape.144
In accordance with the führer’s instruction of 14 March 1942, Naval Group 
Command North requested that the 5th Air Fleet assign three squadrons of Focke- 
Wolfe (FW) 200 Condor long-range reconnaissance aircraft, four squadrons of 
Blohm & Voss (BV) 138s, and several Kettes (three-plane “chains”) of bombers 
and Junkers (Ju) 88 fighter-bombers for air reconnaissance.145 However, the 5th 
Air Fleet informed Naval Group Command North on 19 June that its request 
could not be fulfilled. In the 5th Air Fleet’s view, the attack on Convoy PQ16 in 
late May 1942 had clearly showed that the Luftwaffe itself was capable of inflict-
ing heavy losses on enemy convoys (aircraft had sunk seven ships, U-boats only 
one), but that the prerequisite for doing so was not to weaken the 5th Air Fleet’s 
already inadequate forces by assigning them other tasks.146
On 14 June, Admiral Schniewind, the fleet commander, issued a six-and-one-
half-page operation order entitled “Employment of Fleet Forces in the Northern 
Area against a PQ Convoy.” The mission was simple: an “attack on Convoy 
PQ17.”147 In keeping with the overall operational instruction, Schniewind’s 
operation order divided fleet forces into three elements: the Trondheim group, 
the Narvik group, and the U-boats (see sidebar, “German Order of Battle”). The 
Trondheim group consisted of Tirpitz, Admiral Hipper (with the fleet commander 
embarked), and five destroyers (in contrast to the two destroyers envisaged in 
Carls’s operational instruction). The Narvik group had Lützow, Admiral Scheer, 
and six destroyers. Three U-boats were stationed northeast of Iceland beginning 
on 10 June. Other available U-boats, “probably three to four,” would be in the 
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attacking position between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands. Any other U-boats avail-
able later would be stationed off Bear Island. At the time the operation order was 
issued, there were only two destroyers in Trondheim (Ihn and Lody); four other 
destroyers were to be transferred from Germany to Norway within the next few 
days. There were also two or three torpedo boats in Trondheim to serve as escorts 
for the Trondheim group.148 In the skerries area of Vestfjord and in other coastal 
waters, the Germans would deploy minesweepers and submarine chasers. The U-
boats would follow a route through Andfjord. One former fishing steamer (Schiff 
31) would be employed to escort the U-boats.149
Upon issuance of a coded signal from Naval Group Command North, the fleet 
forces would sail out to their jumping-off points: 1st Combat Group from Trond-
heim to Gimsøystraumen-Vestfjord; 2nd Combat Group from Narvik to the 
northern entrance of Altafjord (the area of the skerries off Sørøya). Each group 
was to be at its jumping-off position and combat-ready within twenty-four hours 
after leaving its home base.150 About five hours prior to the sortie of the combat 
groups, Air Leader Lofoten and Air Leader North (East) would conduct recon-
naissance in the quadrant encompassed by latitude 68 degrees N and longitude 
GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE
 (F = flagship)
1ST COMBAT GROUP (I KAMPFGRUPPE) (TRONDHEIM)
1 battleship: Tirpitz (F)
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Hipper
5 destroyers:  
5th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-14 (F) Friedrich Ihn, Z-4 Richard Beitzen 
6th Destroyer Flotilla: Z-20 (F) Karl Galster, Z-10 Hans Lody, Z-6 
Theodor Riedel
2 torpedo boats: T-7, T-15
2ND COMBAT GROUP (II KAMPFGRUPPE) (NARVIK)
1 pocket battleship: Lützow
1 heavy cruiser: Admiral Scheer
8TH DESTROYER FLOTILLA
5 destroyers: Z-28 (F), Z-24, Z-27, Z-29, Z-30
1 oiler: Dithmarschen
9 U-boats: U-88, U-251, U-255, U-334, U-355, U-376, U-456, U-457, U-703
5TH AIR FLEET, LUFTWAFFE
103 Ju 88 bombers
42 He 111 torpedo bombers
15 He 115 torpedo bombers (on floats)
30 Ju 87 dive-bombers
74 reconnaissance aircraft (including FW 200 Condors and BV 138s)
Sources: Flottenchef/B.d.S., “Operationsbefehl. Einsatz der Flottenstreitkraefte im Nord-
raum gegen einen PQ-Geleitzug,” p. 6; translation of the final report on operation (At-
tack on PQ17) submitted by Admiral Carls (Gruppe Nord) on the 12.7.1942 “Final Report 
on PQ17,” p. 234; Admiral Norway, B. Nr. Gkdos. 295 AI Chefs, 8 January 1942, “Die 
militaerische Lage Norwegen,” p. 30; Irving, The Destruction of Convoy PQ.17, p. 40.
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25 degrees E, up to two hundred nautical miles off the coast. Within the effective 
range of the Luftwaffe’s fighter aircraft, close air support would be provided dur-
ing all phases of the operation.151
Admiral Schniewind reiterated that the operational situation would require 
quick massing and concentrated employment of forces, leading to quick de-
struction of the enemy. The primary objective was destruction of the enemy’s 
merchant ships; the convoy’s screening ships were to be attacked only if they 
threatened the accomplishment of the operational objective. The main objective 
would be accomplished faster and more effectively if the U-boats and the Luft-
waffe provided reliable reconnaissance. The most favorable conditions for the 
attack would be in the sea area east of Bear Island, between longitudes 20 degrees 
and 30 degrees E.152
In his intent (Absicht), Admiral Schniewind directed that suppression of the 
strongest enemy force would be the responsibility of the 1st Combat Group. As 
soon as Convoy PQ17 was detected and located, the combat groups would take 
up their stations. Yet this should be carried out as late as possible, so as to reduce 
the time available for the enemy to react.153 The enemy should be attacked on 
the bow sectors and from the east; the enemy was to be encircled only when his 
combat power was broken up.154 If the enemy’s close screen consisted of no more 
than two cruisers, the attack could be conducted from two directions from the 
outset; this would result in quicker destruction of the convoy.155
Schniewind stressed that an engagement with superior enemy forces should 
be avoided. The operation should be executed quickly so as to be completed 
before an enemy force composed of battleships and carriers, and presumably 
located in the Faeroes–Iceland area, would have any opportunity to intervene. 
The operation could be canceled by the fleet commander or by order of Naval 
Group Command North.156 If enemy heavy forces were encountered during the 
attack on the convoy, the action should continue only as long as the conditions 
for success were favorable.157
On 2 June, Admiral Schmundt (Admiral Arctic) issued his operation order for 
redeployment of the pocket battleship group from Narvik to Altafjord. In addi-
tion to Lützow, Admiral Scheer, and the six destroyers, the Narvik combat group 
included the 6th S-boat Flotilla (seven S-boats) plus one supply ship.158 Close air 
support of the Narvik group through its arrival in Altafjord would be provided 
by Luftwaffe fighters based in Bardufoss and Altengaard (near Altafjord). Air 
reconnaissance would be aimed primarily at detecting enemy carriers in the 
sea quadrant between latitude 67 degrees N and longitude 26 degrees E, up to 
two hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast. Higher-density reconnais-
sance would be conducted between latitudes 69 degrees and 79 degrees N and 
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longitudes 14 degrees and 19 degrees E. Air reconnaissance would be conducted 
during the entire time of the redeployment of the Narvik group.159
On 11 June, Admiral Schmundt directed three U-boats, organized into the 
Eisteufel (“Ice Devil”) group, to take up patrol positions in the Denmark Strait to 
watch for the first sign of PQ17. These U-boats’ primary mission was detecting 
and then tracking the enemy convoy. Surface ships of destroyer size and larger 
could be attacked only when positively identified as hostile. In any uncertain situ-
ation, such as thick weather, all attacks on enemy warships were prohibited. The 
German ships were also directed not to attack enemy submarines, but otherwise 
“to act as though submarines they meet are hostile.”160
The 5th Air Fleet issued an operational order for its forces on 14 June. In gen-
eral, the Luftwaffe was responsible for air reconnaissance and the close support of 
naval forces. The subordinate commanders were directed to use all their available 
forces in attacking the PQ convoy.161 Upon executing the order for Operation 
RÖSSELSPRUNG, Luftwaffe aircraft would be employed in a three-hundred-nautical- 
mile-wide strip off the Norwegian coast. Specific area responsibilities were as fol-
lows: Air Leader North (West) from latitude 62 degrees N to a line crossing from 
the southern tip of the Lofoten area to the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen Island; 
Air Leader Lofoten from a line touching the southern tip of the Lofoten area 
to a line connecting North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen; Air Leader 
North (East) from the line from North Cape to the southern tip of Spitsbergen to 
longitude 30 degrees E.162
Air Leader North (West) was responsible for providing cover for the Trond-
heim group, while Air Leader Lofoten would provide cover for the Narvik 
group.163 Fighter protection would be organized by the commander of fighters, 
Norway, in cooperation with the fleet commander at Trondheim, and Air Leader 
Lofoten in cooperation with the commander of cruisers.164 After the PQ convoy 
crossed longitude 5 degrees E, Air Leader Lofoten would be responsible for the 
sea area to three hundred nautical miles off the Norwegian coast from a line 
connecting the southern tip of Lofoten and the southwestern tip of Jan Mayen 
to a line connecting the southern tip of Spitsbergen and North Cape. Air Leader 
North (West) would be responsible for the sea area west and southwest of the 
Lofoten–Jan Mayen line (see map 4).165
In the meantime, discussion at a meeting between Admiral Raeder and Hitler 
on 6 June focused on operations in the Arctic. Hitler was informed about the 
pending operation in which Tirpitz was envisaged to participate. His agreement 
was lukewarm at best, but he did not reject the idea. Hitler was unclear about 
the form in which the operation would be conducted, but felt it should not be a 
risky undertaking for heavy ships in any case. After the meeting, Raeder directed 
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Admiral Krancke, OKM’s liaison to the führer’s headquarters, to explain to the 
führer once again that the SKL placed great importance on the operation, but 
that it would require sufficient Luftwaffe air cover; it could not be successful 
otherwise.166
Hitler formally approved the plan for RÖSSELSPRUNG on 9 June. However, 
Raeder failed to respond forcefully to Hitler’s remark that he now saw “great 
danger for heavy ships by the (enemy) aircraft carrier.” This meant that the en-
emy carrier must be located prior to the attack on the convoy and eliminated as 
a threat to German heavy ships. The SKL was allowed to move the Trondheim 
group to Altafjord, but then had to await orders to attack. Such orders could come 
only following Hitler’s approval. Raeder’s failure to act energetically—to confront 
Hitler and get him to lift his restrictions on the employment of the heavy ships—
was the key element in the ultimate failure of RÖSSELSPRUNG, notwithstanding 
the German forces’ overall success against Convoy PQ17.167
EXECUTION
Convoy PQ17, now consisting of thirty-six ships plus one rescue ship, sailed from 
Hvalfjord at 1600 on 27 June.168 (See maps 4 and 5.) It proceeded at six knots. The 
next day the convoy encountered heavy fog and ice floes in the Denmark Strait. 
One merchant vessel ran aground and an oiler was so heavily damaged by ice that 
it had to return. Several other ships suffered slight damage from ice.169
The Home Fleet’s Battle Force sailed from Scapa Flow on 29 June. It followed 
a course northward so as to provide support to both the PQ17 and QP13 con-
voys.170 Convoy PQ17 was fully formed at 1200 on 30 June when the long-range 
escort force (six destroyers, four corvettes, two auxiliary AA ships, and two sub-
marines) under Commander Broome plus two rescue ships joined the convoy.171 
The convoy was then some one hundred miles southwest of Jan Mayen Island.172 
The next day, the Cruiser Covering Force sailed from Seydisfjord.173
Operation E.S.’s dummy convoy sailed on 29 June. It carried out its movement 
eastward toward the Norwegian coast on 30 June and 1 July. However, the Ger-
mans’ reconnaissance aircraft did not observe it, and hence they did not react at 
all.174 The entire deception plan was a failure.
At 1640 on 30 June, Luftwaffe aircraft detected westbound Convoy QP13, 
consisting of thirty-nine ships and ten escorts, some two hundred nautical miles 
north of North Cape. However, because of heavy fog, the aircraft were unable to 
maintain contact.175 At 1050 on 1 July, Convoy QP13 was sighted by U­88 some 
250 nm northeast of Jan Mayen, but was not attacked.176
At 1615 on 1 July, U­255 was the first to detect Convoy PQ17. The reported 
position of the convoy was some sixty nautical miles east of Jan Mayen. U­255 
reported that the convoy consisted of thirty-eight steamers and ten to twelve 
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destroyers and other escort vessels. The convoy’s speed was estimated at eight 
knots; B-Dienst later confirmed this.177
At noon on 1 July, the British first noted German shadowing aircraft over 
Convoy PQ17. The weather was calm. All the Allied destroyers had been refu-
eled. The convoy was then some two hundred miles west of Bear Island.178 The 
























   
   
   






















Map 5: MOVEMENTS OF REMNANTS OF CONVOY PQ17, 4–17 JULY 1942
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3 degrees E, at a distance of some ten miles, on the afternoon of 1 July.179 The 
Cruiser Covering Force overtook Convoy PQ17 and sailed parallel to it some 
forty miles north, so as to avoid German detection.180
In the meantime, Bletchley Park learned that the Luftwaffe had detected Con-
voy PQ17.181 The OIC began to decrypt special intelligence traffic, extending 
from noon on 1 July to noon on 2 July. The OIC learned that the Narvik group 
had arrived at Altafjord that morning. It also knew that Tirpitz had sortied from 
Trondheim the previous night. This was confirmed by a British aircraft. Yet Tir­
pitz was not actually located by air reconnaissance that day.182
On 2 July, one fleet tanker and one destroyer left the convoy to join westbound 
Convoy QP13. On the evening of the same day, Convoy PQ17 ran into fog, which 
persisted until the forenoon of 3 July. Bad weather prevented Allied aircraft from 
reconnoitering the Norwegian ports for several days.183
Despite the failure to detect the Allies’ heavy surface ship group, Admiral Carls 
believed that the pending German operation, including the incorporation of 
heavy surface forces, was fully justified. Deployment of the German ships would 
start after the enemy PQ convoy crossed longitude 5 degrees E, anticipated by 
the evening of 2 July.184 Hence, in the forenoon of 2 July, Naval Group Command 
North requested that 1./SKL issue “execute” orders for the operation. This request 
was approved, and signals were sent at 1257 on 2 July. At 1200, the Trondheim 
group received an order to be in three-hour readiness.185 On the basis of reports 
from U­266, Admiral Arctic decided to keep four U-boats in continuous contact 
with the convoy. By 1400 on 2 July, a patrol line of six U-boats was established 
halfway between Jan Mayen and Bear Islands.186
As planned, the Trondheim group sortied at 2000 on 2 July for Gimsøy-
straumen, and four hours later the Narvik group left for Altafjord.187 Lützow 
ran aground in the Tjeldsund after it left Ofotfjord and did not take part in the 
operation thereafter. Likewise, three destroyers (Lody, Riedel, and Galster) of the 
Trondheim group touched ground in Gimsøystraumen and returned to Trond-
heim the next day.188 The Germans believed (wrongly, as it turned out) that the 
enemy did not notice the deployment of the Trondheim and Narvik groups.189
About midnight on 2/3 July, the U-boats and aircraft lost contact with Convoy 
PQ17.190 At 0700 on 3 July, the convoy changed course to due east to pass Bear 
Island, entering the Barents Sea. The Admiralty reported that the ice boundary 
was farther north than had been anticipated. Hence, Admiral Hamilton sug-
gested to Commander Broome that he change to a more northward course. Yet 
Broome did not entirely accept that suggestion, because he was more anxious to 
make progress eastward.191 He changed the convoy’s course only slightly north-
ward (to 021).192
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At 1600, Admiral Carls asked for a decision regarding RÖSSELSPRUNG. He 
shared his intent to deploy the Tirpitz group to Altafjord with Raeder and the 
SKL. Afterward, Admiral Krancke was directed to transmit Raeder’s approval of 
Carls’s intent to Hitler. At the same time he was instructed to explain to Hitler 
that movement of the Tirpitz group to Altafjord was only a preliminary redeploy-
ment, and did not constitute execution of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG. In a mes-
sage sent at 1720, Carls ordered Schniewind to carry out the redeployment.193 By 
deploying the Tirpitz group to Altafjord, only a few hours would be lost if Hitler’s 
approval for the larger operation came before midday on 4 July.194
In the early morning of 3 July, the Admiralty informed CINC Home Fleet that 
a PBY-2 Catalina seaplane, backed by one B-24 Liberator heavy bomber if nec-
essary, would patrol the area between latitude 71°30ʹ N, longitude 19°10ʹ E and 
latitude 71°55ʹ N, longitude 23°40ʹ E from 1530 on 3 July to 0300 on 5 July. This 
patrol was intended to cover the approaches from Altafjord to the convoy’s route. 
Aircraft from Sullom Voe would conduct some additional searches westward of 
Lofoten. The plan also included having five Catalinas available at Arkhangelsk to 
provide searches for the convoy’s passage after it crossed longitude 35 degrees E.195
At 0130, PQ17 changed course to 091. It sailed into an area full of heavy ice 
growlers.196 At 0415, Luftwaffe aircraft detected Convoy PQ17 some eighty nauti-
cal miles northeast of Bear Island, equidistant from that island and Spitsbergen.197
At 0450, Convoy PQ17 suffered its first loss when a single enemy aircraft 
torpedoed the American merchantman Christopher Newport of seven thousand 
gross registered tons (in German documents, Bruttoregistertonnen, or BRT).198
During the day on 4 July, German aircraft maintained contact with PQ17, 
with only short interruptions caused by bad weather.199 As of 1700, the Germans 
still did not have definite information regarding the presence of an enemy heavy 
covering group with—probably—one battleship, two to three cruisers, and three 
destroyers, reported as of 1352 as being northeast of Convoy PQ17 and sailing 
on a southeasterly course.200 At 1745, Admiral Carls reported to the SKL that the 
area north of latitude 71 degrees N was not continuously observed. The 1st and 
2nd Combat Groups were in a three-hour readiness status at Altafjord. Admiral 
Carls believed that, because of the situation, Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG should be 
launched no later than 1700 on 5 July.201
In the meantime, at about 1230, the Admiralty gave Hamilton permission to 
sail east of longitude 25 degrees E should the situation require it. However, the 
Admiralty had no intelligence that justified changing Tovey’s plans. So Tovey 
qualified the Admiralty’s message by directing Hamilton that “once the convoy is 
east of 25° E or earlier at your discretion, you are to leave the Barents Sea unless 
assured by Admiralty that Tirpitz cannot be met.”202 At 1520, Hamilton signaled 
that he would stay with the convoy until the enemy surface situation had been 
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clarified, but certainly no later than 1200 on 5 July.203 These messages sent by the 
Admiralty marked the beginning of increased interference by Admiral Pound in 
the decisions and actions of his subordinate commanders during the operation, 
including bypassing Admiral Tovey to send messages directly to Tovey’s subor-
dinate Hamilton.204
During the afternoon of 4 July, British aircraft reported that Tirpitz and Ad­
miral Hipper had left Trondheim. Admiral Tovey’s force was then some 180–200 
miles northwest of Bear Island. That position was within the mutually support-
ing distance for aircraft from the carrier Victorious to respond in case of enemy 
attack on Convoy PQ17.205 At 1640, Hamilton ordered the convoy to change 
course from 090 to 045 to open distance from the enemy airfield at Banak to four 
hundred miles.206
That afternoon, Bletchley Park asserted that, although there was no verifica-
tion via photographic reconnaissance, it was “tolerably certain” that Admiral 
Scheer and Lützow had been in Altafjord since 1400 on 3 July (when it became 
known they had left Trondheim). By the afternoon of 4 July, all four German 
heavy ships might have been at sea heading toward the convoy.207
At 1809, Admiral Hamilton replied to the Admiralty that he intended to with-
draw to the westward of Convoy PQ17 at about 2200 on 4 July, upon completing 
the refueling of his destroyers.208 Another message from the Admiralty, received 
about 1839, informed Hamilton that further information might be available 
shortly, and directed him to remain with the convoy “pending further instruc-
tion.”209 At that time, Hamilton’s force was some ten to twenty miles ahead of the 
convoy.210 Some 350 miles away from the Cruiser Covering Force, the Battle Fleet 
was in a hovering position southwest of Spitsbergen.211
Over the course of the day, the weather north of Bear Island steadily improved; 
however, the cloud ceiling was low (300–500 meters), making it easier for the 
enemy aircraft to attack the convoy.212 The first attack with a few bombers came 
at 1930, but scored no hits. Luftwaffe aircraft carried out a series of more deadly 
attacks during the evening of 4 July. At about 2020, approximately twenty-three 
Heinkel (He) 111 torpedo bombers attacked the convoy. They torpedoed three 
ships; two had to be sunk, while one was damaged but was able to continue the 
voyage. Four enemy planes were shot down.213 Convoy PQ17 came out of the 
heavy Luftwaffe air attacks remarkably well—its antiair defense proved very 
effective.214
At 2325, Bletchley Park sent the Admiralty an intercepted message: “Most Se-
cret Source (Ultra): 1. Germans located westbound convoy from Russia on North 
Cape meridian P.M. yesterday July 2nd and have since lost in fog. 2. Eastbound 
convoy is expected to be sighted shortly and will be attacked in accordance with 
plan; 3. Warships are expected to move from Trondheim and Narvik (? 36) hours 
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before convoy reaches meridian 5 deg E. Main attack to be concentrated during 
passage between 15th and 30th meridian; 4. U-boats already on station close 
to Arctic. A two repeat A two.” (A2 was the level of reliability of this part of the 
report.)215
Decision to Scatter the Convoy
In the evening on 4 July, Admiral Pound personally went to Bletchley Park to get 
a close look at the stream of decrypted messages.216 The OIC received good news 
at about 1900: that the code “break-in” had been accomplished, so the decrypts 
for the twenty-four hours that had ended at noon that day could be expected very 
shortly.217 At 1918, Bletchley sent a message to Tovey that the German “CINC of 
the Fleet in Tirpitz arrived to Alta(fjord) 0900/4. Destroyers and torpedo boats 
complete with fuel at once. (Admiral) Scheer was already present at Alta(fjord) [so 
were Hipper and Lützow]. At 1623/3 two U-boats were informed their main task 
was to shadow convoy.”218 Commander Norman Denning of the OIC wanted to 
add to this message regarding Tirpitz’s arrival in Altafjord that morning and the 
directive to the destroyers and torpedo boats to refuel that the evidence indicated 
that Tirpitz was still at Altafjord. However, after some discussion with Admiral 
Pound, Denning’s added text was deleted from the message before it was sent at 
1918.219
It was not known how long refueling the destroyers would take. Although 
expected, receipt of the information about the German ships’ arrival in Altafjord 
further reinforced the view that a move against the convoy, in accordance with 
the original plan, was imminent, if not already under way.220 But Denning was 
not convinced the German ships had sailed out of Altafjord. He was supported 
in his view by his superior, Jock Clayton, the deputy director of the Intelligence 
Centre. (Clayton was a rear admiral on the retired list, but had been brought back 
onto active service as a captain.) Further support came from Harry Hinsley, the 
German traffic analyst at Bletchley. For Denning, the absence of any signal from 
Naval Group Command North to Tirpitz was an indicator that the heavy ships 
were still at Altafjord. The comparison was to Tirpitz’s foray against Convoy 
PQ12 in March. There also were no reports from the British submarines. Howev-
er, Pound gave Denning no opportunity to explain his reasons; he instead asked 
direct questions, and expected to receive short, factual answers. Among several 
other questions, Pound asked Denning whether he knew that Tirpitz was not out 
to sea.221 Denning responded that, on the basis of the experience of the German 
sortie against Convoy PQ12, the Germans would not risk Tirpitz if it might be in 
danger from the “Home Fleet, particularly its aircraft carriers.”222 He also tried to 
reassure Pound that “if Tirpitz has put out to sea you can be sure that we should 
have known very shortly afterward within four to six hours.”223
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Denning also pointed to several “negative” indicators that Tirpitz was not at 
sea. For example, Bletchley Park knew that the Germans had sighted CS 1 but had 
reported erroneously that it included a battleship. That would indicate a larger 
force, and therefore the Germans would decide not to send Tirpitz to sea. Bletch-
ley had found no evidence the Germans had detected the heavy covering force. 
Another piece of evidence that Tirpitz was not out to sea was that the Germans 
did not warn their U-boats to stay clear of the convoy. Neither had the German 
wireless telegraphy (W/T) traffic since noon shown any extraordinary activity. 
The British and Russian submarines off North Cape had reported no sightings. 
Collectively, all these “negatives” were a good indication that Tirpitz was still at 
Altafjord.224
Nonetheless, to Admiral Pound’s question, “Can you assure me that Tirpitz is 
still at anchor in Altafjord?” Denning responded, “No. I shall have information 
only after the Tirpitz has left.”225 On this question, in fact, hung the entire future 
of Convoy PQ17. Yet Denning was not in a position to give the desired assur-
ance.226 Pound then asked, “Can you at least tell me whether Tirpitz is ready to 
go to sea?” To this Denning responded, “I can at least say that she will not leave 
in the next few hours. If she were on the point of sailing, the destroyer escort 
would have preceded her and made an antisubmarine sweep. They have not been 
reported by our submarines patrolling the Altafjord.”227
A stream of decrypts began to reach the OIC at 2000. However, they provided 
no new “positive” information bearing on Admiral Pound’s question. By then, 
Clayton was due to attend a staff meeting at 2030 convened by Pound.228 (Coin-
cidentally, that meeting was held just when Convoy PQ17 was repelling enemy 
air attacks.)229 At 2031, a decrypt timed 1130 on 4 July was received at the OIC. 
It confirmed that Tirpitz had not left Altafjord as of noon on 4 July. This signal 
was included in the summarized ULTRA message timed 2110. It had informed the 
U-boats that no German surface ships were then in their operating area, and that 
the British heavy ships, if encountered, should be their main targets. However, 
this information did not change the situation, because an assumption had already 
been made that the destroyers and torpedo boats accompanying Tirpitz would 
not have completed refueling until about noon on 4 July.230
At the 2030 meeting, Admiral Pound and his staff opined that the enemy at-
tack could occur any time after 0200 on 5 July; if that happened, Admiral Ham-
ilton’s cruisers would be destroyed. They also (falsely) believed that the more 
widely merchant ships were dispersed, the better their chance of escape; once the 
alarm was given, the enemy would wish to spend no more time than necessary in 
the vicinity to pick off some ships. However, an eight-knot convoy might require 
a lot of time to disperse over a large area. The air and U-boat attacks had already 
started and were certain to continue.231
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When Clayton returned to the OIC at about 2130, he informed his staff of Ad-
miral Pound’s view that the convoy had to be dispersed because Tirpitz had sailed 
and could reach the convoy by 0200 on 5 July. However, his staff disagreed with 
that assessment. They persuaded Clayton to go back to Admiral Pound and make 
the case that Admiral Tovey should be advised instead that Tirpitz had not sailed, 
and would not sail until the Germans obtained information on the strength of the 
Allied heavy covering force.232 The naval section at Bletchley Park agreed with 
Denning’s assessment that the weight of negative evidence suggested that Tirpitz 
was still at Altafjord. However, Clayton was unable to convince Admiral Pound, 
who had already made up his mind.233
The fate of Convoy PQ17 was decided by three short messages sent by the Ad-
miralty. At 2111 on 4 July, Pound sent a signal to Hamilton (repeated to Tovey): 
“Cruiser force withdraw to westward at high speed.” Pound sent another message 
directly to Broome (repeated to Hamilton) at 2123. It read: “Owing to threat from 
surface ships convoy is to disperse and proceed to Russian ports.” This was fol-
lowed by another at 2136: “My 2123/4th. Convoy is to scatter.”234
At the time Admiral Pound made his decision, Convoy PQ17 was some 130 
miles north-northeast of Bear Island; from North Cape, the convoy was almost 
due north (bearing 008) at a distance of about 240 miles.235 The Allied ships had 
some 450 miles before they would reach Novaya Zemlya. The Battle Force was 
then some 230 miles from the convoy and four hundred miles from the Tirpitz 
group. In other words, it was too far away from both the convoy and the enemy 
heavy ships.236
At 2215, Commander Broome passed the signal to scatter to the convoy com-
modore. The convoy was then at 75°55ʹ N, 28°52ʹ E. Broome, with his destroyers 
(other ships of the A/S screen remained with the convoy), steamed away to join 
Admiral Hamilton’s force.237 Commodore Dowding sent a message to Broome: 
“Many thanks. Goodbye and good hunting”; Broome replied, “It’s a grim business 
leaving you here.”238
At 2230, Hamilton turned his force onto a westerly course, passing southward 
of the convoy—that is, between the convoy and the probable direction from 
which the enemy would approach. The visibility was extremely variable, with nu-
merous fog patches. The Cruiser Covering Force, with the destroyers, withdrew 
westward at twenty-five knots.239
Both Hamilton and Broome were affected less by the content of Pound’s three 
messages than by the quick succession in which they were sent. The cumulative 
effect of the three signals—especially since the last signal had a more urgent pri-
ority marking than the middle one—was to imply that danger was pressing on 
them.240 They believed an attack by Tirpitz was imminent. Commander Broome 
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never forgave himself for obeying the order to scatter the convoy.241 (The third 
message’s order to “scatter” the convoy was actually merely a technical amend-
ment of the term “disperse” that had been used in the second signal; but Hamilton 
and Broome could not have known this. Later, the official Royal Navy history 
would explain the two terms in a footnote. “Disperse” meant ships should break 
formation and proceed at a convenient speed toward their destination, remain-
ing for some hours in close proximity to each other. By contrast, the term “scat-
ter” meant they should begin sailing on different bearings, in accordance with a 
scheme laid down in the convoy instructions.)242
Officially, the decision to scatter the convoy was later explained thus: Convoy 
PQ17 still had thirty ships intact. The combined threat of air and U-boat attacks 
was considerable. The convoy had reached a positon beyond the effective range 
of the Battle Fleet, even if that force was put at risk to engage Tirpitz and the en-
emy’s other heavy ships. In the Admiralty’s view, if the convoy continued on its 
way, it would be harassed by enemy U-boats and aircraft. Any enemy heavy ships 
would most likely be encountered east of North Cape. The enemy would need no 
more than ten hours to reach the convoy, and could return to safety in less than 
that time. Hence, the decision was made to scatter the convoy, with the inten-
tion of minimizing the greater losses anticipated from a surface attack compared 
with those inflicted by U-boats and aircraft. But as it turned out, the convoy lost 
twenty ships after the signal to scatter was given, and only twelve ships reached 
Russian ports.243 This reasoning was faulty because of the proven effectiveness of 
Luftwaffe bombers and Kriegsmarine U-boats in attacking individual merchant 
ships. The threat of enemy aircraft to PQ17 could be neutralized only by having 
superior airpower in the area—unlikely to be provided by the Soviets.
This was only the second time an Allied convoy had received the order to 
scatter. In the first instance, Convoy HX84 (bound from Halifax to Liverpool) 
received such an order on 5 November 1940 when Admiral Scheer was about to 
attack it. However, there were significant differences: the area in which HX84’s 
thirty-seven ships could disperse was much larger, and neither German aircraft 
nor U-boats were attacking the ships. The earlier convoy was also protected by 
only a single escort ship (Jarvis Bay). Admiral Scheer subsequently sank five ships, 
including the escort.244
The order to scatter Convoy PQ17 was given in glaring contravention of the 
“Atlantic Convoy Instructions and Orders” issued by Admiral Tovey in March 
1942. They stipulated that in the face of enemy heavy ships, convoy escorts 
should remain in the vicinity to track and, if circumstances allowed, even to 
attack enemy surface ships. Tovey in his report noted that Convoy PQ17 had 
already completed more than half its voyage (when the decision to scatter was 
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issued, PQ17 was some eight hundred miles away from Arkhangelsk) yet had 
lost only three ships. In his view, the decision to scatter was premature—and 
disastrous.245
In a personal letter to Admiral Sir Percy Noble of the Western Approaches 
Command on 12 July 1942, Admiral Tovey placed responsibility for the de-
struction of Convoy PQ17 squarely on the Admiralty for “scattering of convoy 
unnecessarily early and . . . the appalling conditions of panic suggested by the 
signals they made.” He also sent an officer “down to the Admiralty to make 
clear to them what the reactions at sea were to the information passed out 
and to those three signals in particular.” Tovey also told the Admiralty on the 
phone that he considered it “wrong for the Admiralty to issue definite orders 
to the convoy and escort.” The Admiralty should “give them information by all 
means and, if they wish make a recommendation, but leave it to the fellow on 
the spot to decide the action to be taken.” The Admiralty’s response was that it 
“consider[ed] it putting an unfair responsibility on to an officer of Commander’s 
rank.”246 However, this did not absolve Admiral Pound from bypassing Admirals 
Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey also wrote that Hamilton was entirely responsible 
for the lack of action because he “failed completely to appreciate the altered situ-
ation due to his imagining that there was still a strong likelihood of his being 
brought to action by the Tirpitz.” Hamilton also believed that the best course 
of action would have entailed the destroyer escort operating together with his 
three destroyers as part of the screen for CS 1. Tovey stated in his letter, “I deeply 
regret this mistake of his [Hamilton’s] as there was not the slightest doubt that if 
the destroyers had returned to the convoy within a reasonable time they could 
have helped materially in its defence and in rescuing survivors.”247 Yet while the 
presence of destroyers obviously would have strengthened Convoy PQ17’s AA 
defenses, it was unlikely they would have reduced significantly the number of 
merchant ships sunk.
At 0115 on 5 July, Admiral Hamilton sent the following message to Commo-
dore Dowding, addressing both the convoy’s merchant ships and the remaining 
escorts:
I know you will all be feeling as distressed as I am at having to leave that fine col-
lection of ships to find their own way to harbor. The enemy under the cover of his 
shore-based aircraft has succeeded in concentrating a far superior force in this area. 
We were therefore ordered to withdraw. We are all sorry that the good work of the 
close escort could not be completed. I hope we shall all have a chance of settling this 
score with them soon.248
Hamilton was very much concerned about the effect the escort force’s appar-
ent desertion of the merchant ships might have on morale. If he had known that 
the Admiralty had no more information regarding the enemy heavy units than 
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he himself possessed, he would have remained in a covering position until the 
convoy had widely dispersed.249 It was later claimed that Admiral Pound would 
not have made his fateful decision except for the presence of two U.S. cruisers; 
the U.S. ships were operating under British command for the first time, and he 
did not want to lose them.250
On 5 July, the weather in the operating area was variable, between four-tenths 
and fully overcast, with fog banks. Atmospheric disturbances interrupted radio 
traffic sporadically. Convoy PQ17 was continuously shadowed by Luftwaffe 
aircraft.251
At 0238, Admiral Tovey received an ULTRA message that read: “1. It is not re-
peat not known if German heavy forces have sailed from Altenfjord [Altafjord], 
but they are unlikely to have done so before 1200/4th. 2. It appears that Germans 
may be in some confusion whether a battleship is in company with CS1. Germans 
do not repeat not appear to be aware of position of C-in-C Home Fleet.”252
At 0322, the Admiralty sent a message to Admiral Miles in Moscow informing 
him that, on the basis of air reconnaissance, 
enemy heavy units have moved from Trondheim to Narvik and believed to be using a 
base in Alta fjord area from which to operate against PQ17. British forces other than 
close escort for PQ17 have been withdrawn west of Bear Island and convoy ordered 
to scatter in approximate position 76 degs North 28 degs East at 2200B/4 to proceed 
to North Russia ports. British submarines are being moved from previous patrol posi-
tions to area between latitudes 73 degs and 72 degs N and longitudes 23 degs and 32 
degs E. Catalina aircraft temporarily based in Arkhangelsk will carry out reconnais-
sance between positions 74 degs N 28 degs E and 73 degs N 32 degs E.
The Admiralty requested that Miles try to arrange with Soviet authorities for 
regular air reconnaissance of the Altafjord area, air attacks against enemy heavy 
units in harbor or at sea, and the bombing of enemy airfields, “which is of added 
importance with convoy scattered.”253
At 1625, an ULTRA message was sent to Rear Admiral Richard Bevan, the 
senior British naval officer in north Russia, advising him to anticipate that “most 
likely time of enemy surface attack is now tonight 5/6 July or early hours of to-
morrow 6th July.” The “enemy may strike on 065 degs direction from North Cape. 
Submarine and Catalina aircraft might sight enemy. Request striking force may 
be at short notice from 2000 today 5th July.”254
In the meantime, German air reconnaissance reported at 0655 the presence of 
the enemy force, composed of the aircraft carrier Ark Royal, one (possible) battle-
ship, four heavy cruisers, eight destroyers, and two torpedo boats, proceeding on 
a westerly course at fifteen knots.255 This force was some five hundred miles away 
from the convoy, which had already scattered. For the Germans, this confirmed 
the accuracy of the aircraft report concerning the enemy cruiser force received 
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the previous afternoon (on 4 July) to the effect that no enemy heavy units were 
anywhere near the convoy. It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get 
Hitler’s final permission for the Tirpitz foray.256
During the forenoon of 5 July, the operational situation for the Germans was 
mixed. On the positive side, the convoy had been dissolved, probably because of 
the aerial and U-boat attacks. Most of the ships were still to be found within an 
area approximately sixty nautical miles on a side; however, the convoy’s composi-
tion could not be precisely determined, because of the large size of this dispersal 
area.257 The Germans mistakenly believed that the enemy cruiser group had 
moved westward because it had lost a heavy cruiser. The heavy covering force 
was located well to the west of Bear Island, and was making full use of fog banks 
to disguise its location and makeup. The distance from this group to the convoy 
was 450 nm, and to North Cape also about 450 nm. This distance was sufficient 
that there would be minimal danger to the German forces if they approached 
the convoy unobserved and got the engagement over quickly. If the enemy heavy 
covering forces were spotted during the German forces’ approach to the convoy, 
there would be sufficient time to turn away.258 In sum, the Allied heavy covering 
force was too far away to pose a threat to the 1st and 2nd Combat Groups moving 
to attack Convoy PQ17.259
General conditions for an attack by the German heavy ships on 5 July were less 
favorable than they had been on the previous day. The convoy was farther away—
the area of combat would be eastward of North Cape. And during the withdrawal 
phase, the distance to the enemy heavy forces would be steadily reduced. But the 
risk was still bearable.260
Admiral Carls believed that (1) if any enemy battleships close to the convoy 
were damaged by U-boats and aircraft by 1200, he would be justified in carry-
ing out the operation regardless of the presence of an enemy carrier; and (2) the 
carrier aircraft would have less of an impact if the convoy was attacked north of 
latitude 72 degrees N. The latest time for carrying out RÖSSELSPRUNG was 1300 
on 5 July; otherwise, the attack would take place too close to the Russian coast.261 
Carls essentially requested that Admiral Raeder issue the code word for execut-
ing the operation, with no option to cancel those orders later (Rückrufbefehle). 
However, Raeder refused to do so, because of Hitler’s precondition that the 
enemy carrier must be taken out of the equation first. This was communicated 
to Admiral Carls at 0915. Thus, everything depended on the quality of the air 
reconnaissance. The enemy was unwilling to operate its heavy covering group 
within the effective range of the Luftwaffe torpedo bombers and heavy bombers. 
According to Admiral Carls, the enemy carrier group had already been at sea on 
1 July, and he doubted it could continue to operate for too long. It was possible 
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that the heavy covering group would be withdrawn to refuel and take up a wait-
ing position. Therefore he did not believe the enemy carrier group would pose a 
threat to the German heavy ships.262
Hitler finally gave permission for the operation during the forenoon of 5 July. 
This was the latest favorable time for the attack on the convoy, before it entered 
Russian coastal waters. The code word for the execution was issued at 1137. At 
the same time, Naval Group Command North took over operational control of 
the U-boats operating in Arctic waters.263 Raeder communicated to Carls that the 
conditions for the execution of RÖSSELSPRUNG did exist unless the enemy carrier 
was detected or the German combat groups were detected by enemy aircraft. The 
führer’s approval for the operation was transmitted to Admiral Carls at 1140. 
Forces that had been in one-hour combat readiness after 0900 were directed at 
1052 to be in immediate readiness to sortie. At 1141, the combat groups received 
the requisite code word from Naval Group Command North. At 1230, Naval 
Group Command North took over control of the entire operation. It directed 
Admiral Schniewind to sortie by North Cape, passing Breisund and escorted by 
minesweepers.264
At 1700, the Soviet submarine K21 reported (inaccurately) the presence of Tir­
pitz, Admiral Scheer, and eight destroyers at latitude 71°25ʹ N, longitude 23°40ʹ 
E, or some forty-five miles southwest of North Cape, sailing on a northeasterly 
course. The same submarine claimed to have hit Tirpitz with two torpedoes.265 
However, British intelligence believed that, in view of subsequent sightings, 
these claims seemed “improbable.”266 Despite the Soviet claims, Tirpitz had not 
in fact been hit; nevertheless, K21’s sighting report was of great value to Admiral 
Tovey.267
At 1816, Allied reconnaissance aircraft reported eleven ships at latitude 
71°31ʹ N, longitude 27°10ʹ E on a northeasterly course at ten knots. The British 
submarine Unshaken (P54) shifted its original station farther east, and at 2029 it 
reported Tirpitz and Admiral Hipper, escorted by at least six destroyers, in latitude 
71°30ʹ N, longitude 28°40ʹ E, steering course 060 at twenty-two knots.268
At 1700, the Germans received an important message, an interception of an 
Allied submarine sighting report of two battleships at latitude 71°25ʹ N, longi-
tude 23°40ʹ E, sailing a northeasterly course. Along with the intercepted 1816 
message, these reports left no doubt that the enemy had detected the German 
combat groups.269 Also, starting at 1945 the enemy systematically began to dis-
rupt radio communications on all channels, making the transmission of orders 
difficult.270 A report from B-Dienst at 2006 indicated that enemy reconnaissance 
aircraft had sighted German combat groups in the North Cape area at 1700 and 
1816.271
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RÖSSELSPRUNG Is Canceled
Naval Group Command North concluded at 2000 on 5 July that the enemy heavy 
group was in generally the same position as on 4 July. The enemy heavy cruis-
ers were detected at 1745 on 5 July sailing a westerly course. This group was 
observed until 2010, when it disappeared in fog. The Germans assumed that the 
enemy heavy covering group would have to reduce distance from the German 
combat groups to about two hundred nautical miles to attack, but not less than 
that, because of the danger of attacks from Luftwaffe aircraft based in northern 
Norway. This meant that RÖSSELSPRUNG could only be carried out within the 
time window from 2000 on 5 July to 0200 next morning. Although the attack on 
PQ17 might have beneficial psychological effects for the Germans, its chances of 
success in attacking a now widely dispersed convoy were small. Hence, it was not 
worth justifying the risk of engaging an enemy carrier force.272 Carls believed that 
once the enemy had sighted the German combat groups, the entire operation had 
to be aborted. A clash with the enemy heavy covering group must be avoided in 
any case; the possibility that the enemy carrier might cut off the combat groups’ 
withdrawal was unacceptable.273
Raeder and Carls conferred by phone at 2035 and 2103. They agreed that, giv-
en where the enemy heavy covering group had been sighted, the enemy would be 
able to bring it to bear against the German combat groups during their return to 
base.274 On that basis, Raeder made the decision to abandon the entire operation; 
at 2132, Admiral Carls sent a message to Admiral Schniewind aborting RÖSSEL-
SPRUNG.275 Schniewind was directed to sail with Tirpitz, Admiral Scheer, Admiral 
Hipper, and five destroyers for North Cape, and afterward through the “Inner 
Leads” (the channel between Norway’s mainland and the outer island chain) to 
Vestfjord. Operational control of the U-boats was turned over to Admiral Arc-
tic.276 Lützow, two destroyers, and the torpedo boats were directed to Trondheim, 
and were put under the control of Admiral Arctic.277
Raeder’s decision was based on Hitler’s view that Germany could not afford to 
put its few remaining heavy ships at risk. Because the Allied air reconnaissance 
had prematurely detected the German combat groups, it was highly possible that 
the Tirpitz group would be attacked by enemy carrier aircraft. Another factor in 
Raeder’s decision was that the convoy had already widely dispersed, and the risk 
that would be entailed in employing the fleet forces would not be commensurate 
with the remaining mission elements—i.e., finishing off the enemy convoy would 
be better left to the U-boats and aircraft.278
At 0230 on 6 July, the Admiralty sent a message to Convoy PQ17’s escorts stat-
ing that an “attack by enemy surface forces is probable in next few hours. Your 
primary duty is to avoid destruction to enable you to return to scene of attack and 
pick up survivors after enemy have retired.”279 Shortly afterward, the Admiralty 
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radioed that, in case of attack by the enemy’s surface ships, when it was clear “that 
enemy heavy ships have retired to westward, request you will arrange for a search 
for survivors by all available means including my Catalinas in north Russia not 
required for searching and shadowing enemy.”280
At 1946, the Admiralty sent a message to the PQ17 escort that the “risk of 
attack by enemy surface vessels is now greatly lessened.” The escort vessels were 
directed to return to pick up survivors.281 Those unable to do so but in contact 
with several merchantmen should form them into a group and escort them to 
Yokanga “unless otherwise directed by S.B.N.O. North Russia [Rear Admiral 
Bevan].” Escorts short on fuel should proceed to Arkhangelsk, where they would 
be refueled. The two auxiliary AA ships should not run the risk of taking part in 
rescue operations, but instead should proceed without delay to Arkhangelsk.282
At 1040 on 6 July, Admiral Hamilton’s force joined the Battle Fleet. The weath-
er in the area was unfavorable for air reconnaissance. Tovey felt that nothing was 
to be gained by steering northeastward. Hence, Hamilton’s cruisers and eight 
destroyers were detached to Seydisfjord at 1230 on 6 July. Shortly afterward, the 
Battle Fleet turned southward. All the ships reached their home bases on 8 July.283
In the meantime, the Germans continued their efforts to detect and attack 
what was left of Convoy PQ17. On the morning of 6 July, the convoy’s remnants 
were dispersed east of longitude 40 degrees E and over a 300-by-60 km (186 × 37 
miles) area. The U-boats at that point had no contact with the remnants of PQ17. 
They were directed instead by Admiral Arctic to search for enemy ships in the 
area between longitudes 42 degrees and 48 degrees E. Two U-boats returned to 
Narvik during the night of 6/7 July; two other boats were under way to Kirkenes, 
where they would arrive on the evening of 6 July.284
On 7 July, Commodore Dowding (who survived the sinking of his ship by a 
U-boat on 5 July) organized a convoy of five merchant ships plus one rescue ship 
at Matochkin Shar (Strait), Novaya Zemlya, to head for Arkhangelsk. They were 
accompanied by two auxiliary AA ships, three corvettes, three minesweepers, 
and three trawlers, all remnants of Convoy PQ17’s escort force. They formed up 
and sailed out on the evening of 7 July.285 
Admiral Bevan’s plan was to send one British corvette to reinforce the escorts 
and bring the ships to Arkhangelsk by transiting close to the east coast of Novaya 
Zemlya, south of Kolguyev Island, and around Cape Kanin. Bevan also informed 
the Admiralty that “C. in C. White Sea [commander of the White Sea Flotilla] 
is requesting C. in C. Northern Fleet that additional cover may be provided by 3 
Soviet Union destroyers. Catalina leaves for reconnaissance 1000 B 8th. 4 more 
Flying boats approaching Svyatoy Nos.”286
The ensuing voyage was full of accidents. The ships encountered heavy fog and 
ran into a solid ice barrier south of Byelushya Bay, Novaya Zemlya (the British 
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had not known about the ice, but the Germans did). This forced several ships to 
head for Yokanga anchorage. Admiral Bevan was completely unaware that the 
remnants of PQ17 had left Matochkin Shar until some ships reported entering 
Yokanga. This was because the Soviet Northern Fleet failed to inform Bevan 
about the ships’ departure. The Soviets also provided no information to Bevan 
about ice conditions.287
During the night of 8/9 July, German aircraft reconnoitered the area west of 
Novaya Zemlya, the Kanin Peninsula, other western waterways, the piers at Yo-
kanga, the Murmansk–Leningrad railway, and airfields in the Byelomorsk area 
(Onega Bay).288 Because of heavy fog, they did not fly north of latitude 72 degrees 
N on 8 or 9 July. However, at 1151 on 9 July German aircraft reported the pres-
ence of a group of five enemy merchant vessels. Attacks by thirty-eight aircraft 
in two groups from 1st Group, 30th Air Wing (I./KG 30) at Banak followed. The 
Germans claimed that one seven-thousand-ton vessel and another of eight thou-
sand tons were damaged. Because of fog at Banak upon the flyers’ return, I./KG 
30 was diverted to Petsamo, while II./KG 30 reached Banak.289
During the night of 9/10 July, some forty German bombers carried out a 
high-level attack against these ships for four hours, ending at 0230. The Luft-
waffe received information on the convoy from U-boats operating in the area. 
Two Allied merchant ships were sunk, while four enemy aircraft were believed 
to be shot down. The surviving ships reached Arkhangelsk on 11 July.290 Also on 
10 July, German aircraft attacked docking facilities and fuel tanks at Rost and 
airfields in the Murmansk area, and suppressed coastal batteries on the Rybachy 
Peninsula.291
On 16 July, Commodore Dowding returned with three corvettes to organize 
another convoy from the remnants of PQ17 and bring it to Arkhangelsk. He 
arrived after a stormy voyage to Byelushya Bay on 19 July, where five merchant 
ships were at anchor plus two British trawlers and one Soviet icebreaker. Another 
merchant ship joined the convoy at Moller Bay, Novaya Zemlya, on the morning 
of 21 July. The convoy’s defenses were reinforced by one auxiliary AA ship, one 
corvette, two minesweepers, and two Soviet destroyers on 22 July. Two days later, 
the convoy arrived in Arkhangelsk having suffered no losses.292
To sum up: between 2 and 10 July, the 5th Air Fleet employed 130 Ju 88s, 
forty-three He 111s (twenty aborted), and twenty-nine He 115s (six aborted) in 
attacking Convoy PQ17. In many cases, U-boats were able to sink heavily dam-
aged ships initially hit by the Luftwaffe. The 5th Air Fleet stopped its attacks on 
Convoy PQ17 only when no further ships were sighted.293 German losses in these 
attacks were only five aircraft: one BV 138, two He 111s, one He 115, and one FW 
200.294 In the aftermath of their attacks, the Germans grossly exaggerated their 
successes. Largely from B-Dienst radio intercepts, they claimed that between 4 
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and 11 July their aircraft and U-boats had sunk thirty-seven ships of 231,090 
(actually 244,028) combined BRT.295 They claimed positive information that U-
boats had sunk sixteen ships of 107,947 combined BRT, while the 5th Air Fleet 
had sunk twenty-one ships of 136,081 combined BRT.296
The true losses were heavy enough without exaggeration. The attacks by the 
Luftwaffe and the U-boats resulted in the destruction of twenty-two merchant 
ships (fourteen American) of Convoy PQ17’s thirty-four that tried to get through 
(or 65 percent).297 The ships sunk carried 430 tanks, 210 aircraft, and 3,350 motor 
vehicles, plus 99,316 tons of other cargo.298
The almost total destruction of Convoy PQ17 had significant military, psycho-
logical, and political effects. In purely military terms, the Germans accomplished 
a major tactical objective. The decision of the British chiefs of staff on 13 July to 
recommend that convoys “should not be sent to Northern Russia in present cir-
cumstances” had a negative operational effect. The Royal Navy suffered a major 
loss of confidence regarding its ability to protect convoys to northern Russia.299 
Churchill sent a telegram to Stalin on 17 July informing him that further convoys 
to northern Russia would be postponed. This, in turn, had major political and 
psychological consequences. Stalin became intensely suspicious about Churchill’s 
true motives. He believed that Britain might seek a separate peace with Nazi 
Germany.300
CONCLUSION
The decision to send badly needed supplies to the Soviet Union was made purely 
for political and strategic reasons. Admirals Pound and Tovey were opposed to 
that decision. Their main concern seems to have been the lack of adequate forces 
to support such an effort, and the possibility of large losses in naval ships and 
personnel. (The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were either unable or unwilling 
to provide much support in defense of the Allied convoys.) The British admirals’ 
concerns were well founded. Not only was the convoy route to northern Russia 
long, but it was also open to deadly attacks by the Luftwaffe and U-boats. The 
problem was compounded by the prevalence of bad weather and ice conditions, 
and the long daylight hours in summer. Yet in retrospect, the decision to help the 
Soviet Union was sound, and fully justified strategically. It played a critical role 
in the Soviet ability to withstand the German offensive on the eastern front in 
1941–42.
The Allied operational command organization seemed fairly simple and 
straightforward. However, for some reason the Home Fleet’s area of responsibil-
ity was not formally defined. The Home Fleet was the single largest British naval 
command available for keeping the Kriegsmarine in check. However, its forces 
were never adequate, because of competing demands from other theaters. In 
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fact, it was forced repeatedly to provide ships to other fleets. The Home Fleet was 
primarily composed of heavy surface ships and carriers; it lacked an adequate 
number of smaller ships suitable for convoying duties. That was why Western 
Approaches Command provided most of the A/S escorts for Allied convoys to 
northern Russia. The U.S. Navy also reinforced the Home Fleet by sending its 
newly formed TF 39.
The German operational command organization in Norway and the adjacent 
area was highly unsatisfactory. No multiservice command was established in that 
theater throughout the entire war. This meant that each service prepared and ex-
ecuted its own operational plans. An effective employment of naval forces and the 
Luftwaffe was almost entirely dependent on close cooperation among mid- and 
low-level commanders. For the Kriegsmarine, the problem was not made much 
easier by having the Fleet Command forces within the area of responsibility of 
Naval Group Command North. In addition, the headquarters of Naval Group 
Command North was located too far away from its subordinate commands in 
Norway. To make things worse, the Kriegsmarine had a penchant for making 
numerous changes, in both titles and the subordination relationships among the 
various forces. This was especially the case with the Fleet Command. Another 
major problem was the insufficient freedom of action allowed to subordinate 
naval commanders, the result of too-close supervision by higher commanders. 
This was especially the case in the relationship between Naval Group Command 
North and Admiral Arctic.
Both the Allies and the Germans, in preparing plans for and employing their 
respective forces in combat, were greatly dependent on having well-organized 
and effective intelligence apparatuses. British naval intelligence proved to be 
much more effective because of the superb abilities of the decoders at Bletchley 
Park, especially at decrypting German naval messages. Despite widely held be-
liefs to the contrary, this task was never easy, because the German codes were 
difficult to crack; there were many times when Bletchley and the OIC were in 
the dark about German intentions, plans, and movements. This was especially 
the case for a large part of 1942, during which Bletchley Park was unable to read 
coded messages to U-boats.
German Naval Intelligence was well organized and quite effective at provid-
ing naval commanders with fairly accurate and timely intelligence on the Allied 
OOB, convoys, and the losses inflicted by U-boats and the Luftwaffe. B-Dienst 
was especially effective at reading messages regarding the composition, departure 
dates, and routes of Allied convoys. This proved invaluable to the Kriegsmarine, 
and its U-boat arm in particular.
The Allies developed their plans for convoying to northern Russia over time. 
Although some changes in plans were made for each convoy, the pattern was 
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consistent. The fact was that the geography and ice conditions in the Barents Sea 
gave planners little or no choice in selecting routes and defense forces for each 
convoy. Admirals Pound and Tovey were strongly opposed to sending convoys 
during the summer months, when they were highly vulnerable to attacks by 
enemy aircraft and U-boats; yet they had to execute the decisions made by the 
British and U.S. governments. Purely political reasons dominated Allied planning 
for convoys to northern Russia.
The German plans for Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG were the result of numerous 
studies prepared by all the major naval commands in Norway concerning the 
possibility of employing heavy surface ships and U-boats in the Arctic. As usual 
in the German military, the operational-level command issued an operational 
instruction, while subordinate commanders issued operation orders. However, 
the lack of joint-force commanders resulted in the lack of a single plan for the 
employment of heavy surface ships, U-boats, and Luftwaffe aircraft.
The operational instruction issued by Naval Group Command North on 4 
June envisaged employing both the Trondheim and Narvik groups of surface 
ships. A major flaw in the plan was the unnecessarily complicated command 
relationship under which the Trondheim group was subordinate to Naval Group 
Command North, while the Narvik group was under Admiral Arctic. Only dur-
ing the second phase of the operation were both groups under the operational 
command of Naval Group Command North.
A major prerequisite for the success of RÖSSELSPRUNG was comprehensive air 
reconnaissance of the potential operating area, followed by the weakening of the 
enemy heavy covering force. This would have meant the 5th Air Fleet’s acquies-
cence to the request by Naval Group Command North to assign more aircraft for 
reconnaissance—but the 5th Air Fleet simply refused to do so.
But perhaps the single greatest problem was Hitler’s unwillingness to risk 
any heavy surface ship to attack enemy convoys. This risk aversion, in essence, 
precluded any effective employment of the German heavy surface ships based in 
Norway, most notably to prevent the Allies from running convoys to northern 
Russia. The German ships retained value only to the extent that they inhibited a 
possible enemy amphibious landing and invasion.
Convoy PQ17 went ahead as planned. Although detected and tracked by 
German U-boats and aircraft, it suffered almost no losses until the evening of 4 
July. Admiral Pound’s decision to “scatter” the convoy at that point was perhaps 
understandable, but cannot be considered sound. No convoy should be left to 
proceed independently without its direct and distant covers. If the convoy was 
faced with destruction by a superior force, it should have been directed to with-
draw temporarily to a safer distance or return to a safe port. Admiral Pound also 
violated some of the basic principles of sound naval command and control by 
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directly interfering with and bypassing Admirals Tovey and Hamilton. Tovey’s 
criticism of the Admiralty was fully justified. The higher commander should 
normally leave the subordinate commander sufficient freedom of action for him 
to exercise the initiative in the course of an operation.
Positioning of the Home Fleet’s Battle Fleet in relation to Convoy PQ17 on 5 
July was clearly unsound: it remained too far away to provide distant cover and 
support to the convoy, and also too far away to engage the enemy heavy surface 
group effectively.
Admiral Raeder’s decision to cancel RÖSSELSPRUNG on the evening of 5 July 
was unavoidable because there was little to gain from using heavy surface ships to 
try to destroy the widely dispersed ships of (the former) Convoy PQ17. The time 
to employ those heavy surface ships was prior to 5 July. Yet doing so was clearly 
impossible, given the strictness of Hitler’s conditions for employing Tirpitz and 
its ilk. Yet Tirpitz’s presence in Altafjord and the ever-present possibility of its 
attacking PQ17 were the most important factors in the fateful decision to scatter 
Convoy PQ17, with the subsequent horrendous losses of Allied merchant ships 
from Luftwaffe and U-boat attacks.
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BOOK REVIEWS
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali� 
Leiden, Neth�: Brill, 2015� 372 pages�  
In Maritime Security Cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea, the legal adviser to the 
Ghana Navy, Commander Dr� Kamal-
Deen Ali, argues that the world should 
pay attention to the maritime domain of 
West and Central Africa� The same argu-
ment can be made about his book, as 
Ali not only provides the most in-depth 
analysis of maritime security prospects 
and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to 
date but offers conceptual frameworks 
for maritime security that are applicable 
around the world� Furthermore, the 
lessons that can be extracted from the 
Gulf of Guinea experience—both the 
problems of insecurity and the efforts 
to address them—can serve as help-
ful guidance for approaching similar 
challenges elsewhere� Notwithstand-
ing the relative absence of credible 
literature on maritime security in West 
and Central Africa, this book exhibits 
the rigor of first-rate legal scholarship 
combined with the intimate knowledge 
gleaned from an insider’s perspective, 
making it undoubtedly a seminal work 
on both the Gulf of Guinea specifically 
and maritime security in general�
Ali begins, rather helpfully, by exploring 
the meaning of several terms� First and 
foremost, he seeks to provide a work-
ing definition of the “Gulf of Guinea,” 
as the phrase has been used for years 
without any real consistency to describe 
the maritime region of West and Central 
Africa� Ultimately, the author expands 
the range of states included in this 
important region� At a minimum, Ali in-
cludes the twenty-five member states of 
the Maritime Organization of West and 
Central Africa, all of which are members 
of either the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) or the 
Economic Community of Central Afri-
can States (ECCAS)� But he notes  
that Rwanda, which recently rejoined 
ECCAS, should not be included, as its 
strategic interests do not align with the 
maritime domain of West and Central 
Africa� On the other hand, he argues that 
Mauritania, which left ECOWAS in 2000 
and is a member of the Arab Maghreb 
Union, should be included, as it is an 
important partner for maritime security 
cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea� This 
argument constitutes the first of many 
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novel contributions the book makes to 
the context-specific dynamics of mari-
time security in West and Central Africa�
Beyond defining the Gulf of Guinea, 
Ali makes a convincing case for the 
region’s global strategic significance� The 
economic contribution of the region to 
the global energy, mineral, and agricul-
ture markets makes the national security 
concerns of states in West and Central 
Africa concerns for the entire world� 
Even after the decline in the price of oil, 
Ali’s case remains unimpeachable, as his 
arguments for the region’s geostrategic 
relevance go far beyond oft-repeated 
statements about Nigerian oil in par-
ticular� With details about the region’s 
contribution to the global supply of 
cotton, cacao, and fish, one need never 
mention oil to recognize the economic 
significance of the Gulf of Guinea� 
These arguments lend further weight to 
the examples and analyses of the main 
portions of the book, but the concep-
tual features of the book are perhaps 
its most significant academic feature�
In reviewing the literature on maritime 
security, Ali exposes some significant 
gaps, in both coverage of issues and ex-
isting conceptual frameworks� He begins 
his analysis by asking a few important 
questions: What is security? What is 
maritime security? And for whom is 
maritime security? In dissecting some 
of the existing works on maritime 
security, he comes to advocate a “hu-
man security” approach, but compiles 
elements from a number of different 
sources� He thus settles on maritime 
security as being a composite of societal 
security, environmental security, food 
security, and economic security� One 
could argue, therefore, that this 
approach aligns maritime security more 
closely with development than defense�
Conceptually, Ali charts new territory 
on several fronts� First, his analysis 
of the theoretical underpinnings of 
security lead him to the conclusion that, 
although the literature is largely silent in 
doing so, the theoretical approaches to 
“security” in general can be applied to 
the maritime realm as well� He writes, “It 
is argued that since the ocean environ-
ment serves the political, economic, and 
strategic objectives of States, the dynam-
ics that surround the pursuit of all inter-
state interests will similarly be reflected 
in the maritime realm�” This notion of 
the activities, interests, and challenges of 
the maritime domain being interrelated 
with the broader national interests sug-
gests that a state’s maritime territory is a 
microcosm of the state itself� Thus mari-
time security cannot be severed from 
national interests—security, develop-
ment, governance, etc�—and is, indeed, 
a fundamental component of them�
Ali’s second departure from the lit-
erature involves taking an evolution-
ary approach to maritime security� By 
examining how maritime security has 
developed from being a matter merely 
of transportation security into a field 
posing integrated, multisectoral chal-
lenges today, he shows how the concept 
of maritime security has changed and 
broadened over time� Furthermore, he 
contends that states’ maritime concerns 
are context specific rather than uni-
versal� Partly for this reason, he also 
asserts that there is no real consensus 
on the elements of maritime security, 
allowing for a wide conception of what 
is included� He seems to suggest that 
the best approach in the literature is in 
the 2008 UN secretary-general’s Oceans 
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and the Law of the Sea report, which 
lists (section V[B]) the main maritime 
security threats as “piracy and armed 
robbery against ships”; “terrorist acts 
involving shipping, offshore installations 
and other maritime interests”; “[i]llicit 
trafficking in arms and weapons of mass 
destruction”; “illicit traffic in narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances”; 
“[s]muggling and trafficking of per-
sons by sea”; “[i]llegal, unreported and 
unregulated fishing”; and “intentional 
and unlawful damage to the marine 
environment�” He later assesses this 
set of threats, along with others, in the 
specific context of the Gulf of Guinea�
The third main departure is Ali’s novel 
framework for conceiving of maritime 
security� His framework, elaborated 
throughout the book, has three ele-
ments: (1) identifying the maritime 
security threat path; (2) applying the 
threat path to geopolitical and geostra-
tegic features; and (3) implementing a 
three-layer, three-indicator approach� 
The maritime security threat path is a 
bit more than merely a list of generic or 
even specific maritime security threats� 
It examines both the activity and the ef-
fects of any given threat� This approach 
allows for the contextualization of the 
threats versus geopolitical or strategic 
priorities� The third element of the 
framework then concerns the approach 
to those threats, involving three layers—
national capacity, regional cooperation, 
and global support—paired with three 
progress indicators—improved  
maritime governance, adequate legal 
frameworks, and an inclusive mari-
time security concept� While the book 
elaborates this conceptual approach in 
the Gulf of Guinea context, it is ap-
plicable globally� Further academic 
work is therefore warranted, applying 
Ali’s conceptual framework to other 
contexts besides the Gulf of Guinea�
As significant as this book’s theoreti-
cal contribution may be to the aca-
demic literature on maritime security in 
general, the book’s contribution to the 
discourse on maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea is impossible to express 
adequately� As a Ghanaian naval officer 
and legal adviser, Ali is able to delve 
into the subject matter in a way that 
few could� The majority of the book is 
dedicated to the region-specific analysis, 
and this is truly the heart of the work�
Given the resource constraints of West 
and Central Africa as well as the trans-
national nature of many of the threats, 
it is not surprising that cooperation 
is seen as the overarching answer to 
addressing maritime insecurity in the 
region� But the architecture of maritime 
security cooperation is still very much 
under construction� Ali meticulously 
dissects the challenges, internal and 
external, that plague the progress of 
effectively using cooperation as a means 
of countering threats� His personal 
familiarity with the processes afoot 
takes the chapters on both regional ap-
proaches and international partnerships 
beyond the capacity of normal academic 
scholarship� Indeed, one could not look 
up most of the information contained 
in these portions, further adding to 
the tremendous value of this volume�
Similarly, the legal analysis in this book 
would be difficult for any scholar outside 
the region to replicate� Ali’s access to 
national laws and regional legal frame-
works as well as his detailed understand-
ing of international maritime law affords 
him the opportunity to provide insight 
into both the legal developments and 
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challenges in the Gulf of Guinea� Indeed, 
the book may be viewed as a compen-
dium of the existing legal regimes in the 
Gulf of Guinea� This legal landscape is 
important to understand as efforts pro-
ceed to combat maritime insecurity and 
enhance maritime governance through 
cooperation� The section on emerging 
jurisdictional issues and legal com-
plexities is particularly significant, as it 
provides a helpful warning of problems 
that are likely to arise as the coopera-
tive architecture continues to develop�
Naturally, one of the challenges of writ-
ing an analysis of real-world issues is 
that they do not remain constant� If one 
were to attempt to identify a criticism 
of the book, it is that it is already out of 
date on a few specific issues, although 
one hardly can blame that on the author� 
For example, the section on private 
security companies or private maritime 
security companies, if written today, 
likely would include a number of new 
issues as well as new accountability 
mechanisms� But the analysis and les-
sons that can be gleaned remain sound 
and important, even if additional facts 
exist that could enhance the discussion�
 The book expressly arrives at five main 
conclusions: (1) Current processes for 
maritime security cooperation in the 
Gulf of Guinea do not address adequate-
ly the multiple security threats in the 
region� (2) Poor governance contributes 
significantly to maritime security threats 
in the Gulf of Guinea, but the current 
cooperative framework does not address 
the land-sea nexus of maritime security 
concerns� (3) The relevant legal frame-
work for maritime security in the Gulf of 
Guinea is poorly developed, and this un-
dermines the effectiveness of maritime 
security enforcement and regional and 
international cooperation� (4) Prevailing 
regional cooperative processes lack coor-
dination and have suffered several set-
backs� (5) International support for mar-
itime security cooperation in the Gulf 
of Guinea is inadequate, uncoordinated, 
and in some cases driven by national in-
terests that affect its overall effectiveness�
These conclusions, as well as the analysis 
that led to them, serve as an invaluable 
aid in the ongoing effort to secure the 
maritime domain of West and Central 
Africa� This book is a must-read for 
maritime security scholars and anyone 
—from policy makers to industry 
leaders to students—working on mari-
time matters in the Gulf of Guinea�
IAN M� RALBY
Marie von Clausewitz: The Woman behind the 
Making of On War, by Vanya Eftimova Bellinger� 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2015� 312 pages� $29�95�
One is tempted to ask why naval officers 
should be interested in reading a biog-
raphy of the wife of the famous Prussian 
philosopher of war Carl von Clausewitz� 
In answer we might go to the words of 
Marie von Clausewitz herself, from her 
letter of dedication to Carl’s unfinished 
masterpiece On War: “Readers will be 
rightly surprised that a woman should 
dare to write a preface for such a work 
as this� My friends will need no explana-
tion� � � � Those who knew of our happy 
marriage and knew that we shared every-
thing, not only joy and pain but also 
every occupation, every concern of daily 
life, will realize that a task of this kind 
could not occupy my beloved husband 
without at the same time becoming 
NWC_Summer2016Review.indb   146 6/8/16   3:58 PM
151
War College: Summer 2016 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2016
 B O O K  R E V I E WS  1 4 7
thoroughly familiar to me” (preface to 
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed� and 
trans� Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ� Press, 
1986], p� 65 [emphasis in original])� 
In other words, to understand better 
On War’s hidden treasures, it helps 
to understand the formidable woman 
behind On War� We historians have 
this quaint notion that understanding 
the context for things helps one bet-
ter understand the things themselves� 
For naval professionals, especially at 
the Naval War College, which owes 
so much to the Prusso-German intel-
lectual tradition, to understand better 
the genesis of the greatest philosophy of 
war is no small thing� (Readers inter-
ested in evidence for this idea should 
consult Ronald H� Spector, Professors 
of War: The Naval War College and the 
Development of the Naval Profession 
[Honolulu, HI: Univ� Press of the Pacific, 
2005; originally published by the Naval 
War College Press, 1977], pp� 14–17)�
Additionally, Bellinger’s biography is 
the result of a fruitful collaboration 
with Donald Stoker, who has published 
a companion biography of Marie’s 
more-famous husband� Together they 
mined a treasure trove of recently 
uncovered correspondence between 
Carl and Marie held in Germany by the 
(now) famous couple’s descendants�
Marie von Clausewitz is more than just 
a biography of a woman married to an 
officer and military theorist; it covers the 
spectrum of relevant social, intellectual, 
military, political, and feminist history� 
It is truly a synthesis of all these forms, 
much like Peter Paret’s Clausewitz and 
the State (1976), which has held the field 
on the details of Clausewitz’s life and 
times until now� As advertised, though, 
the book is centered on the life of his 
companion and lifelong love, Countess 
Marie von Brühl� With her formidable 
language skills, Bellinger does exception-
al work in bringing the history, and even 
the prehistory, of the Brühl family to life�
Many surprises await the reader regard-
ing Marie’s background and influence� 
For example, she was no “ordinary” 
Prussian countess, but rather a daugh-
ter of an imperial count of the Holy 
Roman Empire� As an imperial aris-
tocrat, she frequented only the very 
highest social circles in Europe� Her 
friends and acquaintances were queens, 
princesses, and various types of grand 
duchesses—all themselves politically 
influential women, in an age when few 
women wielded such influence�
Marie’s elevated background raises 
the book’s first major question, which 
Bellinger poses in this way (p� 47): “How 
and why did a countess raised in the 
highest social circles ever allow herself 
to consider marrying a man with con-
spicuously less social standing?” Carl’s 
family had only a dubious claim to the 
“von”—which denoted nobility—in front 
of his name, he being a son of (at best) a 
very minor provincial official� Bellinger 
answers the question in this way (p� 8),  
and it tells one much about both Carl 
and Marie: “Indeed, from the very 
beginning of their romance, the couple 
determinedly defied the parochial at-
titudes of the time and strived to build a 
relationship if not equal in status, then 
at least equal in nature� � � � [I]t was Carl’s 
promise to treat her as an independent 
and free individual that made this for-
midable countess decide upon marriage 
with a man of lesser social standing�”
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In other words, Carl and Marie man-
aged to rise above the social norms of 
their times� Until now we have had only 
Carl’s perspective, as it were—the one 
we read in On War� By telling the story 
of the collaboration between the two, 
Bellinger’s book makes clear that the real 
political animal in the family was Marie, 
not Carl� Her influence can be judged by 
the fact that after Carl resigned his com-
mission in the Prussian army and left 
for Russia to join its army—without the 
Prussian king’s written permission—the 
king still acknowledged Marie, and even 
nodded to her at court functions� As for 
Carl, the king never forgave him com-
pletely; he did allow him to rejoin the 
Prussian army later, but never gave him 
a position of real influence� Again, this 
misfortune is our good fortune, since 
it probably allowed Carl the extra time, 
beyond that required for his minimal 
duties at the Kriegsakademie in Berlin, 
to write and rewrite his masterpiece�
One also learns that Marie was very ac-
tive in supporting her husband’s career, 
and developed friendships and corre-
sponded independently of Carl with the 
great figures of the day, especially Gen-
eral August Neithardt von Gneisenau� 
Marie’s mother, interestingly, was from 
the British middle class (a story in itself), 
and she taught Marie to speak English 
exceptionally well for a German aristo-
crat� This probably further cemented her 
relationship with Gneisenau, who also 
spoke English fluently� The two were 
so close that Marie, an accomplished 
painter, later executed one of the more 
famous existing portraits of Gneisenau�
Bellinger herself is married to a military 
service member� Because of that experi-
ence, as she writes about this military 
marriage she has an exceptional eye for 
the sorts of details that some academics 
might miss� Her text is full of interest-
ing insights and observations on the 
extraordinary couple, but also includes 
details that even sailors will recognize, 
such as the fact that Marie and Carl 
numbered all their letters when he was 
in the field so they could tell if some 
were missing� (The reviewer used this 
very technique with his spouse during 
his many cruises in the U�S� Navy�)
Readers looking for new insights on 
the Prussian perspective from inside 
the Prussian court during the Napole-
onic Wars will be well rewarded, as will 
those interested in how little or how 
much Marie played a role in the genesis 
and writing of On War, the subject that 
occupies roughly the last quarter of the 
book� Addressing Marie’s pivotal role in 
getting Carl’s work published, Bellinger 
leaves little doubt that without Marie 
there might have been no On War for 
us to read today, nor any of Carl’s other 
works� Ms� Bellinger’s work reminds 
us that a human life is rarely a solo ac-
complishment, lived apart and distinct 
from other human beings� Rather, a 
relationship such as that of Marie and 
Carl von Clausewitz is an enterprise 
lived in collaboration with others of our 
kind—or in Marie’s case, not her kind—
especially those we love and who love us� 
Highly recommended for all audiences�
JOHN T� KUEHN
A Higher Standard: Leadership Strategies from 
America’s First Female Four-Star General, by Ann 
Dunwoody� Boston: Da Capo, 2015� 288 pages� 
$25�99 (Kindle $14�99)�
In this book, General Ann Dunwoody, 
USA (Ret�), traces her illustrious career 
from initial entry into the Women’s 
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Army Corps in 1975 as a second lieuten-
ant through her promotion to four-star 
general to her retirement in 2012 as 
the commander of the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC)� Dunwoody came 
from an army family: her father was 
a veteran of both Korea and Vietnam 
and retired as a brigadier general; her 
brother was a West Point graduate; and a 
sister was one of the Army’s first female 
helicopter pilots� Throughout her re-
markable career, Ann Dunwoody blazed 
a trail with a lengthy list of “firsts”:
• First female field-grade officer in the 
82nd Airborne Division
• First female to command a battalion 
in the 82nd Airborne Division
• First female to command the Com-
bined Arms Support Command
• First female in the U�S� military to 
achieve the rank of four-star general
Dunwoody’s promotion to four-star 
general made front-page news across the 
country and brought instant recognition 
outside military circles� Yet Dunwoody 
remained well-grounded, with strong 
support from her family� She relates sto-
ries about her mother and father and the 
influence each played in her career� She 
also tells about her husband, Craig, and 
how important he was to her success� 
These stories really enable the reader to 
relate to her on a personal level� Dun-
woody writes (p� 72): “Throughout my 
life I’ve met plenty of superheroes, but 
the strongest and most effective among 
them were the ones who were simply 
human and knew they weren’t perfect�”
The title of the book, A Higher Standard, 
is important to Dunwoody� “Those 
words became the foundation of my 
leadership philosophy and a central part 
of how I tried to live my life�” Dunwoody 
explains that she consistently worked 
hard to maintain a higher standard for 
both herself and whatever organization 
she led� After speaking to executives at 
Coca-Cola, Dunwoody related, “After 
managing nearly sixty-nine thousand 
employees, one thing is clear to me: 
there is a higher standard that pro-
vides the foundation upon which every 
effective leadership journey is built�” 
We all could learn from her mantra�
This is truly a book about leadership, 
with each chapter showcasing impor-
tant lessons and strategies applicable to 
leaders in any organization� Dunwoody 
highlights that “[t]his is not a manual 
about how to become a general, nor will 
I reveal a secret recipe for becoming a 
great leader�” Her sincerity and passion 
for the Army team are evident� Chapter 
2, “Wendell Would Be Proud—‘Never 
Walk by a Mistake’”—chronicles her 
relationship, as a new second lieuten-
ant platoon leader, with her platoon 
sergeant, Sergeant First Class Wendell 
Bowen� Dunwoody writes (p� 38): “Ser-
geant Bowen shared wisdom on many 
levels that guided me through every step 
of my military career�” In this chapter, 
she discusses the important leadership 
lessons that young officers and new 
leaders in any company must learn� 
Dunwoody is a good storyteller, and the 
lessons she shares are easy for the reader 
to relate to� The leadership lessons are 
summarized in the postscript: “Leader-
ship Strategies from an Army Life�”
Another chapter, “Leader of Leaders—
‘Build Your Bench,’” enables Dunwoody 
to chronicle her work to promote and 
build the succession plan at AMC 
prior to her retirement� She relates 
(p� 223): “One of the most important 
jobs a senior leader has is to develop 
leaders or to ‘build the bench�’” This 
is a critical lesson that many leaders 
never learn—to the detriment of the 
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organizations they lead� Countless lead-
ers are often too involved in promot-
ing themselves, and see developing 
subordinates as a sign of weakness�
The final chapter, “Afterthoughts—
‘My Way to Continue the Conversa-
tion � � � ,’” was initially confusing� It 
did not flow with the rest of the book; 
it seemed disjointed; it seemed to be 
made up of random thoughts about a 
variety of topics� I eventually realized 
that it was Dunwoody’s way of discuss-
ing and underscoring contemporary 
issues she believes are important�
During my almost thirty-year career in 
the U�S� Army, I was privileged to serve 
in the 10th Mountain Division with Ann 
Dunwoody� Her technical and tactical 
skills, along with her keen insight and 
caring attitude, made her a positive role 
model� It is fitting that she ends every 
talk with the phrase “In the end, we’re all 
just soldiers, but that’s the highest thing 
you could claim to be�” Dunwoody’s leg-
acy in the Army and the larger U�S� mili-
tary will impact generations of young 
Americans for years to come� This book 
showcases her exceptional talents as an 
army officer and leader� It is a must-
read for leaders at all levels, in both 
the military and other organizations�
THOMAS J� GIBBONS
Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, by Orde F� 
Kittrie� New York: Oxford Univ� Press, 2016� 504 
pages� $29�95 (Kindle $14�41)�
In Lawfare: Law as a Weapon of War, 
legal scholar Orde F� Kittrie analyzes the 
increasing effectiveness of the use of law 
to achieve objectives that not long ago 
might have been achievable only using 
force� In one of the first major works 
in English on the practice of lawfare, 
Kittrie has written an important book 
for lawyers, policy makers, and military 
strategists� Successful strategic perfor-
mance requires an appreciation of the 
role of politics in war, and because law 
is an intensely political matter it is an 
integral part of the strategic operating 
environment� Kittrie’s highly readable 
Lawfare enhances our understanding of 
the growing strategic potential of law�
This book is at once a history of lawfare, 
a collection of representative case stud-
ies, and a resource for other researchers� 
The foreword by former CIA director R� 
James Woolsey Jr� is itself an interesting 
read, setting up Kittrie’s analysis with a 
description of the international legal are-
na as a sheriff-less “Wild West” exploited 
by various governments and nonstate 
actors� The author also describes his 
own foray into lawfare as a professor 
at Arizona State University, where his 
analysis of Iran’s dependence on external 
gasoline suppliers eventually led to the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Account-
ability and Divestment Act of 2010� Kit-
trie’s practical bent is evident through-
out Lawfare, and he offers numerous 
suggestions for incorporating lawfare 
into U�S� national security strategy�
Among the strengths of Lawfare are the 
concepts provided in the first chapter 
that prepare the reader for the case 
studies that follow� Kittrie begins with 
a historical overview, tracing lawfare 
back to the seventeenth century, when 
Hugo Grotius used legal arguments to 
bolster Dutch maritime power� Kit-
trie’s section on the literature of lawfare 
provides a unique summary of the 
leading works in the field� Kittrie breaks 
down the practice of lawfare into two 
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categories: instrumental lawfare—the 
use of legal methods to achieve results 
typically sought from kinetic weapons; 
and compliance leverage disparity—the 
seeking of advantages over an opponent 
more disposed to comply with the law� 
Kittrie attributes the rise of lawfare to 
three factors: the increased number and 
reach of international laws and tribunals, 
the rise of nongovernmental organi-
zations focused on the law of armed 
conflict, and the advance of globaliza-
tion and economic interdependence�
Kittrie follows up his macro-level 
conceptual analysis with detailed case 
studies at the micro level that exemplify 
the prevalent trends in lawfare� His 
examples move from the battlefields of 
the Middle East through the courtrooms 
of New York to the doctrinal manuals of 
the Chinese military� The range of ex-
amples, all linked by the common theme 
of lawfare’s increasing effectiveness, 
underscores how widespread and mul-
tifaceted the phenomenon has become�
Kittrie devotes four of his eight chapters 
to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which 
he describes (p� 197) as “the closest thing 
the world has to a lawfare laboratory�” 
For example, Israel’s experience with 
maritime law in 2011 demonstrates how 
“offensive” lawfare can achieve a military 
objective without using force� In May 
2010, Israeli forces intercepted a flotilla 
of ships from Turkey attempting to vio-
late a blockade of the Hamas-controlled  
Gaza Strip, killing nine people� A UN 
fact-finding mission subsequently 
criticized Israel for its handling of the 
incident� Faced with a similar flotilla 
preparing to leave Greece in June 2011, 
Israeli lawyers used legal measures to 
stop the ships from leaving port� Those 
measures included threatening legal 
action against companies providing 
the ships with essential services such as 
maritime insurance� In letters to these 
companies, Israeli lawyers referenced 
the U�S� Supreme Court case of Holder 
v. Humanitarian Law Project (561 U�S� 
1 [2010], 130 S�Ct� 2705) to argue that 
providing services to the flotilla was il-
legal because it supported terrorism� The 
letters proved persuasive� By rendering 
the ships unable to secure the necessary 
services to gain permission to leave their 
Greek ports, Israel succeeded in stopping 
the 2011 flotilla without firing a shot�
Kittrie devotes a chapter to China’s inno-
vative approach to lawfare� He explains 
how China systematically wages lawfare 
across the strategic operating environ-
ment, including maritime, aviation, 
and space lawfare, as well as lawfare 
in cyberspace� For example, Kittrie 
analyzes how China is using maritime 
law to justify denying access to the South 
China Sea for international navigation� 
China has developed a concept of law-
fare it calls falu zhan, or “legal warfare,” 
as part of its military doctrine� Kittrie’s 
case studies show how China incorpo-
rates lawfare into its strategy through a 
comprehensive approach coordinated 
across the Chinese government�
Unlike China, the United States has no 
similar comprehensive lawfare strat-
egy� Kittrie describes how parts of the 
U�S� government nevertheless have 
employed legal techniques success-
fully to achieve strategic results, such as 
the U�S� Treasury’s use of international 
financial laws against Iran� Some of the 
most effective U�S� lawfare has been the 
work of private-sector attorneys rather 
than U�S� government actions� Kittrie 
provides several examples of litiga-
tion that used the Antiterrorism Act 
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of 1990� A significant case was Boim 
v. Holy Land Foundation, in which at-
torneys working on behalf of the family 
of a U�S� victim of terrorism secured a 
judgment against Islamic fund-raising 
organizations, drying up a significant 
source of material support to Hamas�
Kittrie concludes with a compelling 
argument for a more creative and in-
novative integration of lawfare into 
U�S� strategy� As he observes (p� 96), 
the 2015 National Security Strategy 
identifies security challenges that are 
decentralized, transcend state borders, 
involve nonstate actors, and “cannot 
be neutralized using only deterrence 
or the United States’ traditional ki-
netic toolbox�” Lawfare underscores 
why strategists must have a practical 
understanding of the entire spectrum of 
factors affecting the strategic operating 
environment—informational, cultural, 
political, economic, social, and legal�
Kittrie understands that it is unrealistic 
to expect strategists and policy makers 
to be legal experts as well, so his conclu-
sions include an analysis of the sources 
of “lawfare power” and recommenda-
tions for leveraging the skills of the U�S� 
legal community� To show how private-
sector expertise can inform potential 
military uses of lawfare, Kittrie describes 
how Special Operations Command 
Pacific reached out to the University of 
Pennsylvania’s law school for research on 
foreign criminal laws that could be used 
to detain and prosecute foreign fighters 
supporting the Islamic State� In Kittrie’s 
assessment (p� 32), if the United States 
properly leverages its extensive legal 
expertise to support a national lawfare 
strategy, the “U�S� advantage in sophis-
ticated legal weapons has the potential 
to be even greater than its advantage 
in sophisticated lethal weapons�”
Lawfare reminds us that lethal force 
is only one of many factors affecting 
outcomes in war� Kittrie points the way 
toward how legal factors can be used to 
achieve practical effects� Military officers 
and policy makers who read this book 
will be rewarded with a better under-
standing of the legal dynamics that are 
exerting an increasingly powerful influ-
ence on the legitimate use of violence�
KEVIN ROUSSEAU
Playing War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepara-
tions for World War II, by John M� Lillard� Lin-
coln: Potomac Books, Univ� of Nebraska Press, 
2016� 224 pages� $39�95 (Kindle $26�37)�
With the Navy’s recent efforts to rein-
vigorate war gaming, there has been 
renewed interest in the interwar gaming 
conducted at the Naval War College in 
Newport, Rhode Island� In the Naval 
War College Review, Proceedings, and 
other maritime journals, war-gaming 
experts and enthusiasts alike have tried 
to characterize the nature and value of 
the Navy’s war games played between 
1919 and 1941� John Lillard’s Playing 
War: Wargaming and U.S. Navy Prepa-
rations for World War II is the latest 
contribution to this resurgence� Seek-
ing to provide a comprehensive study 
of the interwar games conducted at the 
College, Lillard intends to inform our 
understanding of the “navy’s transition” 
during this period� Playing War asserts 
(p� 8) that the Newport games were 
“transformational” and played a “central 
role � � � in preparing the navy for war�” 
For the most part, the author contributes 
to the history of that era, but does so 
with a work that would have benefited  
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from additional editing and more at-
tention to detail in its historiography�
This book succeeds with its analysis of 
how the Newport war games evolved to 
reflect the emergence of new technolo-
gies and operational thinking for the 
Navy� Lillard organizes his analysis into 
three phases: early (1919–27); middle 
(1928–34); and late (1935–41)� He 
focuses on one or two College classes 
within each of the phases, concentrating 
on those of significant figures such as 
Chester Nimitz, Thomas Hart, Harold 
Stark, Kelly Turner, Bull Halsey, and 
Robert Ghormley� The author is at 
his best when he analyzes the actual 
games played and describes the relevant 
insights recorded by the student-players 
or the gaming faculty, or both� For ex-
ample, his section on Tactical Game 94 
of 1923 describes how that game demon-
strated the importance of reconnaissance 
and detection of the enemy’s forces first� 
In his chapter on the middle phase, Lil-
lard explains how the games explored 
the innovations of air and undersea 
warfare, pointing out that the players 
learned more about aviation than they 
did submarines� Lillard concedes that 
the College games were not innovative 
in themselves; instead he reinforces the 
idea that “they were a common playing 
field, a shared experience” for the men 
who would fight the next war at sea�
Playing War is a useful complement to 
Edward Miller’s War Plan Orange: The 
U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945 
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 
1991) and Albert Nofi’s To Train the 
Fleet for War: The U.S. Navy Fleet Prob-
lems, 1923–1940 (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, 2010)� Lillard’s ex-
amination of the 1933 Van Auken report 
is particularly effective at showing the 
College’s contributions to the evolution 
of War Plan ORANGE and the fleet prob-
lems� Requested by College President 
Admiral Harris Laning and written by 
Captain Wilbur R� Van Auken, head 
of the newly created Research Depart-
ment, the report summarized lessons 
learned from all the Blue-Orange games 
played between 1927 and 1933� The 
author notes that Van Auken’s analysis 
of the Trans Pacific problem presaged 
the logistic challenges of the war and 
the advent of the four hundred de-
stroyer escorts that emerged during the 
war� As War Plan ORANGE matured in 
the 1930s, so too did the war gaming, 
marked by the construction of Pringle 
Hall and its famously square-tiled gam-
ing floor� Lillard succinctly chronicles 
Newport’s war-gaming transforma-
tion throughout the book’s narrative�
Readers familiar with the scholarship 
that examines the U�S� Navy between 
the two world wars will be distracted 
by Lillard’s efforts to set his thesis apart 
from the other literature� Playing War 
looks and feels most similar to Michael 
Vlahos’s The Blue Sword: The Naval 
War College and the American Mis-
sion, 1919–1941 (Newport, RI: Naval 
War College Press, 1980)� Both of these 
works are short in length, and have 
appendices and tables that lay out the 
war games played by each class� Lillard’s 
book focuses more directly on the games 
and the chronology of the College than 
Vlahos’s monograph does� However, in 
attempting to separate his research from 
The Blue Sword, Lillard states (p� 10) that 
Vlahos “did not use wargame records 
from the Naval War College archives,” 
which is not true� Making matters more 
confusing, Lillard continues to refer 
to Vlahos’s text throughout the book� 
Later, Lillard asserts (p� 12) that John 
Hattendorf, coauthor of Sailors and 
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Scholars: The Centennial History of the 
U.S. Naval War College (Newport, RI: 
Naval War College Press, 1984), is “a 
former professor of naval history” whose 
history of the College lacks “critical 
analysis�” At the time of publication, 
Hattendorf was and remains the Ernest 
J� King Professor of Maritime History 
at the Naval War College, and is still 
recognized as the preeminent scholar on 
the history of the U�S� Navy at Newport�
In addition to these two notable errors, 
Playing War still reads like a disserta-
tion in need of another round of editing� 
Chapter introductions and descriptions 
of the students are repeated several times 
and add little to the analysis presented� 
With the main body of the book ending 
at 137 pages, this work leaves the reader 
with the impression that there is still 
more to explore about the relationship 
between the interwar war games and 
how the U�S� Navy fought during the 
Second World War� While this imperfect 
volume has some merit, the definitive 
history of the Naval War College’s inter-
war war games remains to be written�
JON SCOTT LOGEL
Social Science Goes to War: The Human Terrain 
System in Iraq and Afghanistan, ed� Montgomery 
McFate and Janice H� Laurence� New York: Ox-
ford Univ� Press, 2015� 320 pages� $39�95 (Kindle 
$22�99)�
The twenty-first-century security 
environment has been characterized by 
numerous cross-cultural battle spaces, 
such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan� 
The U�S� Army initiated the human 
terrain team (HTT) because it needed 
to address the impact of the human 
cultural dimension in the combat 
operational environment� The HTT’s 
mission was to conduct research (in the 
social sciences and anthropology) and 
to advise military commanders about 
the unique cultural aspects of the local/
regional population� In eleven chapters, 
McFate and Laurence have compiled 
an invaluable collection of experiences 
from the scientists involved� They afford 
us the opportunity to accompany these 
scientists on their journeys, as they share 
their perspectives with the military� We 
learn the value of embedding social 
scientists with military units and how 
important their knowledge and expertise 
are for military leaders to achieve an un-
derstanding of today’s complex, cultur-
ally diverse operational environments� 
In this way, social scientists can help 
military leaders make more-informed,  
and therefore better, decisions�
General David Petraeus (Ret�) states 
in the foreword that the “key ter-
rain in irregular warfare is the human 
terrain�” He highlights the role social 
scientists played in shaping the cultural 
framework of the battle space and how 
they contributed to military leaders’ 
knowledge to ensure mission success� 
General Petraeus posits the notion that 
the military indeed may require even 
greater sociocultural knowledge to 
conduct future military operations�
Today’s military leaders are well trained 
in tactics, techniques, and procedures; 
however, the twenty-first-century 
battle space presents inherent dif-
ficulties for military leaders� One of 
their principal deficiencies is a lack of 
cross-cultural competence (C3)� C3 is 
the ability to communicate effectively 
and appropriately with people of other 
cultures� As the number of multina-
tional coalition military operations 
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continues to increase, military leaders 
will need to achieve C3 to be effective�
Military leaders must be prepared to 
adapt to a wide range of cultural, social, 
and political challenges in the operation-
al environment� Education in cultural 
competency, cultural intelligence, and 
social intelligence plays a pivotal role in 
a military leader’s ability to lead, build 
relationships based on trust, and develop 
unity of effort and command within 
complex, culturally diverse environ-
ments� A leader’s ability to engage and 
communicate effectively requires that he 
or she understand the unique social and 
behavioral qualities of the local popula-
tion� This capability is a requirement 
for successful negotiation and conflict 
management� Lack of it can mean the 
difference between success and failure�
This volume is a tribute to the knowl-
edge and expertise of social scientists 
who served as members of HTTs� Their 
stories serve as evidence of their unique 
experiences, insights, and contributions 
toward achieving cultural understand-
ing in combat zones in places such as 
Iraq and Afghanistan� It is worth not-
ing that HTTs offered more than just 
cultural expertise� Rather, they made 
a considerable investment in develop-
ing relationships with local people 
and provided their military units with 
critical assessments about operating in 
and among members’ host nations� This 
information was critical for military 
decision makers and those involved in 
counterinsurgency campaigns, so it was 
critical for the social scientists as soon 
as possible to build rapport and cred-
ibility with the local population, as well 
as with the military units to which they 
were assigned� Laurence and McFate 
invite us to share their experiences as 
we join each scientist on that journey�
For example, James Dorough-Lewis’s 
chapter, “Investing in Uncertainty,” 
provides a clear illustration of some of 
the challenges the social scientists faced 
in the HTTs� We learn about the need to 
delineate between social scientists and 
members of the Intelligence Commu-
nity� This distinction is critical for social 
scientists as they attempt to establish 
relationships based on trust and cred-
ibility� Their research task is to assess 
and understand the cultural nuances 
and the cultural environment that may 
impact the overall military operation; 
in contrast, the intelligence analyst 
probes the environment for meaningful 
information that will be used to un-
derstand the operational environment� 
The social scientist seeks to understand 
each individual’s cultural perspective 
and relationships among people living 
in the environment� Social scientists and 
anthropologists in the HTTs work with 
the local people to build relationships 
based on trust and to find ways to help 
local people continue with their daily 
lives� In one such example (p� 196), the 
Army had built a hospital to meet all the 
security requirements� However, Sunni 
women needing medical care preferred 
to travel to a hospital an hour away—
rather than travel the path on which 
their husbands, sons, and brothers had 
lost their lives� Social scientists were 
able to communicate with these women 
and understand their cultural perspec-
tive, which they shared with the military 
team� This incident highlights the need 
to understand the culture, beliefs, and 
values of the local people when operat-
ing in a culturally diverse region� Social 
scientists provide a cultural lens toward 
the local people, examining and explain-
ing how they perceive what is happening 
in their unique cultural point of view�
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This book provides the perspectives 
and experiences of social scientists who, 
embedded with military teams, shared 
their knowledge and cultural expertise 
to help military leaders make informed 
decisions within culturally diverse 
environments� This volume will prove 
to be an invaluable resource for military 
leaders, as it highlights the importance 
and impact of understanding the role 
of cultural diversity in military op-
erations� McFate and Laurence have 
performed a service to the military by 
providing a valuable resource for all 
military leaders to guide them in future 
military operations� In addition, this 
book applauds those scientists who were 
daring enough to join in the human 
terrain effort and share their experiences 
with us� The ability to achieve cultural 
competence must be viewed as a war-
fighting imperative and as a prerequi-
site for all future military leaders� This 
volume is informative and inspiring—a 
must-read for all those interested in 
the cultural and human dimensions 
of multinational warfare� The detailed 
bibliography provides recommenda-
tions for further reading to enhance 
the reader’s knowledge of this topic�
YVONNE R� MASAKOWSKI
Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special 
Operations Command, by Sean Naylor� New York: 
St� Martin’s, 2015� 560 pages� $29�99 (paperback 
$17�99, Kindle $14�99)�
Once again, Sean Naylor has produced 
an authoritative and well-written book� 
Relentless Strike chronicles the history 
of the Joint Special Operations Com-
mand (JSOC), America’s top-tier special 
operations military unit� To the benefit 
of history and the reader, and most likely 
to the consternation of the Pentagon, 
Naylor’s knowledge of special operations 
and his extensive contacts reveal the 
temperaments and competencies of key 
individuals and the details of numerous 
clandestine missions and organizational 
capabilities� Many will condemn Naylor 
for revealing these secrets, but the 
fault is not with Naylor; it is with those 
who talked� The book also, perhaps 
unintentionally, exposes flaws in how 
the United States wages war, as well as 
the limitations of special operations�
The book begins by recounting the 
creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian 
hostage rescue operation in 1980� New 
threats to national security required a 
new military organization that had the 
resources and capabilities to respond 
quickly to crises and apply special-
ized military capabilities to rescue 
hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize 
weapons of mass destruction� Naylor 
reminds us that senior military lead-
ers opposed the new command, but 
the failure in Iran trumped parochial 
thinking� The second and more inter-
esting part of the book addresses the 
expansion of JSOC as one result of the 
momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks�
From the beginning, JSOC had signifi-
cant advantages over both conventional 
military organizations and nonaffili-
ated special operations units� The units 
placed under JSOC’s direct control were 
the best-trained and best-resourced 
units in the military� Each of these 
units had its own sophisticated—and 
grueling—selection process� Remark-
ably, JSOC headquarters had nothing 
that mirrored such careful processes 
for selecting its staff� Also oddly, the 
Pentagon had no process for selecting 
a JSOC commander whose experience 
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and temperament matched the require-
ments of a national force� To be sure, 
some of JSOC’s early commanders were 
excellent—but that was the exception� 
This deficiency became clear in the im-
mediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks�
The 1980s and ’90s were a period of 
steady growth in terms of structure, 
budget, and formalized relationships 
throughout the interagency world� JSOC 
was required to be ready to launch a 
task force within four hours for a variety 
of missions of national importance� 
Although specific mission require-
ments ultimately would dictate the task 
force’s composition, significant mission 
“enablers” from inside the Defense De-
partment and external to it always had 
to be on standby� It required dedication 
of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft 
to deploy the JSOC staff, operators, 
helicopters, ground-assault vehicles, 
and other necessary equipment for 
initial operations� This initial package 
often would encompass five hundred 
people, and more people and equipment 
frequently would follow� Addition-
ally, being ready for every contingency 
required JSOC to have a comprehen-
sive liaison network throughout many 
government agencies, especially the 
Intelligence Community� This formulaic 
approach to every mission resulted in 
a large task force being deployed for 
almost every problem� As a result, JSOC 
unintentionally undermined its ability to 
deploy clandestinely and remain agile�
During this time frame, JSOC deployed 
to war alongside conventional forces in 
Panama and during Operation DESERT 
STORM� It also deployed in response 
to the hijacking of the Italian cruise 
ship Achille Lauro, which had eighteen 
Americans aboard, and to Somalia in 
1993 in what would become the “Black 
Hawk Down” debacle� Other, less-
known operations took place as well� 
The results of JSOC’s work before 9/11 
were mixed, at best� While the qual-
ity of operators in JSOC’s subordinate 
units was superb, the JSOC command 
and staff—and “Washington”—often 
underperformed� Some of these defi-
ciencies would be addressed after 9/11�
The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of 
vulnerability for Americans� They also 
created a need to respond quickly with 
force against those directly and indi-
rectly responsible� No one was more 
frustrated by the military’s inability to 
strike back quickly than Donald Rums-
feld, the Secretary of Defense� Rumsfeld 
looked to General Charles Holland, 
commander of the U�S� Special Opera-
tions Command (USSOCOM), for a 
plan� He was bitterly disappointed: Hol-
land was unprepared, and therefore was 
reluctant to seize the opportunity to take 
the war to America’s enemies� However, 
JSOC’s reputation, built in part by its 
extensive liaison network in Washington 
and its sophisticated exercise program, 
now grabbed Rumsfeld’s attention� JSOC 
easily was able to sell its unique capabili-
ties to an anxious buyer� JSOC’s bound-
less self-confidence would lead to an 
expanded role, because the administra-
tion in Washington desperately needed 
to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters�
Although JSOC was a subordinate com-
mand of USSOCOM, General Holland 
was happy to stay on the sidelines� JSOC 
would become “almost an independent 
military force for Rumsfeld,” under 
the command of Major General Dell 
Dailey� Everything seemed to be in place 
for JSOC to destroy those responsible 
for the 9/11 attacks� The leadership in 
Washington empowered JSOC to do 
whatever was necessary� The superbly 
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trained operators were anxious to make 
Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with 
their lives for their actions� But, for the 
second time, a leadership deficiency on 
the part of a senior commander ham-
pered JSOC� General Holland, and now 
Major General Dailey, both aviators, did 
not have what was necessary to unleash 
JSOC’s special operations capabilities� 
Both were conservative, conventional 
thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of 
warfare� The triad necessary for success-
ful action had two elements in hand—
Washington sponsorship and competent 
operators—but still lacked a key ele-
ment: a proper JSOC commander� Major 
General Stanley McChrystal would fix 
this shortcoming, and with gusto�
McChrystal commanded JSOC for 
almost five years, transforming it into 
a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
and beyond� To McChrystal and many 
in Washington, JSOC was the “nation’s 
main effort in the war on terror�” He was 
in charge of a global enterprise, but the 
enterprise needed better intelligence and 
a better scheme to respond rapidly to 
that intelligence� JSOC would expand its 
liaison network within the Intelligence 
Community and to other organizations 
operating in the region� Capturing and 
interrogating enemy operatives now 
would be preferred to killing them� 
JSOC began running agent networks as 
well as putting its own operators on the 
ground, even in places such as Bengha-
zi, to develop situational awareness� 
JSOC also demanded extensive aerial 
reconnaissance assets� Likewise, war in 
the information age pushed JSOC to 
develop a cyber capability to hack into 
social media and cell phone commu-
nications� Then JSOC’s subordinate 
units needed to retool to respond to the 
growing clarity about the disposition 
of the enemy networks that the intel-
ligence process was producing�
General McChrystal’s force of person-
ality fused all these disparate parts of 
the enormous intelligence apparatus 
together� Retooling Delta Force, the 
Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was rela-
tively easy; the troops instinctively knew 
they needed to operate in small teams 
and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy 
networks� They welcomed McChrys-
tal’s aggressiveness and willingness to 
take risks� The war was an obsession 
for the JSOC commander� It became 
McChrystal’s life, and he wanted his 
men to understand that the war, and 
nothing else, should be their life too� His 
single-minded determination was infec-
tious to some and repellent to others� 
The JSOC commander had perfected a 
process that became known as F3EAD 
(“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze, 
Disseminate”), and the JSOC opera-
tions center was called the “Death Star�” 
“Strike to develop” intelligence became 
the task force catchphrase� McChrystal 
had perfected the F3EAD machine, and 
the process had become self-sustaining�
Naylor claims that in the U�S� military’s 
darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only 
American force achieving success� This 
depends on how you measure success, 
especially in light of the contemporary 
situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan� 
Under McChrystal’s leadership, JSOC’s 
operators efficiently and effectively 
found, fixed, and captured or killed 
high- and midvalue targets and anyone 
else they deemed appropriate� Often 
they fought their war disconnected 
from other U�S� and coalition forces 
that were fighting the same war� JSOC’s 
size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s, 
grew from about eight hundred to 
more than 2,300 in 2008, not including 
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a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence 
brigade added in late 2008� JSOC de-
manded and received a disproportionate 
share of assets, including taking control 
of other military units not only when 
necessary but when convenient—to the 
dismay of commanders also charged 
with fighting the war� But JSOC did 
kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many, 
many other very bad people� Leaders in 
Washington declared, “JSOC is awe-
some�” Our enemies needed killing, and 
no military unit did it better than JSOC�
Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several 
key figures described JSOC as “a Fer-
rari in the garage�” General McChrys-
tal, with the full support of leaders in 
Washington, took the Ferrari out of the 
garage and created a killing machine 
whose performance was unparalleled� 
Unfortunately, a discerning reader 
easily could conclude that the Fer-
rari actually was still on the same road 
as the rest of the U�S� military—and 
that road would lead to nowhere�
HY S� ROTHSTEIN
Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P� 
W� Singer and August Cole� New York: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2015� 416 pages� $28 (paperback $14�95, 
Kindle $9�99)�
No author today will argue with Samuel 
Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any 
work of fiction requires the reader 
to engage in a willing suspension of 
disbelief� The wording of the concept 
is important because it goes beyond 
the idea of a reader just pushing the “I 
believe” button� The concept requires 
the reader to be an active participant: 
he or she must willingly enter a world 
known to be false� It is the job of the 
author to maintain that world, to hold 
the reader suspended throughout the 
entire book, and to prevent him or 
her from falling out of the fictional 
world with an ungraceful “whump�”
For the author of a techno-thriller, 
holding the reader suspended in this 
alternate reality requires even more 
finesse than for other types of fic-
tion� The world of a techno-thriller is 
relatively close to the world in which the 
reader lives� Both the technology and 
the environment of the story are set in a 
future near enough that all the govern-
mental and organizational structures, 
global and domestic relationships, and 
technical capabilities showcased in the 
story must be close enough to what the 
reader knows today to be believable�
This is the challenge P� W� Singer and 
August Cole set for themselves in Ghost 
Fleet� It is a herculean task� The inter-
national backdrop today is far different 
from that of the techno-thriller heyday 
of the 1980s and early 1990s� The U�S� 
cultural setting of Red Storm Rising, 
published in 1986, was influenced by 
forty years of the Cold War� Dominated 
by baby boomers and gen Xers, the 
general population of the United States 
during that time had limited access to 
international news and perspectives, 
had grown up with the threat of nuclear 
war, and had been indoctrinated with 
the ideological vilification of Com-
munism� Today the cultural backdrop 
for the U�S� population is as mixed 
and varied as the people themselves� 
International news and perspectives are 
available to anyone, quite literally at the 
touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear 
war has been replaced with a threat of 
terrorism; and ideological vilification 
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revolves around extremist religious 
groups rather than nation-states�
This techno-thriller, then, with its 
hegemonic China overtaking the United 
States, feels slightly unbalanced, as if it 
is not settled on a firm foundation� It 
was only during the last decade that a 
majority of Americans came to consider 
China a player on the international 
stage, and those Americans who view 
China as a threat (with the exception of 
the U�S� Navy, perhaps) represent both 
a smaller percentage and an even newer 
phenomenon� In fact, the American 
perspective of our relationship with 
China over the past ten years probably 
can be described best as bipolar, or 
maybe schizophrenic; but historically 
China has not been considered existen-
tially threatening, and still is not com-
monly considered so today� Whump�
That means the story Pete Singer and 
August Cole create has to be strong 
enough to overcome each cultural 
inconsistency that unceremoniously 
dumps us out of our suspended disbelief� 
Unfortunately, the one-dimensional and 
stereotyped portrayal of the military 
family in the story is representative of 
the rest of the characters in the book� 
Whump� China’s “Directorate” is a 
calculating, unfeeling behemoth� The 
Russian character is a vodka-swilling 
spy� The insurgent is a femme fatale� 
Whump, whump, whump� It may be 
an editor’s dream to have characters do 
exactly what we presume they would 
do, but as a story line it does not carry 
enough of a thrill to make the reader 
want to stay engaged� Rather than 
incorporating strong, motivating factors 
(including irrational ones) that would 
make erratic actions plausible and add 
interest and depth to the story, the 
characters act exactly as their stereo-
types suggest they should—and the 
results of their actions are predictable�
The strongest element of the book is 
the technologies the authors choose to 
include� While the overuse of nomen-
clature feels clunky for all but those 
who collect technical classifications 
like Boy Scout badges, the authors do 
not reach too far into the realm of sci-
ence fiction to build their arsenal of 
weapons, chemicals, and drugs� There 
is enough linkage to existing technolo-
gies and medical trends to make the 
future employment of these more-
advanced programs feel realistic� Even 
so, they all fit into a too-predictable, 
no-surprise-here mold� There are even 
a few moments when the story feels like 
a propaganda piece for the Navy’s exist-
ing Zumwalt-class destroyer or railgun 
programs� Whump, and whump again�
All of which raises the question, who is 
the audience P� W� Singer and August 
Cole are trying to reach? If it is the 
military, we do not need to read four 
hundred pages to tell us what we already 
know� China’s versions of the concepts of 
antiaccess/area-denial and air-sea battle 
have brought plenty of visibility to the 
future risk China represents, even for 
those who have not been watching the 
Pacific for years� If the book is intended 
for a civilian population that no longer 
shares the common cultural backdrop 
that existed during the Cold War, it 
feels like just another fearmongering 
piece written by another advocate for a 
bigger defense budget� If it is a plea for 
the administration to sit up and take 
notice of China as a threat, it does not 
do a good enough job of explaining why 
all the elements of U�S� national power 
supposedly are completely defunct�
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Perhaps all of this is what makes the 
book unique, though� While the plot fol-
lows the typical path of a techno-thriller, 
where an aggressive move by a “bad guy” 
forces a “good guy” to join in a fight of 
epic proportions, the discomfort the 
reader feels at the end is real, despite 
all the fully anticipated and stereotyped 
characters, plots, and technologies�
But that is not so much thrilling as it is 
troubling� The disturbing question that 
lurks in the background and perme-
ates the plot like an insidious, deadly 
gas is, how effective is the United States 
when it comes to using the diplomatic 
and informational elements of national 
power in the international arena? This 
might have been the true heart of the 
story� Surrounded by layers of protective 
muscle in military might and economic 
strength, have the diplomatic and in-
formational elements of U�S� national 
power aged and atrophied beyond the 
size of the body they inhabit? Without 
the diplomatic and informational ele-
ments, can the government still oper-
ate on just the military and economic 
elements? The idea is unexplored, but 
Ghost Fleet, with a plot that takes Lady 
Liberty’s sword and purse away right 
from the start, leaves readers suspended 
in a disbelief completely different from 
the one they thought they were entering�
CONNIE FRIZZELL
In All Respects Ready: Australia’s Navy in World 
War One, by David Stevens� Melbourne, Austral�: 
Oxford Univ� Press, 2014� 320 pages� $59�95�
Writing a definitive history of any major 
conflict from a single nation’s perspec-
tive can be an exacting task—and, in 
the case of the First World War at sea, a 
thankless one too, when compared with 
the far better known and better reported 
situation on land� This notwithstanding, 
it is hard to imagine a more timely and 
well-balanced book� David Stevens, as 
the Royal Australian Navy’s historian, 
was perhaps in a perfect position to take 
on this project, but this should in no 
way diminish what he has achieved� His 
extensive and far-reaching research has 
produced a work that, while entertain-
ing and readable, has sufficient gravitas 
to ensure it will become the defini-
tive work on the subject� This title will 
appeal to all audiences; historians will 
revel in the wealth of archival material 
and private diaries, but this book is far 
more appealing than a mere record of 
historical fact� Anyone who has been to 
sea and experienced life on board ship, 
in particular a warship, will appreciate 
the insights from someone so obviously 
well versed in this area� Drawing heav-
ily on his own seagoing background, 
Stevens presents an engaging narrative 
that gets to the very heart of the unique 
human experience that is life at sea�
In many ways, then, this book represents 
the best of both possible approaches 
to a history of this type: the broad and 
analytical, which sweeps over the major 
maritime events of the time, giving 
the work its much-needed context; 
and the intensely personal, employ-
ing many passages from diaries, letters, 
and reports that together illustrate the 
rich variety of naval life from the deck 
plates to the wardroom� To this end, 
each chapter ends with a short biog-
raphy of an important or interesting 
figure from the preceding pages, which 
both enriches and helps to consolidate 
this comprehensive coverage� The book 
also triumphs in another aspect: by not 
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overlooking the very real administra-
tive challenges the young navy faced in 
trying to establish itself simultaneously 
with the moment of its supreme test: a 
world war at sea� Thus, interspersed with 
coverage of all the important actions at 
sea is a discussion of the myriad sup-
porting activities necessary to develop 
a navy with global reach: the establish-
ment of bases and supply lines; the use 
of native labor; the issues of pay and 
benefits; the challenges of recruiting and 
training; right down to health concerns 
and the treatment of offenders and  
deserters—it is all there� Even the bore-
dom of the long and often fruitless pa-
trols in search of contraband and intel-
ligence, so much a feature of the war at 
sea and yet rarely reported on, is repro-
duced faithfully in an engaging manner�
In the end, one is left to marvel at the 
foresight of those who, all those years 
ago, came up with the “fleet unit” idea, 
as a way for the British dominions to 
contribute to the naval defense of the 
global economic system—something 
that should still resonate today, in this 
new era of naval cooperation� Australia 
alone among them persevered with it, 
and as a result was propelled within a 
few short years into the companionship 
of those nations with true global reach at 
sea� This is an important book because, 
above all else, it is a lasting testament 
to the character of the Australian sailor� 
The hurdles were enormous, but the 
Australians, it seems, always rose to the 
challenges, overcoming them with ease 
under the most trying of circumstances 
—and with an alacrity and charm 
that has endeared them to all�
ANGUS ROSS
O U R  R E V I E W E R S
Connie Frizzell, an information warfare officer and a captain in the U�S� Navy, is a joint mili-
tary professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, and the codirector of the 
College’s Center for Cyber Conflict Studies� She was also a 2012–13 Harvard Kennedy School 
of Government national security fellow�
Thomas J. Gibbons, a retired colonel in the U�S� Army, is currently associate professor of profes-
sional military and graduate education effectiveness at the Naval War College, working for the 
associate provost� Prior to assuming this position he was the senior Army adviser at the College 
and worked in the Joint Military Operations Department� Dr� Gibbons served on active duty in the 
U�S� Army for twenty-nine years�
John T. Kuehn is the General William Stofft Chair for Historical Research at the U�S� Army Com-
mand and General Staff College (CGSC)� He retired from the U�S� Navy in 2004 at the rank of 
commander after twenty-three years of service as a naval flight officer, flying both land- and 
carrier-based aircraft� He has taught a variety of subjects, including military history, at CGSC since 
2000� He has authored Agents of Innovation (2008) and A Military History of Japan: From the Age 
of the Samurai to the 21st Century (2014), and coauthored Eyewitness Pacific Theater (2008) with 
D� M� Giangreco, as well as numerous articles and editorials� He was awarded a Moncado Prize 
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from the Society for Military History in 2011� His latest book, published by Praeger for the two 
hundredth anniversary of the battle of Waterloo, is Napoleonic Warfare: The Operational Art of the 
Great Campaigns (2015)�
Jon Scott Logel is an associate professor at the Naval War College� He conducts applied research in 
the War Gaming Department and teaches Ulysses S� Grant and the Profession of Arms� He is the 
author of the forthcoming Designing Gotham: West Point Engineers and the Rise of Modern New 
York, 1817–1898�
Yvonne R. Masakowski is an associate professor of strategic leadership and leader development at 
the Naval War College� She received a PhD and a master’s degree from the City University of New 
York and a master’s degree from the University of Connecticut� She is a contributing editor to the 
Journal of Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making.
Dr. Ian Ralby is an adjunct professor of maritime law and security at the Africa Center for Strategic 
Studies and nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council� He has extensive experience in 
international and maritime law, and is considered an expert on both the regulation and oversight 
of private security companies, and on maritime security� He holds a BA and an MA from the Uni-
versity of Maryland, Baltimore County, a JD from William and Mary Law School, and an MPhil 
and PhD from the University of Cambridge�
Angus Ross is a retired Royal Navy officer, and a graduate of, and professor of joint military 
operations at, the Naval War College� He received a second MA from Providence College and is 
currently pursuing PhD studies, looking at naval transformation prior to the First World War� His 
recent published works include articles in this journal and others on the dilemma facing both the 
Royal Navy and the U�S� Navy in the wake of the Dreadnought revolution�
Hy S. Rothstein is a senior lecturer, Department of Defense Analysis, and a member of the Center 
on Terrorism and Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School� He has a PhD in interna-
tional relations from the Fletcher School, Tufts University� His research has focused on unconven-
tional warfare, counterinsurgency, psychological warfare, and military deception� He is the author 
of Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare (2006)�
Kevin Rousseau is a student at the U�S� Army School of Advanced Military Studies� He is a retired 
U�S� Army lieutenant colonel and a graduate of the U�S� Military Academy, the Defense Intelligence 
College, the George Mason University School of Law, and the Naval War College Command and 
Staff distance education program�
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IN MY VIEW
SECURING NATO’S WEAKEST FLANK
Sir:
I read the Winter 2016 article by Jonathan Altman, entitled “Russian A2/AD in 
the Eastern Mediterranean: A Growing Risk,” and I would like to highlight the 
urgency of securing NATO’s southern flank. NATO needs a stronger presence 
in the Mediterranean to monitor activities and prevent attacks on its members.
U.S. Chief of Naval Operations Admiral John Richardson has stated that there 
is no plan to bolster scarce U.S. naval resources in the eastern Mediterranean. 
This means NATO must adapt by increasing its presence on its southern flank 
and boosting the military power of existing members to deter aggression in the 
region. Greece is one member nation that could increase its involvement, thereby 
strengthening NATO’s capabilities.
Greece is a key geopolitical point for NATO because it forms the alliance’s 
southern tip, and its large eastern border is exposed to conflicts that unfold in 
the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Athens is a trusted and capable ally. Even 
though the country is facing financial difficulties, it is one of only five NATO 
members that meet the alliance goal of spending two percent of gross domestic 
product on defense, having consistently surpassed the minimum as far back as 
1988.
While the United States has forward-deployed destroyers in Rota, Spain, 
Washington should consider permanently basing an aircraft carrier, destroyers, 
and amphibious ships at Souda Bay on the Greek island of Crete. These forces 
could counter crises, provide more stability, and reinforce allies’ perceptions of 
American might. Crete is closer than Rota to where threats are likely to unfold: 
in the Middle East and North Africa. A Congressional Budget Office report 
states that basing more ships and crews abroad will boost overseas operations on 
a smaller budget.
NATO currently has twelve of its sixteen E-3 airborne warning and control sys-
tem radar planes operating primarily out of the NATO air base in Geilenkirchen, 
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Germany. This limits the availability of airborne surveillance and command, con-
trol, and communications functions for tactical and air-defense forces. Having 
Global Hawks at Souda Bay could boost NATO’s real-time intelligence in theater, 
and a combat search-and-rescue capability on Crete could provide for quick 
responses across Europe, Africa, and the Levant. Military personnel deployed at 
Souda Bay also would be able to further their educations and skill sets by partici-
pating in training and educational activities nearby at the NATO Missile Firing 
Installation, the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Center, and 
other facilities on the island.
When the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, was under attack in 2012, the U.S. 
military was unable to respond for hours. American lives could have been saved 
if the United States had sent aircraft from its Souda Bay naval base—it is located 
only 750 miles from Libya. In the aftermath of that attack, a Marine antiterror-
ism detachment was added at Souda Bay to provide a quick-response capability 
in the region.
Using Souda Bay better is a sound idea, as it is located very close to key danger 
areas. Athens, Washington, and NATO should identify more opportunities to 
work together synergistically and protect peace and commerce in the Mediter-
ranean Sea.
CONSTANCE BAROUDOS
Vice President, Lexington Institute
RESPONSE TO STEVEN WILLS’S “THE EFFECT OF THE GOLDWATER- 
NICHOLS ACT OF 1986 ON NAVAL STRATEGY, 1987–1994”: SOME  
MISSING PIECES
Sir:
Steven Wills provided a very thought-provoking article in the Spring 2016 Naval 
War College Review concerning the Navy’s loss of strategy-making authority ow-
ing to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act (G-N) and the subsequent deterioration 
of the Navy’s corporate ability to craft strategy, because of its inability to generate 
a corps of officers with repeated tours in strategy-making billets.
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However, G-N was not the only factor at work. A missing piece in Wills’s ar-
ticle is the recognition that necessity is not only the mother of invention; it is the 
genesis of strategy. That is, the 1990s featured the lack of a compelling strategic 
problem that needed to be solved. Without such a problem, attempting to craft 
global strategy is akin to trying to clap with one hand. The 1980s Maritime Strat-
egy was a solution to a strategic problem that arose in the 1970s. At the time, the 
Soviet Navy had significantly expanded and the U.S. Navy came to the realization 
(in part through war gaming at the Naval War College [NWC]) that a global war 
with the Soviet Union might not go nuclear automatically. Simply shepherding 
reinforcement shipping across the Atlantic was not enough; the Navy had to find 
a way to take the offensive and help alleviate pressure on the NATO central front. 
This created a need for a global conventional naval strategy. Although the decade 
of the ’90s had its share of turbulence, the Navy could fall back on its well-oiled 
tactical doctrine to deal with the challenges of the period.
However, it was a time of force reductions and competition among the services 
for a share of the shrinking defense budget. What became critical for the Navy 
was effective budget justification—the forte of N8. Thus, although N3/N5 was 
starved of experienced strategists such as Captains Swartz, Harris, and Diamond, 
N8 was populated by top-notch analysts such as Captain Arthur “Trip” Barber. In 
this environment, N8 became dominant and insulated from N3/N5.
It appeared that in 2006 there was an incipient revival of the capability under 
the leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan as N3/N5 during Admiral Mike 
Mullen’s reign as Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). A major reason for this was 
that Admiral Mullen had a global strategic problem to solve. The 9/11 attacks 
generated a new global, maritime, strategic problem: how to prevent terrorists 
from using the seas to mount attacks on the U.S. homeland and those of our 
allies. The key to solving it was establishing a global partnership for maritime 
security—a challenge that was both larger than the perspectives of the regional 
unified combatant commanders and beyond the ken or interest of the Joint Staff.
Not having an in-place strategic apparatus to solve the problem, Admiral Mul-
len did two things: he turned to NWC, and he established a small, ad hoc task 
force inside N51 composed of sharp, relatively junior officers. As the strategy 
project developed, NWC faculty would conduct a program of research, gaming, 
and outreach to create the underlying logic of a new strategy, and the N51 team 
would articulate that logic by drafting a strategy document. The product of this 
collaboration was the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” 
(CS21). This document was not itself the strategy, which was essentially to court 
foreign navies in a way that would secure their cooperation, but it was decisive 
in making the strategy work. It catalyzed widespread global naval cooperation 
that did indeed go a long way toward solving Admiral Mullen’s strategic problem.
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Concurrently with attempting to solve the strategic problem at hand, Vice 
Admiral Morgan also tried to establish an institutionalized strategy process 
within the office of the CNO (OPNAV). The process involved a formalized flow 
of events—meetings, reviews, games, etc.—that crossed directorate boundaries 
and also drew in external parties such as NWC. An instruction was drafted, but 
it was never signed; in this writer’s view, it foundered because of opposition from 
N8, which stood to lose its dominance, and Vice Admiral Morgan’s retirement.
In 2012, shortly after becoming CNO, Admiral Greenert requested a “refresh” 
of CS21. Such a project was certainly warranted, as global geopolitical conditions 
had significantly changed from 2007. However, still lacking any viable strategy-
making apparatus, he turned once more to NWC for assistance. However, this 
time, rather than a full research and analysis project, the refresh was supposed 
to employ a rather short-fused drafting process, producing something within a 
couple of months. NWC complied and duly produced a draft.
However, with no focused strategy team in place, and with the new and po-
litically charged concept of air-sea battle ricocheting around the Pentagon, the 
draft got put on the back burner. The lack of a well-defined strategy problem at 
the time also contributed to inhibiting the creation of a new document. China 
and Russia were clearly becoming threats, but the exact nature of a global naval 
strategic problem was not yet clear. Admiral Greenert over the next two years 
substituted his mantra of “warfighting first, operate forward, be ready” for a 
new strategy document. Within OPNAV, strategy development fell prey to end-
less redrafting. Finally, after several years of such activity, the Navy produced a 
“refresh” of CS21.
However, its relationship to the 2007 document was in name only, the new so-
called CS21R being (in this writer’s view) essentially a pleading document aimed 
at Congress for a larger Navy. To the extent that the Navy’s strategic problem in 
2014 was a shrinking fleet owing to the Budget Control Act (sequestration), the 
new document could be seen as supporting a strategy of influencing Congress. 
However, it was not produced by a cadre of experienced strategists, nor was it the 
product of a formal and disciplined institutional process.
The new CNO, Admiral John Richardson, has inherited a more clearly defined 
and compelling strategic problem of global proportions that will require of the 
Navy discerning strategic analysis. While the global maritime security problem 
the 2007 CS21 addressed is, at least for the time being, apparently under control, 
the growth of increasingly assertive Chinese and Russian naval power along with 
a dire budget crunch at home poses a global naval strategic problem of unprec-
edented scope and complexity. Not only must the Navy reengineer its forces and 
doctrine to deal with such new threats as antiship ballistic missiles; it must also 
find a way to maintain effective presence in three or more widely separated areas 
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of the Eurasian littoral to fight terrorism, support allies, and assemble a global 
naval partnership against major-power expansionism.
Admiral Richardson has promulgated a guidance document entitled “A De-
sign for Maintaining Maritime Superiority.” It is not a strategy in the traditional 
sense, but it establishes a set of criteria and lines of effort for the Navy to work 
toward. The key concept embedded in it is fleet design. Given the restrictions on 
the Navy’s authority (and ability) to craft actual strategies in the manner of the 
1980s Maritime Strategy that Wills discusses, work on fleet design appears to be 
an appropriate avenue of strategic analysis.
In the early 2000s, the threat of terrorists supporting another 9/11-style attack 
on the United States via maritime smuggling created the need for a particular 
kind of naval strategy. Today, the combination of factors just mentioned poses 
another global strategic naval problem that needs to be solved. For various rea-
sons, neither N8 nor N3/N5 is capable of solving it on its own. The CNO needs 
to strengthen the strategy-development capabilities of the Navy Staff. This would 
include establishing a mechanism whereby N3/N5 and N8 would work more 
synergistically, bringing the right officers into those directorates and lengthen-
ing tours there, especially for leadership. In addition, he must create an effective 
collaboration with a range of outside organizations, most directly NWC and the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).
The Navy is also working to produce a new cadre of strategists. Both NWC and 
NPS have developed new, more-extensive programs to provide an educational 
foundation for officers specializing in strategy. Whether this will bear fruit in 
the future is uncertain, the strictures of G-N still being in place. If Wills is right 
(and I believe he is), without the ability to detail officers to multiple tours in a 
well-established strategy office, this education will go for naught. The CNO also 
disestablished the Strategic Studies Group, a move that has generated quite a bit 
of discussion among naval cognoscenti. I am not privy to his reasons, but I would 
guess that he is looking to put some other mechanism in place that can generate 
robust thinking about fleet design.
A second missing piece that Wills touches on but does not develop is the struc-
ture of the Unified Command Plan. In addition to the current strategic challenges 
just mentioned, any new Navy strategy will have to contend with two other effects 
of G-N: the many joint area of responsibility (AOR) boundaries that have been 
drawn in the water, and the joint process of global force distribution.
In World War II, Admiral Ernest King, as both CNO and commander in chief, 
had wide latitude for changing the longitude of U.S. naval forces; he could, within 
the general strategic guidelines of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, move Navy 
forces between the Atlantic and Pacific theaters, and, within the Pacific theater, 
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allocate forces between MacArthur and Nimitz. For King, the world ocean was a 
unified theater of war.
Today there is no naval officer with such authority. The Navy’s precious few 
ships are allocated via a joint consensus process whose inherent logic seems to 
be to oil the squeakiest regional wheel. This does not allow easily for the applica-
tion of a global naval strategy. At best, the CNO can bring the logic of a global 
naval strategy—if he has one—to the meeting. Second, since the world ocean 
is fragmented by joint AORs, the ability of modern naval forces to synchronize 
fluidly across hemispheric swaths of ocean—an emerging operational necessity 
—is compromised. These obstacles to the efficient and strategic application of 
American sea power in peace and war are not likely to be removed by legislation. 
Therefore a new Navy strategy—a new fleet design—will have to account for 
them in some way.
Wills is right in everything he says, and he presents a good piece of history, of 
which modern-day officers of all ranks should be aware. However, as discussed 
here, there is more to the story, whose plot continues to unfold. It now falls to Ad-
miral Richardson to resurrect somehow the Navy’s ability to develop and execute 
a new form of global naval strategy.
ROBERT C. RUBEL
Captain, USN (Ret.)
Professor Emeritus, U.S. Naval War College
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson of the Naval War College is the Program Man-
ager for the Chief of Naval Operations Professional Reading Program.
[W]e must keep uppermost in mind that leadership remains our most 
important task.
ADMIRAL ARLEIGH BURKE, JANUARY 1959
n January 2013, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) released the Navy Leader 
Development Strategy (NLDS), which outlines the key elements of professional 
development for all sailors, from E-1 to O-10. This top-level emphasis echoes the 
sentiment of former CNO Admiral Arleigh Burke, as quoted above. The strategy 
defines a career-long Navy Leader Development Continuum that integrates four 
core elements: experience, education, training, and personal development. Since 
its launch, the NLDS has been embraced widely as a clear and concise tool that 
individuals and commands can use to help craft development paths tailored to 
their specific needs. In January 2016, CNO Admiral John Richardson maintained 
the momentum by calling on all hands to “strengthen and broaden leadership 
development programs to renew and reinforce the Navy Team’s dedication to the 
naval profession.”
The NLDS identifies personal development as one of the four core elements 
of leader development, and recommends that all sailors engage in professional 
reading to improve their knowledge of Navy traditions, roles, and missions. The 
CNO Professional Reading Program has purchased and distributed leadership-
relevant books throughout the fleet, including the following (several of which 
were profiled separately in previous “Reflections on Reading” Columns):
• A Sailor’s History of the U.S. Navy, by Lieutenant Commander Thomas J.  
Cutler, USN (Ret.), speaks eloquently about the value of studying the past to 
illuminate the future and the importance of understanding the heritage of 
one’s chosen profession. Award-winning author Cutler provides a series of 
interesting and informative vignettes about the honor, courage, and com-
mitment of our Navy’s remarkable sailors. In the preface he argues that, 
I
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regardless of how busy sailors may become in dealing with the pressing issues 
of the day, they are well served by finding some time to consider the path that 
led them to their current situations, and that a knowledge of history often 
shows that the solution to today’s problems may have roots in the past.
• In the Shadow of Greatness, by Naval Academy graduates Joshua Welle, John
Ennis, Katherine Kranz, and Graham Plaster, is a fascinating book that
provides a glimpse into the lives of some members of the post-9/11 genera-
tion of warriors. The stories drawn from the Naval Academy class of 2002 are
representative of an entire generation of sailors and officers who volunteered
for service with the knowledge that they would serve in combat. Each story
provides a glimpse into the lives of modern-day military officers who faced
unique challenges, yet succeeded.
• Navigating the Seven Seas, by retired master chief Melvin G. Williams Sr. and
Vice Admiral Melvin G. Williams Jr., showcases important leadership lessons
from the first African American father and son to have served at the top in
the U.S. Navy. In addition to the engaging biographical content of the book,
the authors identify what they call “the Seven Cs of Leadership”: character,
courage, competence, commitment, caring, community, and communicating.
Each quality is explained through vivid examples that will help guide all sail-
ors to successful lives and Navy careers.
• Leading with the Heart: Coach K’s Successful Strategies for Basketball, Business,
and Life, by Mike Krzyzewski and Donald T. Phillips, provides entertaining
and informative lessons on how to build a culture of success. Duke Univer-
sity basketball coach Mike “Coach K” Krzyzewski’s story is a great example
of living the American dream through hard work and dedication. The son
of working-class Polish immigrants, Krzyzewski earned a scholarship to the
U.S. Military Academy at West Point, where he first played and later coached
basketball. His secrets to success are communication, trust, collective re-
sponsibility, caring, and pride. The parallels to a military leader’s challenges,
such as building teams, dealing with high organizational turnover rates, and
overcoming defeat, are readily apparent.
• The Trident: The Forging and Reforging of a Navy SEAL Leader, by Jason Red-
man and John Bruning, tells the story of Lieutenant Redman’s odyssey as a
Navy SEAL and wounded warrior. His experiences as an enlisted man who
rose through the ranks and earned a commission demonstrate the inspir-
ing courage, dedication, and commitment he showed throughout his career.
Redman received severe wounds in a firefight in Iraq, then earned national
attention when he posted a sign on his hospital door at Bethesda warning all
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who entered not to feel sorry for him because of his wounds. In his introduc-
tion to the book, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates writes, “This 
story, though, is not just about a SEAL on the Iraqi battlefield, but a SEAL at 
war with himself and his ultimate victory. I believe his story will inspire the 
reader, just as it did me.”
There is no single path toward leadership excellence, but reading about the 
successes and challenges of other leaders can help shape your personal leadership 
style. Former president Harry Truman put it best: “Not all readers are leaders, but 
all leaders are readers!”
JOHN E. JACKSON
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